




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VIEW
OF LAMBERT'S "NOTES
ON INGERSOLL"

BY
HELEN M. LUCAS
"

NEW YORK
THE TRUTH SEEKER COMPANY

1909

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EXPLANATORY.

This was begun with the idea of proving to Catholics that the real Ingersoll was very different from the false one of the "Notes"; but Mr. Lambert's method made it impossible to discuss the matter in such a way as to leave any chance of Catholics' reading it without anger. So the plan of giving as true an exposition as possible of the "Notes" for anyone to read who would was carried out as the best that could be done in the case. A correct idea of a man who has been misrepresented will gradually spread among all kinds of people if *numbers* perform their duty to let the truth be known by a word, quotation, newspaper article, letter, or book as the occasion comes. This opinion is the reason for offering you this View.

A friend advised me not to take the trouble to write on this subject, because, she said, it had been completely discussed at the time the Lambert book was published. But that was not the case among those I knew, and *very* few of those I meet now know anything about it.

I hope better writers than I am will be induced to help to give a more perfect understanding of Lambert and Ingersoll.



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VIEW OF LAMBERT'S NOTES.

The Ingersoll-Black Discussion and Some of the Ensuing Treatises.

In 1881 Mr. Allen Thorndyke Rice, editor of the North American Review, asked Col. Robert G. Ingersoll to write for the Review on the subject, "Is All of the Bible Inspired?" and asked Judge Jeremiah S. Black to write an answer. The articles were written and published, and Mr. Ingersoll answered Mr. Black, but Mr. Black refused to answer Mr. Ingersoll.

The introduction to Mr. Lambert's "Notes on Ingersoll" begins with the charge, which had been already disproved, that Mr. Ingersoll prevented the appearance of an answer from Mr. Black. The denial of the editor of the Review is sufficient answer to the charge. To the denial the editor adds the explanation that he urged Mr. Black to answer; that Mr. Ingersoll was ignorant of any dissatisfaction on the part of Mr. Black until after his own answer had appeared, and was anxious that Mr. Black should rejoin.

Although no one was found to answer Ingersoll

Mr. G. P. Fisher wrote an article in favor of the Christian religion, which was published in February, 1882. It began: "I comply with the request of the North American Review that I should write an article on the Christian religion. Not being ambitious to shine in the character of a *malus haereticorum*, I shall not enter the lists as a combatant in the debate which has lately been waged in its pages." In the last paragraph he says: "Should anyone be moved to contradict statements in the preceding article, I shall not, partly for the reason stated at the outset, feel obliged to make reply. I have no fear that candid readers will infer from my silence that the propositions which have been stated above admit of no further defense." "Ingersoll As He Is" is my authority for the information that he wrote with the stipulation that Ingersoll should not be permitted to answer him.

We have the "Notes on Ingersoll," a dissertation on the discussion of Ingersoll and Black, by Rev. L. A. Lambert, a Catholic priest. In answer we have an admirable book by Mr. B. W. Lacy, who says on his title page he writes "by invitation of Rev. Father Lambert." With easy good nature he presently, in his introduction, quotes the invitation, which ends: "We hold ourselves responsible to him" (Ingersoll) "and to all the glib little whiffets of his shallow school."

By way of answer to Mr. Lacy, Mr. Lambert published a book, "Tactics of Infidels," which should be answered fully, not characterized in a single sentence here.

Of course, Mr. Ingersoll has never answered Mr. Lambert, because the only course for a gentleman to take was to pass on. If some one should accost you on the street, shaking his fists in your face, shouting opprobrious epithets, calling you "idiot," "liar," "fool or dishonest, you may take your choice," charging you with "egotism," "sophistry," and "brazen audacity," saying you stop your "clatter," and pause in your "ribaldry" (all of these and more, quite as insulting, are in the short introduction to the "Notes"), would you not pass on? And a "debate" of such a character in print would be still more irrational,

Misleading insinuations and contemptuous epithets, which occur so often in the "Notes," lead readers who are barred by their religious rulers from seeing the other side to suppose that Mr. Ingersoll is an unintellectual buffoon.

Pointing out the difference between right and wrong is not personal abuse. Criticizing admitted atrocities is not "wounding and lacerating the hearts and faith and feelings of those by whose tolerance he is permitted to outrage the common

sense and sentiment of Christendom," as Lambert charges.

Showing reasons for thinking that barbarous passages of the Bible were the work of barbarous people and not God-given rules for our guidance is not considered by all a process of laceration of hearts, but by some, at least, a work of humanity. As for tolerance—Catholics uphold the old Spanish Inquisition. As for ridicule of religion—I have heard very religious people ridicule, and sometimes misrepresent, other people's religion. The rule is to hold only one's own religion sacred.

In trying to belittle Mr. Ingersoll the author praises those others, from whom he wishes us to think Mr. Ingersoll has copied; ascribing "intense earnestness and masculine vigor" to "Tom" Paine, "learning and wit" to Voltaire, "philosophical penetration" to Hobbes and Bolingbroke, "analytical faculty" to Herbert Spencer, "industry" to Tyndall and Huxley, and "comprehensiveness and incisive logic" to John Stuart Mill. This brings up the question of how he would characterize Ingersoll if he wished to write disparagingly of Hobbes or any of the others mentioned above, and specify their lacking attributes. "All these," wrote Mr. Lambert, "are masters in their way, whom Mr. Ingersoll has not succeeded in imitating or understanding. Wanting in originality he draws liberally from the wri-

tings of Paine, Voltaire, Bolingbroke, and others for his points and arguments."

Points and arguments are very good things to have in books. If Mr. Lambert had only put down the names of the authors from which the points and arguments were drawn when he quoted from Ingersoll maybe we might stumble on an explanation of how they could have been imitated without being understood. Anyhow, points and arguments are very much to be preferred to abusive personalities.

Infidels, says the author, have said nothing new since the time of Celsus, Porphyry and Julian, forgetting that their arguments are often based on discoveries made since the time of the old authors he mentions.

Mr. Lambert says the "moral code of Moses is as impervious to his attacks as are the pyramids of Egypt," etc. It might be answered, it is not now in force in civilized countries. People are now fined and imprisoned for selling diseased meat to anybody, foreign or native; and giving it to the stranger within our gates is considered just as criminal. It is hoped that witchcraft will never again be punished by death. We may say the same of the crime of disobedience of children, and Sabbath breaking. Even the Jews, who still keep the Sabbath as a holy day, would pick up sticks if they

needed them, tho, according to the Bible, God, when questioned particularly, pronounced the sentence of stoning to death. Perhaps he neglected to prescribe the penalty when giving the laws thru Moses; anyhow the Jews did ask him what they should do with the guilty Sabbath breaker. Slavery, which was established and regulated in the Pentateuch, is now abhorred by many people—many good people, tho the doctrine that it was a crime was started, Mr. Black said in his debate with Ingersoll, by “the adherents of a political faction of this country,” who were “not a very respectable portion” of the “civilized world.” Also, his faith and reason both assured him “that the infallible God proceeded upon good grounds when he authorized slavery in Judea.” You see, Mr. Black *gives reasons* for thinking slavery right; we should honor him for that, altho many of us do not think his reasons convincing.

Mr. Lambert. The Christian is not bound, at the call of Mr. Ingersoll or anyone else, to reprint proofs; that Mr. Ingersoll's ignorance of those arguments is no reason why they should be repeated; that it is Mr. Ingersoll's article which is on trial, and he proposes to consider that.

Comment. How can the article be dealt with leaving out of consideration the subject of the article, which, of course, is the subject of the whole

debate? Why write a book on any subject if reasoning is to have no place in it? He says that proofs of what Mr. Ingersoll cannot believe are on record and have never been answered by Mr. Ingersoll's ancestors in Atheism and unbelief, from Anaximander, Epicurus and Lucretius down to d'Holbach, Leland, Cabanis, Hobbes, and Paine. Such valuable proofs, and Mr. Lambert will not give us even one!

THE ETERNITY OF THE UNIVERSE.

Mr. Lambert begins chapter i by quoting Mr. Ingersoll: "The universe, according to my idea, always was and forever will be."

Lambert.—"When you say, 'according to my idea,' you leave the inference that the theory of an eternal universe never entered the mind of man until your brain acquired its full development. Of course you did not intend to mislead or deceive. You simply meant that your idea of the universe is like most modern plays adapted from the French or elsewhere. Your philosophy, like those plays, wants the freshness and flavor of originality, and suffers from bad translation. The old originals from which you copy that it incumbent on them to give a reason, or, at least, a show of reason, 'for their idea.' In this enlightened age you do not

deem this necessary. It is sufficient for you to formulate your 'idea.' To attempt to prove it would be beneath you. Is this the reason why you do not advance one single argument to prove the eternity of matter? Have you got so far as to believe that your 'idea' has the force of an argument, or that the science of philosophy must be readjusted because you happen to have an 'idea'?"

Comment. The first and second sentences of the comment by this language critic contradict each other, and the text quoted gives no grounds for either sentence. "According to my idea" is the same thing as "That is only what I think; I may be wrong." What follows shows that Ingersoll meant the idea was not authoritative, for he goes on: "On this subject nothing can be positively known."

He *did advance* argument in proof of his idea of the eternity of matter: observation of Nature.

To this the author of the Notes opposes his idea, without quotation marks, which means that *his* ideas are really ideas.

Lambert. "That which is eternal is infinite. It must be infinite because, if eternal, it can have nothing to limit it.

"But that which is infinite must be infinite in every way. If limited in any way, it would not be infinite.

"Now matter is limited. It is composed of parts

and composition is limitation. It is subject to change, and change involves limitation. Change supposes succession, and there can be no succession without a beginning, and, therefore, limitation. Thus far we are borne out by reason, experience, and common sense."

Then—

"Matter is limited, and, therefore, finite; and if finite in anything, finite in everything; and if finite in everything, therefore not eternal."

Comment. It is supposed the author spread this out so much because he considered it so weighty.

WORDS—"LAW" AND "FORCE."

Ingersoll. "We know nothing of what we call the laws of nature, except as we gather the idea of law from the uniformity of phenomena springing from like conditions. To make myself clear: Water always runs down hill."

Lambert. "We acquire a knowledge of Nature by observing the effects of the forces of nature; but we do not 'gather an idea of law' from a study of those forces and their effects. The idea of law in general is, and must be, prior to the idea of particular laws." (He illustrates by instancing a stone, which, thrown up, comes down again.) "The mind here does not 'gather an idea of law,' but begins in-

stinctively" (he says instinctively) "to seek *the* law in the case. To seek for *a* law presupposes the idea of law, for we do not seek for that of which we have no idea.

"To talk about 'gathering an idea of law from phenomena' is unphilosophical. We conclude, or deduce laws from phenomena, but we cannot 'gather an idea' of law from anybody. To gather an idea is like gathering a huckleberry or an Ingersoll. It is not customary to gather a unit. You confound idea with judgment or deduction."

Comment. Judgment or deduction gives you the idea. In other words, you gather the idea by your judgment of phenomena, or deduction from it. No one confines all words to one meaning. Webster defines gather: "To derive, as an inference; to collect, as a conclusion, from circumstances that suggest, or arguments that prove; to infer; to conclude."

Perhaps one is deficient in humor who fails to see that a joke like gathering a huckleberry or an Ingersoll is worth considerable sacrifice of sense, time and point.

Lambert. Ingersoll is unfortunate in saying water always runs down hill; that running down hill is an exception to the general action of water; that its general tendency is upward and outward; instances steam, vapor, dew; the effect of the equator

and mountains; the effect of the rotation of the earth, and of the earth's being a spheroid. "You saw somewhere a bit of water running down hill and 'gathered the idea' that it always does so."

Comment. After this discourse a man whose mind is on the argument of the question under discussion by Mr. Ingersoll and Mr. Black—the eternity of the universe—would be apt to say he understood perfectly what Mr. Ingersoll meant by water always runs down hill, but how can an extended essay to show that it does not run down hill affect the question at issue?

Compare Ingersoll's clear and concise statement with the pages urging that water very seldom runs down hill. Thru the "Notes" there are many pages of language criticism, instead of arguments touching the subject of debate.

Lambert (continuing the subject of the water's running down hill). "Your view was too narrow and local. It wanted breadth and comprehensiveness. You misinterpret nature, as you misunderstood and misinterpreted Moses and revealed religion. You have proved yourself an incompetent interpreter of nature, and you cannot be relied on when you presume to criticise and condemn or deny that which is above nature."

Comment. Suppose Ingersoll had written the pages, partly quoted, partly summarized above;

terms as polite as pedantic or wordy would never have been applied to him by a critic like the writer of the "Notes."

There are four or five more pages, similar to the lecture given above, to the effect that Ingersoll had confounded law and force with some malignant purpose in view, tho he doesn't hint what that purpose is. On page 28 attention is called to some italicized proposition which seems to me to be hard to understand:

Lambert. "There is an inherent principle in the forces of nature which causes them to act in the same manner under the same circumstances. This however, is not a law, but the nature of the forces themselves. The laws of nature, then, as commonly understood, are *the uniform action of natural forces, expressed in words.* When physicists speak of the laws of nature, they refer to the forces of which the laws are the verbal expression. They suppose philosophers have sufficient intelligence to understand this fact; and yet it appears that they are sometimes mistaken. In all you say on this subject you confound law with force; whether this is done intentionally or thru ignorance I need not stop to consider."

Comment. The definition of the laws of nature which is printed in italics—*the uniform action of natural forces*—so far seems to me to show what

I have been thinking all along, that the two phrases, *laws of nature* and *uniform action of natural forces*, mean exactly the same thing; but if so, why all these pages of criticism of the first phrase? Why this charge of confounding the two for some dishonest purpose, or, as appears on page 28, of confounding them intentionally or thru ignorance? Particularly hard to understand is the phrase which follows the ones just compared—*expressed in words*. How can we express in words the uniform action of natural law? Does he mean that “uniform action of natural forces” comes as near expressing the idea as we can by words? If it is expressed in words in the same sense in which the rest of the book is expressed in words, why put it in italics? Why say expressed in words at all? Could it be the italics were put there as an assurance that the thot is all right—that it does mean something, even if we can’t make out what it is? The hope arises that if it had been expressed in large capitals we might have seen the meaning at once. But now the fear arises that trying to comprehend the idea of force expressed in words is too strong for an ordinary brain.

The next sentence says the same thing with only a slight change in the wording: “When physicists speak of the laws of nature, they refer to the forces of which the laws are but the verbal expression.”

You see it is the very same in meaning, but what is the meaning? The next sentence, "They supposed philosophers had sufficient intelligence to understand; but it appears that they are mistaken," has not crushed out the desire to fathom Mr. Lambert's Bunsbyan thots expressed in a flood of words.

The closing words of chapter ii still further roil the flood: "Your quibbles on the word 'law' have been already exposed. *Force* is the cause of the phenomena. The *law* is the mere statement of what the force will do in any given case."

To see if my little intellect has quite ceased to act I turn back to Ingersoll and read, "Law does not cause the phenomenon, but the phenomenon causes the idea of law in our minds." That seems quite clear to me, and I take courage to go on to chapter iii (16th edition), which Mr. Lambert begins with a quotation from Ingersoll.

CREATED UNIVERSE; OR, SELF-EXISTENT UNIVERSE.

Ingersoll. "To put a God back of the universe compels us to admit that there was a time when nothing existed but this God; that this God had lived from eternity in an infinite vacuum, and in absolute idleness. The mind of every thoughtful man is

forced to one of these two conclusions: either that the universe is self-existent, or that it was created by a self-existent being. To my mind, there are far more difficulties in the second hypothesis than in the first."

[In his answer Mr. Lambert separates this into three parts. As the answer to the first half of the first sentence is pretty long I will summarize part of it:]

Lambert. "It compels us to admit nothing of the kind. The eternal God can place an eternal act. His creative act could, therefore, be coeternal with his being. The end of the act, that is, creation, could be coexistent with the eternal act, and, therefore, eternal." He says it could be so, Christianity does not say that it is so, but reason teaches that it could have been. But if it is not, Ingersoll's conclusion does not follow. "For, in this hypothesis as time began with creation and is the measure of its endurance, it follows that before creation was time was not. Hence, God did not exist in time before creation. God IS. To him there is neither past, present, nor future, only eternity. God is alone before creation was."

Comment. That is a pretty ingenious way of saying God could create himself and the universe at the same time, but if he didn't he didn't exist before

creation. But there is the sentence, "God is alone before creation was."

To one who was not educated in a theological school of any kind it seems as if that last that knocked out the other two, or as if either of the other two could knock out the last one.

And it seems as if the past, present, and future make up eternity.

Lambert. "But granting that God is alone before creation was, what follows?" Here he quotes the last half of the first sentence of his text, and answers, "If God lived in it it could not have been a vacuum. A vacuum is that in which *nothing* is. In the hypothesis that God is, he is something; he is infinite, and an infinite vacuum is infinite nonsense. But the word has a gross, material sense, and you used it for a purpose."

Comment. Let us see about the infinite nonsense; what does the Bible say? It seems strange to me that Mr. Lambert did not quote the story of creation from it, instead of taking so much pains to give a different explanation.

Genesis has it: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, and the earth was without form and void" (a vacuum) "and darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters."

As that was before creation the waters did not

have to be created; they were already (placed?) in the vacuum! Is it possible that the waters created God? All that he had to do with them was to divide them and put the firmament between them. "Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters." This account says, "Let there be." It does not say who accomplished the division; it is supposed to come simply by the order, without anyone to do it but God. Anyhow there is no question about the making of the firmament. The Bible says God made it and "divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which were above the firmament." A very strange thing about it is that the account reads as if it were made after it was put in the midst of the waters. Then God said, "Let the waters be gathered together in one place and let the dry land appear." The problem of gathering them into one place without disturbing the firmament which divided them into two parts must have been a difficult one; but everything is possible with God, and it was done. "On the fifth day God said let there be lights—(right here my mind cleared up a little, and the conviction came that of course God was talking to himself when he said, "Let there be," etc. I don't see why I should have been puzzled over that). He said, "Let there be lights in the firmament." Of course there was

no danger that the waters under or above the firmament would put out the lights. "The greater light to rule the day and the lesser light to rule the night, and he made the stars also." Now that is very interesting. It is a wonder that Mr. Lambert did not let the inspired volume explain the creation, especially as it was already written. Even the mention of book, chapter, and verse would do, as Bibles are accessible to every one. According to his belief the Bible is the infallible word of God, of which he is an infallible interpreter.

But, wait a minute. Perhaps it is as the infallible interpreter that he explains that God can place an eternal act, etc. No, that cannot be either, for he does not settle the question in debate; he says only that Ingersoll is wrong. The only affirmations of his own belief that he settles positively are that "God did not exist in time before creation," and "God is alone before creation was." How would that sound without the words "in time"? But it would not do to leave them out, for the author's words must be given correctly. Notice, God did not exist before creation, God did exist before creation.

"But the word vacuum has a gross material sense, and you used it for a purpose," said Mr. Lambert.

His meaning must be that Ingersoll used it in a

gross material sense for a bad purpose. According to the dictionary and common usage, vacuum is simply an empty space; this leaves out all considerations of arguments of scholars as to whether there can be any empty space (vacuum) or not; it also leaves out the seeming contradiction of the statement that the earth before creation was void (vacuum), and yet had water in it, and also had the spirit of God moving on the face of the waters. I see no way of getting a hint of any kind of bad purpose for which the word vacuum could be used. The words "gross material sense" gives no light on the subject. It seems as if Ingersoll used the word just as Mr. Lambert's argument shows he used it, meaning emptiness, tho Mr. Lambert thinks he is wrong, for "in the hypothesis that God is he is something." Well, we would never suppose that Mr. Lambert took the gross material sense to mean God, even if he had not shown that he believed Ingersoll meant simply emptiness.

While weighing in my mind the relative merits of two courses of action to get me out of the difficulty of understanding how the word vacuum could be used in a gross material sense: whether to advertise for an explanation of this difficult passage, or to write to Mr. Lambert admitting that I need instruction, any suggestion from others will be thankfully received.

In answer to the greater difficulty in the second hypothesis, Mr. Lambert says that it is a pity Ingersoll didn't take time and space to weigh those difficulties. It seems to me his arguments preceding and following the remark are exactly on those points, while Mr. Lambert contents himself with reiterating, by way of answer, that our minds are finite; we cannot know God absolutely, but we know with certainty that he is, and explaining the beliefs of the Gnostics and Pantheists.

EQUAL RIGHTS OF ALL TO EXPRESS THOTS ON THE INFINITE.

Ingersoll. "What we know of the infinite is almost infinitely limited, but little as we know, all have an equal right to express their honest *thot*."

Lambert. "Has any man the right, common sense being the judge, to talk about that of which his knowledge is almost infinitely limited? All may have an *equal* right to give their honest *thot*, but none have the right to give their honest *thot* on all subjects and under all circumstances. Common sense and decency forbid it. The honesty of a *thot* does not give weight or importance or truth to it. If so, lunatics would be the best of reasoners, for none are more honest in their *thots* than they. *Thot* must be judged with reference to its truth,

and not with reference to the honesty of him who thinks it. This pl a of honesty in thinking is a justification of every error and crime, for we must, in the very nature of the case, take the thinker's word for the honesty of his thot. Guiteau, if we can believe him, expressed his honest thot by means of an English bulldog revolver, and, if your theory be true, he had a right to do it.

"The right to give an honest thot implies the right to realize that thot in action and habit. If it means less than this, it means the right to gabble like an idiot. I assume that it is not this latter right you claim. Then, in claiming the right to give your honest thot, you claim to realize that thot in act and practice, and cause it, as far as you can, to penetrate, and obtain in human society. If your claim for liberty of thot means less than this, it is the veriest delusion.

"I take it, then, that in claiming the right to give your honest thot, you claim the right to promulgate that thot, and to put it in practice in the affairs of life. Now, in view of this claim of yours, I ask, by what right you interfere with the slaveholder's honest thot, or the Mormon's honest thot? Your plea for the right of expressing honest thot is a miserable pretense, or else by it you mean that those only who *agree with you* have the right of expressing it in word or action. The doctrines of our

loquacious liberals, when analyzed, will be found to mean this and nothing more."

Comment. Does this mean that Mr. Ingersoll has not the right to talk because his knowledge of the infinite is limited, while it is different with his critic? No; for he admits all have an *equal* right, tho he limits it to certain subjects and certain times. The correct inference might be that Ingersoll had no right to express his thoughts on the creation of the universe in a public debate; but carrying that out might lead some people to believe that the other side could be barred. Further along we find that it is only the truth which can, by right, be spoken. Who is to be the judge as to whether it is the truth or not before it is expressed? Should it be privately submitted to an opponent before it is published, and suppressed if not true, in the opinion of the exponent of opposite views? Would Mr. Lambert be willing to submit his thots to this text and abide by the judgment given? Perhaps he would say that everything affecting faith and morals should be submitted to the decision of an infallible teacher; almost everything has some bearing on morals and the church has shown that many interesting subjects are inimical to faith; witness, geography, astronomy, chemistry, philosophy, history, literature, and politics.

Here he expresses his thot that according to Mr.

Ingersoll's theory Guiteau had a right to express his thot by means of an English bulldog revolver; if not, it means to gabble like an idiot. Let us shorten that for a clear view. Ingersoll's idea of the right to express thots on the universe means Guiteau had a right to shoot Garfield, or he gabbles like an idiot, because the right to express thot implies the right to realize it in action and habit. Supposing that is an honest thot, admitting that its elegance or inelegance does not affect the undeniable right of expression, its truth is questionable, and if it is not true Mr. Lambert's own rule would justify its suppression. But let it stand (against him), for liberals, loquacious or reticent, do not wish to restrict thot even when expressed in the style of Mr. Lambert.

Does my right to say God can place an eternal act, or to say I cannot conceive an eternal act, carry with it the right of assassination? Many people would draw a line between an expression of opinion on a self-existent or created universe and murder, and would never see the slightest connection between expression of the opinion and such an act.

Let us hear how Mr. Lambert would realize any opinion of the universe in action and habit. He gives his opinion, without expressing it in action and habit, that Ingersoll's "plea for the right of expressing thot is a miserable pretense, or else by it

you" (Ingersoll) "mean that only those who *agree with you* have the right of expressing it in word or action. The doctrines of our loquacious liberals, when analyzed, will be found to mean precisely this and nothing more."

In short, Mr. Lambert's argument seems to be: People do not have the right to express thots on the universe, for that right carries with it the right to murder. Therefore, he has no right to give the opinions he has been giving or any other opinions, for he has no right to murder. What does he really think on this subject? That no one has a right to have thots?

Can anyone else interpret the expression of belief that "*all*" have a right to express thot, to mean "*only those agreeing with me*" have the right?

As for loquacious liberals, if there is one liberal who fills pages with obscure, unmeaning, contradictory dissertations, who writes paragraphs of scornful vituperation of a blameless character, leaving the subject he pretends to discuss untouched, let him be discountenanced by other liberals, and let his friends try to lead him to better ways.

DESIGN ARGUMENT.

Lambert. "As Mr. Black did not advance this argument I am at a loss to understand why it was

introduced by Mr. Ingersoll, unless it was to give us a specimen of his ability in the way of metaphysical skyrocketing."

Comment. Mr. Black *did* advance the argument that the existence of God was proved by the design of the universe. (See page 35 of the Ingersoll-Black discussion.)

Quoting, "It will not do to say that the universe was designed, and therefore there must be a designer." This man who says in his introduction this is not a subject to make merry over, and that the orator of applause and laughter stops his clatter and pauses in his ribaldry, breaks the quotation in two to say, "Why not, if all have a right to give their honest thot?"

Everyone will understand that this is a specimen of Mr. Lambert's wit, which is not intended to be a part of the argument; it is not expected that anyone would take the meaning to be that the right to speak any belief was denied, for it is plain that "it will not do to say" is equivalent to "it is not sufficient to say" without proof that there is a designer.

He then goes on to answer, certainly there must be proofs, and they are found in works of theology and philosophy; that it is Mr. Ingersoll's place to answer those proofs, and not very cunningly leave the inference that no such proofs exist; if Mr. In-

gersoll was ignorant of those proofs he should have informed himself.

Now, tho Mr. Black said it would be a waste of time and space to enumerate proofs that the universe was created by a preexistent and self-conscious Being, and he would assume that all would have sense and reason enough to see that it could not have been designed without a Designer, and tho he did not give any proofs, Mr. Ingersoll did answer what has been given by other authors as proofs, beginning, however, with the above, which is here quoted and commented on in such an extraordinary manner.

What would be said of anyone who should answer in any but a religious argument that it would be a waste of time to give proofs? In anything but religion no man would think of relying on mere assertion to combat another's opinion, admitting that he would attempt no proof. And Mr. Lambert comes into the discussion reiterating the dogma under discussion by way of answer to reasons for disbelief in the dogma.

He denies that Christians say so wonderful a thing as man must have had a creator; but they do say it, and the theological books dealing with the subject that I have so far seen give that as a reason. But Mr. Lambert calls it childish nonsense. He says the proof that all things were created is

not in their being wonderful, but that they exist. Of course he does not mean that God does not exist. He says in another place that man is curious and wonderful because he exists and is finite. He says "the idea of a self-existent, eternal designer excludes the idea of a design prior to or independent of him. This is so self-evident that it needs only to be stated." There is the same assumption of the designer.

To show that everything had to have a designer but God he says: "The universe is the eternal idea of God realized in time and space by the creative act." That sentence is really wonderful. I presume the subjects of the priest not only look upon it as wonderful but accept it as the statement of a profound "Truth." I wonder if they pretend to understand it? How many could remember that as they could less ingenious contrivances?

But I find I haven't given Ingersoll's words, which are here criticized:

Ingersoll. "I know as little as any one else about the plan of the universe; and as to the 'design' I know just as little. It will not do to say that the universe was designed, and therefore there must be a designer. There must first be proof that it was 'designed.' It will not do to say that the universe has a 'plan' and then assert that there must have been an infinite maker. The idea that the design

must have had a beginning and that a designer need not, is a simple expression of human ignorance. We find a watch, and we say: 'So curious and wonderful a thing must have had a maker.' We find the watchmaker, and we say, 'So curious and wonderful a thing as man must have had a maker.' We find God, and then we say, 'He is so wonderful that he must *not* have had a maker.' In other words, all things a little wonderful must have been created, but it is possible for something to be so wonderful that it always existed. One would suppose that just as the wonder increased the necessity for a creator increased, because it is the wonder of the thing that suggests the idea of creation. Is it possible that a designer exists from all eternity without design? Was there no design in having an infinite designer? For me it is hard to see the design in earthquakes and pestilences. It is somewhat difficult to discern the design or the benevolence in so making the world that billions of animals live only on the agonies of others. The justice of God is not visible to me in the history of this world. When I think of the suffering and death, the poverty and crime, of the cruelty and malice, of the heartlessness of this 'design' and 'plan' where beak and claw and tooth tear and rend the quivering flesh of weakness and despair, I can not con-

vince myself that it is the result of infinite wisdom, benevolence, and justice."

Lambert. In answer to the remark about the plan of earthquakes, etc., Mr. Lambert, to illustrate Mr. Ingersoll's egotism, tells a story of a boy whose eye was hurt by a cinder from a passing locomotive. He asks himself what design or plan a great corporation could have in throwing a cinder into his eye, and represents the boy as saying it is difficult for him to see design or benevolence in it. "Who will say that boy was not a philosopher and an egotist, or that a fortune does not await him when he is old enough to take the lecture field?"

Comment. As the great corporation has never been supposed to be infinite and to plan the universe you see how far he had to bring his anecdote to connect it with the subject and bring in insulting insinuations. Not seeming to care that he is now at work against the design argument which he has been upholding he proceeds as if Ingersoll were advocating the doctrine he—Lambert—has, for the time, abandoned. He calls upon Ingersoll to prove that God designed suffering before attributing it to him. "You should be just, even to God." This follows immediately after his quotation where Ingersoll argues that God could not have designed suffering.

LAMBERT EXPLAINS THAT SUFFERING IS NOT DESIGNED, IT RESULTS FROM CRIME—CRIME THE RESULT OF LIBERTY.

Lambert. "Crime is the result of human liberty—the not a necessary result—and suffering is the result of crime." He illustrates his argument on liberty and crime and suffering by saying shipwrecked mariners must not blame the captain when the shipwreck is the result of disobedience to his command.

Comment. As a rule shipwrecks are not the result of disobedience to the captain's commands, but of the power of wind and wave entirely beyond the control of anyone.

Lambert. "To those who see in man's nature and destiny nothing higher than that of the grasshopper, or the potato bug . . . there must be something inexplicable in the sufferings of this life."

Comment. Here he is supposed to indicate Ingersoll, as he is the subject of criticism, but the designation is too unsuitable to give any concern to the friends of the high-minded poet whose object in life was progress and the happiness of others.

Suffering is inexplicable to those only who believe it was designed. Mr. Lambert would say that God did not design it, but he says God designed the

universe; at any rate, that is the only thing to be made out of the pages before us, not forgetting the definition, "The universe is the eternal idea of God realized in time and space by the creative act." (Consulting the text every few words kept me from ending that, "expressed in words.")

Universe is the whole thing, earth, sun, etc.—which must include the whole of the earth—every-thing on it, of course. If God did not design every-thing, who did design the part that he did not? Evil is especially indicated in Isaiah xlvi, 7, as being the creation of God, and it is given in his own words, "I create evil. I, the Lord, do these things." The opinion that suffering is the result of crime is not sustained, even in the one instance given by Mr. Lambert. It is admitted that crime is sometimes the cause of suffering to the guilty one who commits the crime, but it is also the cause of the suffering of the innocent as well as the guilty. Besides crime there are unavoidable acci-dents, and diseases contracted thro no fault of the sufferers.

"Crime is the result of human liberty—tho not the necessary result—and suffering is the result of crime," says this Catholic theologian. "Evils that are the results of man's perversions of liberty can not be attributed to the design of God."

All this about crime's being the result of liberty,

perversion of liberty, man's free agency, seems to me to be the filling of space left by the absence of reasons. Do people ever say of any particular crime that it is the result of liberty? Say a man shoots another because he is angry or wishes to rob him, no one would ever think of calling the crime the result of liberty, or of the perversion of liberty, but of the ugly temper of the criminal; the loss of his liberty will be the result of the crime.

Mr. Lambert does not say God planned the good and the Devil sometimes overcame the good with evil, or that God's plan was upset in any way. We gather the idea (think of an Ingersoll or a huckleberry and have a good, uproarious laugh) from Mr. Lambert's arguments that the universe would have gone on all right if that pestiferous quality, liberty, had been left out of the plan.

Lambert (in chapter v, "pursuing" his victim "with cold, relentless cruelty," as the preface has it), starts out with the idea that the victim can not see on account of "intellectual staphyloma"; that he puts his judgment above God's and attempts to assume his place; "men have been kindly, but firmly consigned to insane asylums for such philosophy"; that he should doubt his powers of vision, which is "difficult to a man of almost infinite self-assertive capacity, but is wisdom"; accuses him of attributing death, suffering, crime, cruelty and

malice to the plan; tells him "it is unphilosophical to attribute to a plan objectionable features when you confess ignorance of that plan."

Comment. The brief statement by Mr. Ingersoll of his reasons for thinking that the belief in the eternity of the Universe is more reasonable than the belief that it was designed, was too plain to be misunderstood by anyone. Does his cold, relentless dissector (see preface) represent him as arguing that God designed the misery of the world and was therefore unjust, to give the impression to the people of his church that he had advocated the doctrine which his argument showed he questioned and doubted—did he so represent Ingersoll as accusing God of cruelty and injustice, thinking they would look at it as he guided them in spite of Ingersoll's words which Lambert himself quotes? It seems he did think they would, and the chances are that he was right in so thinking. Ingersoll could not fail to be understood, but the subjects of the church are barred from seeing his writings unless given by an author who publishes them under the Imprimatur of the church. It is not enough for the powers of the church that they should be allowed to present their own case in any way they choose, having their own arguments—or anything they might wish to have in place of arguments—side by side with the work

they do not wish their subjects to accept, or even before it; they do not allow anything they suspect might prove subversive of any of the dogmas or practices of their religion to be submitted to the judgment of their subjects. The sacred congregation of the Holy Office is still at work. The present "Father of his country" is more determined than was his predecessor in Galileo's time to crush liberty and to keep intelligence and progress away from the world.

Mr. Black avoids the argument against design of the cruelty and suffering of the world, saying, "We have neither jurisdiction nor capacity to re-judge the justice of God." Ingersoll notices this, and answers:

Ingersoll. "In other words, we have no right to think upon this subject, no right to examine the questions most vitally affecting human kind. We are simply to accept the ignorant statements of the barbarian dead. This question cannot be settled by saying that it would be a mere waste of time and space to enumerate the proofs which show that the universe was created by a pre-existent and self-conscious Being. The time and space should have been 'wasted' and the proofs should have been enumerated. These 'proofs' are what the wisest and greatest are trying to find. Logic is not satisfied with assertion. It cares not-

ing for the opinions of the 'great'—nothing for the prejudices of the many, and least of all for the superstitions of the dead. In the world of science a fact is a legal tender; assertions and miracles are spurious coins. We have the right to rejudge the justice even of a god. No one should throw away his reason—the fruit of all experience. It is the intellectual capital of the soul; the only light, the only guide, and without it the brain becomes the palace of an idiot king, attended by a retinue of thieves and hypocrites."

Lambert. Stating a truth is not avoiding a question; "you, however, avoid the question by not admitting Black's proposition, or disproving it. It is the hinge on which the whole argument turns, and you should not have avoided it." He then goes on with more than ten pages of comment on Ingersoll's reasoning in disproof (which is cool, as he just charged Ingersoll with avoiding the question). He restates Mr. Black's proposition about rejudging the infinite; he says: "The finite cannot be the measure of the infinite. God's justice is infinite. The human mind is finite. Hence the latter cannot be the measure of the former—in other words, we have not the capacity, and, for a stronger reason, not the jurisdiction to rejudge the justice of God," and continues, "This is the clear issue Mr. Black made with you, but instead of

meeting it squarely, as candor would dictate, you proceed to avoid it by misstating it. Thus you say: 'In other words, we have no right to think upon this subject—' This is neatly done. But it will not succeed. Mr. Black did not say we have no right to *think*. He said we have no right to *judge*, and it seems to me that any adult, whose intellect is not below the average, will see a difference between *thinking* and *judging*. You honor the truth in Mr. Black's proposition when you try to torture it out of shape before you answer it."

Comment. Judge is a definition of think, according to Webster. Can we judge, or decide that we must not judge, without thinking? Mr. Ingersoll expressed *thots* in the examination of the subject; then Mr. Black spoke very decidedly to the effect that we must let that subject alone. Mr. Lambert seems to presume on his people's not thinking, examining or judging when he speaks. Torturing the truth out of shape before answering it! Mr. Lambert knows that he himself is doing that very thing. What Mr. Ingersoll did was to state what the proposition necessarily involved and that statement was a convincing answer. If Mr. Black thought we had neither the capacity nor jurisdiction to judge (rejudge must mean judge), that was what he thought a truth. Mr. Ingersoll, not looking on it as a truth, stated its meaning in words show-

ing that if it were a truth it would suppress the right of thinking and examining. No capacity means we are *not able* to do anything with the subject. No jurisdiction means *no right* to do anything with it. Is not the necessary conclusion then that Mr. Black thinks we must let it alone? That we have no right to *think* on the subject? No right to *examine* the subject? Think and examine are a little different in meaning, and therefore Mr. Ingersoll used both words, as both meanings are involved.

I am ashamed to go on so long about words that all can understand for themselves if they read them in the connection in which they are used, but the author of the "Notes" prints whole pages which lead one to think he was trained to argue with a table-leg, and his whole concern seems to be to create as much diversion as possible from points of argument.

Finishing the sentence he began to quote—"no right to examine the questions vitally affecting human kind"—he goes on in this characteristic fashion:

Lambert. "There you are again. This is the veriest kind of verbal thimble-rigging. Mr. Black did not say we had no right to *examine* these questions. He said we had no right to *rejudge* the justice of God. You need not be told that

there is a difference between *examining* and *judging*. I cannot believe in view of your knowledge of the English language that you change these words without a purpose, even though you hold that 'candor is the courage of the soul.'

Comment. Next we have a paragraph, lengthy in proportion to its contents. "We neither accept the statements of the barbarian dead, nor the ignorant statements of the atheistic living; the question between Mr. Black and Mr. Ingersoll is whether the finite can judge the infinite."

The immediate question between those gentleman was, whether an infinite intelligence created the evil in the universe. Mr. Black and Mr. Lambert content themselves with the affirmation that an infinite intelligence did; Mr. Lambert brings forward the further information that liberty is responsible for the evil, but as he declares that the infinite created the whole universe—perhaps at the same time creating himself—the first affirmation cannot be affected by the other one.

The branch of the subject put forth by Mr. Black in place of an argument on the main question was also considered, Mr. Black and Mr. Lambert acting upon their right to judge that Mr. Ingersoll had no right to judge.

ASSERTIONS AND MIRACLES.

Taking up "Logic is not satisfied with assertion" the "Notes" proceed with much pomp to correct the "blunder" of "confounding" logic and reason.

Reasoning must be logical. There is no logic in mere assertion. Ingersoll is right in spite of the long lecture which the author calls "careful analysis."

Ingersoll's sentence, "In the world of science a fact is a legal tender," is referred to on page 56 as "meaningless verbiage." Was that characterization suggested by this concise sentence or by pages 50-54 of the "Notes," from which I will copy a specimen? A note says it is from Brownson's Quarterly Review. I don't know whether Mr. Lambert is the author or not, but the style seems to be according to his own heart:

"I allow you to doubt all things if you wish, till you come to the point where doubt denies itself. Doubt is an act of intelligence; only an intelligent agent can doubt. It as much demands intellect to doubt as it does to believe—to deny as to affirm. Universal doubt is, therefore, an impossibility, for doubt cannot, if it would, doubt the intelligence that doubts, since to doubt that would be to doubt itself. You can

not doubt that you doubt, and then, if you doubt, you know that you doubt, and there is one thing, at least, you do not doubt, namely, that you doubt. To doubt the intelligence that doubts, would be to doubt that you doubt, for, without intelligence, there can be no more doubt than belief. Intelligence then, you must assert, for without intelligence you cannot even deny intelligence, and the denial of intelligence by intelligence contradicts itself, and affirms intelligence by the very act of denying it. Doubt, then, as much as you will, you must still affirm intelligence as the condition of doubting, or of asserting the possibility of doubt, for what is not, cannot act." The quotation takes up two more pages of the "Notes." It follows two paragraphs sustaining Mr. Black in not taking time and space to give proofs, saying: "Mr. Black is not justified by your ignorance" in doing so; that the wisest and greatest, and "the world do not agree with you," and more to the effect that Mr. Ingersoll stands alone, in words we look upon as mildly insulting—for this author.

But, as Mr. Lambert is not shut off by the North American Review as Mr. Black was (that is what he says), he will "produce the argument of a philosopher for the existence of God. I do not deem it necessary, or logically called for,

just here, to do this; but as it may prove instructive to you I give it." Then follows the argument from Brownson's Review, of which a specimen was given. Readers may not be charmed with its appearance, but I do wish they would read all of it, not only all of the argument but the whole of his book, "Notes on Ingersoll."

In his "answer" to "In the world of science, a fact is a legal tender," he says you must demonstrate a fact, it must be established as such before it is a legal tender; "What are facts?" Ingersoll and Christians do not agree, says Lambert. "What you intended, then, as a wise saying has no practical sense in it. But for those who like that sort of thing, it is about the sort of thing they like."

Doubtless many think it not worth while to take the trouble of noticing such trifling. By way of apology I will copy two of the notices of the "Notes" from Mr. Lacy's Appendix to his reply:

"The author completely turns the tables on the doughty Colonel. We commend the volume to all who would see the assumptions and crudities and mistakes of Ingersoll turned inside out, upside down, end for end, and over and over."

—Chicago Star and Covenant (leading Universalist paper in the Western states).

"An earnest and keen reasoner. The pamphlet should have many readers."—New York Herald.

It may be that the writers of the above never read the work they praise, but I believe there are many who have been led to think it contains an array of brilliant and unanswerable arguments, many probably taking the word of others for their opinions.

In answer to Mr. Black as to our having no right to consider the question of design, Ingersoll said, "No one should throw away his reason—the fruit of all experience." Mr. Lambert remarks for the benefit of that part of his audience which can hear his opponent's arguments only as stated by the "Father," "Your purpose here is to leave the impression that, to be a Christian, a man must throw away his reason." The indication of this purpose is in the words of Mr. Lambert only. It is not shown anywhere in the argument—unless we get it from Mr. Black's idea that we cannot "rejudge." No words of Ingersoll's could be so construed.

Lambert says that when Ingersoll says reason is the result of experience, and then says it is

the intellectual capital of the soul, the only light, etc., he contradicts himself.

If he had said it is the capital of the soul and this capital is derived from experience, it would mean the same thing, and the expression would have been no plainer to anybody.

Mr. Lambert's "But mind and reason are identical. Reason is the mind in action" (leaving out the small criticism that they contradict each other), provokes the thought: Must not reason on religion; mind not in action on that subject.

He continues the paragraph, which ends the chapter, in his usual style, thus:

Lambert. "A result is an effect, and an effect cannot be prior to its cause. It follows, then, from your own definition, that reason is not and cannot be the only light or guide of the soul. But even if you had not contradicted yourself egregiously, your assertion that reason is the only light, etc., cannot be accepted, for it is a pitiable begging of the whole question at issue —a denial of revelation as a guide to reason, and this you will see is the only point between you and the Christian. Your statement thus cunningly assumes as proved, that which you set out to prove. This is one of the peculiarities of your method in debate. It is on this account

that I am under the necessity of analyzing almost every assertion you make."

Comment. According to this, revelation is the guide to reason. It is very strange that it guided him so far away from the first chapter of Genesis in the explanation of the universe; and strange, too, in what different directions it guides different people.

THE COMMANDMENTS.

In commenting on "Of course it is admitted that most of the commandments are wise and just," he asks if it is "candid to make a limitation so indefinite as to leave you room to dodge? Why not specify which, if any, are not wise and just?" But the very next sentence to the one criticized does specify the one against graven images, and after it, in the same paragraph, a part of the 10th, placing woman on an exact equality with other property, is specified. Mr. Lambert fills a chapter in quoting and criticizing the two objections, beginning the last paragraph thus: "You argue like a man who places much confidence in the credulity or gullibility of his readers, and imagines that while a few may investigate and know the truth, the larger number will take his word for it and inquire no fur-

ther. This policy shows a good knowledge of human nature, for the average man is not overburdened with the faculty of discrimination"!

He says the one against graven images could not be the "death of art unless it forbade art." But Ingersoll spoke of the effect on art. Mr. Lambert says Ingersoll suppressed the explanation of the command that you must not worship the graven images, but the command says you must not make them, and says also afterwards that you must not worship them. That many of the early theologians thought that statues and paintings were forbidden is shown by the fact that religious zealots destroyed them for many years. For centuries the Christians had much trouble over this.

The Bible says God forbade the making of images (Ex. xx, 4; Lev. xxvi, 1; Deut. xvi, 21-22). In Exodus and Leviticus we have both commands, in Deuteronomy it doesn't say anything about worshiping.

This priest, who, when in his least bitterly insulting moods, refers to Ingersoll's "conceit," instructs the man he criticizes, saying, "I will give you a definition of art, which will, if you study it well, prevent you in future from showing your ears to quiet, thoughtful men, who have

gone somewhat deeper than you have into philosophy and theology."

That a knowledge of philosophy and theology is necessary to an understanding of the meaning of the word art may be new to many.

Notice above that the conceit is imputed to Ingersoll.

Lambert. "Poetry is an art—and where can we find more sublime specimens of it than in the Psalms of David, the Book of Job, the majestic flights of Isaiah, and the soul-piercing threnodies of Jeremiah? Here we have the highest genius and the highest art, and yet because they did not daub lecherous pictures on canvas, or cut naked Venuses out of stone, they were not artists. The commandment was the death of art!—trash."

Comment. Ingersoll did mention painting and sculpture, but Lambert's readers should know that any indelicate suggestions were not made by *Ingersoll*. What a revelation of character does this priest present to people of the least refinement who have had the happiness of seeing glorious pictures and beautiful, pure, statues.

Criticizing Mr. Ingersoll's objection to the putting of woman on an exact equality with other property, he says, because they are forbidden alike that does not place crimes on the

same plane, for the penalty may not be the same; that Ingersoll would not have been satisfied if the commandment hadn't forbidden coveting another's wife; says "You are like the Frenchman who was to be hanged, neither a long nor a short rope would suit him." (I presume the writer did not think it worth while to select an illustration; he must keep a pile ready at hand, and in this case took the one that happened to be on top.) But he has another argument; he tells Mr. Ingersoll that as a lawyer he ought to know that the distinction between objects forbidden or protected by law is in the penalty; that the law sends a fifty-cent thief to jail, and the one-hundred-dollar thief to state's prison; as the wife stealer had a heavier penalty than the ox stealer it did not put them on an exact equality.

But Mr. Lambert should see that the fifty-cent thief and the one-hundred-dollar thief were in the same category—thieves. The wife and the ox were both *property*, which was the ground of the objection.

The rest of his argument on this point appears to carry on the idea that Ingersoll does not stand alone, for most people would be misled by his arguments, as the average man is "apt to place too much confidence in the ignorant statements

of that monumental bore of modern times, the roving lecturer—admission fifty cents."

It is hoped that none of these average men were so far misled as to provide only fifty cents to buy a ticket for an Ingersoll lecture. Falsely fixing the price so low does not belittle *the lecturer*.

Ingersoll. "A very curious thing about these commandments is that their supposed author violated nearly every one. From Sinai, according to the account, he said: 'Thou shalt not kill,' and yet ordered the murder of millions; 'Thou shalt not commit adultery,' and yet he gave captive maidens to gratify the lust of captors; 'Thou shalt not steal,' and yet he gave to Jewish marauders the flocks and herds of others; 'Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, nor his wife,' and yet he allowed his chosen people to destroy the homes of neighbors and to steal their wives; 'Honor thy father and thy mother,' and yet this same God had thousands of fathers butchered, and with the sword of war killed children yet unborn; 'Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor,' and yet he sent abroad 'lying spirits' to deceive his own prophets, and in a hundred ways paid tribute to deceit. So far as we know, Jehovah kept only one

of these commandments—he worshiped no other God."

Lambert (taking "He ordered the murder of millions" for his text takes nearly seven pages saying): God has a right to remove at his will those he has placed on the earth; death is only passing from one department to another in the same universe—therefore a trifling circumstance; that the commandment forbade unjust killing only; quotes from the Book of Wisdom, which he says describes some of the sins of the people, tho I do not find anything of that kind except what he repeats in the last paragraph. He begins the last paragraph of this part of the criticism thus: "Here we find that these people, whom you beslaver with your gushing sympathy, were sorcerers, murderers of their own children, offering them with their own hands in sacrifice to idols, and man-eaters." He ends this paragraph with

"A fellow feeling makes us wondrous kind."

About the Bible account of God's disposal of captive maidens to their captors the priest refers to the Colonel as making a "baseless assertion, or an appeal to ignorance," and asks, "What will honest men of common sense think of a philosophy that has to be propped and bolstered by such shameless misrepresentations of history?"

The twenty-first chapter of Deuteronomy, 10-14, shows it is exactly as Ingersoll said.

Lambert justifies the taking of flocks and herds from their owners, and says, "Our government confiscated millions of dollars' worth of property during the late war, yet it never occurred to anyone but a simian philosopher that such confiscation was stealing. The cause that justifies the war justifies the confiscation."

Take particular notice of the phrase, "simian philosopher." Also, notice that the justification of those wars is not given; also, to Ingersoll's assertion that the people who took the flocks and herds were marauders he answers that they could not have had a better title because God has a right to do as he pleases—has a right to be very bad. Many conscientious people who believe that he could not do wrong believe that the Bible misrepresents him.

Mr. Lambert denies that God sent lying spirits to deceive his prophets. He admits there were false prophets, but thinks God could not make them impossible without destroying free will and human liberty. "They were popular lecturers in their day, and did not die without issue." He says there were laws enacted condemning them. Perhaps they were human laws. I have not found them. He says he will give \$100 to the

poor if Ingersoll or his disciples will make good the statement; says he is familiar with the texts in Kings and Ezekiel and insinuates that Ingersoll lies.

Ezekiel xiv, 9. "And if the prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I, the Lord, have deceived that prophet, and I will cut him off from the midst of my people Israel, and ye shall know that I am the Lord." This not only shows Ingersoll's statement correct, but shows the Bible charges God with punishing the prophet for being deceived by God—"I will cut him off," etc.

Kings xxii, 20-23. The Lord inquired who would persuade Ahab to go to Ramoth-Gilead, where he would be defeated and killed. A spirit answered that he would. The Lord asked him how, and he said, "I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets, and he said, Thou shalt persuade him and prevail also; go forth and do so. Now, therefore, behold the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all thy prophets, and the Lord hath spoken evil concerning thee."

How can that be explained to mean anything else than what it says? It is plain that Ingersoll was right.

I Kings xxi tells us Ahab wished to get, by exchange or purchase, a vineyard near his house;

but the owner refused to part with it. Ahab's wife forged letters in her husband's name to compass the death of the owner of the vineyard. When Ahab heard of his death he went down to get the vineyard; but the Lord sent Elijah to see Ahab about it, seeming to think that he, instead of his wife, was the guilty person, and a charge of following idols was brot against him. When Ahab heard this "he rent his clothes, put sackcloth upon his flesh, and fasted, and lay in sackcloth, and went softly"; whereupon the Lord went to Elijah: "Seest thou how Ahab humbleth himself before me? Because he hath humbled himself before me I will not bring the evil in his days; but in his son's days will I bring the evil upon his house." But, as we have seen, he sent the lying spirit to betray him.

Notice that according to this account, God, because of the crime of Ahab's wife, will visit evil on his family in his son's day. Many people, who do not think they are rejudging the justice of God, do not believe he ever made any such promise.

Read 2 Thess. ii, 11, in which we find that "God shall send them strong delusions that they may believe a lie, that they may all be damned"; in Numbers xiv the Lord spoke unto Moses and Aaron and warned them they should know his breach of promise. The Lord told Moses he

would send him to Pharaoh to bring the Israelites out of Egypt, but that he would harden Pharaoh's heart, so that he should not let them go till he had visited dire plagues on them to show his power; then when he, God, did allow them to go they should spoil the Egyptians. Among the things God is represented as doing to show his power is killing all of the first born of the Egyptians, and that night in which it is done is honored thus: Ex. xii, 42. "It is a night to be much observed unto the Lord for bringing them out from the land of Egypt; this is that night of the Lord to be much observed of all the children of Israel in their generation."

Exodus i tells that God dealt well with the women who lied to Pharoah.

I Samuel xvi says that when God wanted David to supersede Saul (I Sam. xv, 11, "he repented that he had made Saul king over Israel"), he sent Samuel to manage it, telling him to deceive Saul by taking a heifer for sacrifice as a pretense.

Genesis xxvii gives an account of an infamous trick which God rewards.

In Isaiah vi, 9-10, we find the command to deceive the people, lest they understand and convert, and be healed. This is better expressed in the New Testament in the words of Jesus (Mark iv, 12).

Ingersoll confined himself to very few words; but perhaps he considered cumulative evidence unnecessary to disprove the inspiration of these passages.

He quotes Mr. Black's justification of the intolerance of the Old Testament on the grounds that blasphemy and idolatry were treason.

Mr. Lambert. "If these positions of Mr. Black are well taken, it is difficult to see how you can escape their logical consequences. . . . You became a colonel to assist the government to punish that attack on its supreme authority, majesty and honor. What new light has penetrated your skull that you now defend treason in Judea? Is it because God, against whom you seem to have a personal grudge, was the direct ruler there? If you should carry out your theories of toleration to their logical conclusion and realize them in overt acts in this country you would find yourself in due time dangling from a gibbet. It does not seem to have occurred to you that it was necessary to disprove Mr. Black's statement, that idolatry was treason, before you could drive him from his position. If you grant that idolatry was treason against the Jewish state you give away your case, and justify the punishment which that state inflicted on the idolater. No man with an atom of sense will attempt to deny this. To meet Mr. Black squarely and logically

you should have proved that idolatry was not treason, and if you could not do this, as most certainly you could not, you should have 'walked up like a man,' and admitted that the Jews were right, and not only right, but were bound to punish idolatry and blasphemy with death, as treason is punished in all times and by all nations, whether God is the immediate head of the government or not."

Ingersoll had said (in answer to Mr. Black) : " . . . according to Mr. Black, we should all have liberty of conscience except when directly governed by God. In that country where God is king, liberty cannot exist. . . . Think of an infinite being who is so cruel, so unjust that he will not allow one of his own children the liberty of thot! Think of an infinite God acting as the direct governor of a people and yet not able to command their love! Think of the author of all mercy imbruining his hands in the blood of helpless men, women and children, simply because he did not give them intelligence enough to understand his laws. An earthly father who cannot govern by affection is not fit to be a father; what, then, shall we say of an infinite being who resorts to violence, to pestilence, to disease, and famine, in the vain effort to obtain even the respect of a savage? Read this passage, red from the heart of cruelty: 'If thy brother, the

son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, Let us go and serve other gods which thou hast not known, thou nor thy fathers . . . thou shalt not consent unto him, nor hearken unto him, neither shalt thine eye pity him, neither shalt thou spare, neither shalt thou conceal him, but thou shalt surely kill him; thine hand shall be first upon him to put him to death, and afterwards the hand of all the people; and thou shalt stone him with stones, that he die.' . . . This is justified on the ground that 'blasphemy was a breach of political allegiance, and idolatry an act of overt treason.' We can understand how a human king stands in need of the service of his people. We can understand how the desertion of any of his soldiers weakens his army; but were the king infinite in power, his strength would still remain the same, and under no conceivable circumstances could the enemy triumph."

Mr. Lambert (in justification of the law for stoning a wife to death if she should say, Let us worship the sun). "The traitor should be removed from the body politic as you would remove a cancer from your jaw, your mawkish sentimentality to the contrary notwithstanding."

"Religious toleration meant liberty of treason."

"There is a huge fallacy in all this cant about freedom of thot, thinking as we please, etc. The intellect—I mean, of course, the sane intellect—is governed by motives and principles of reason, not by the whims of the will. Will to think that two and two make five, or that parallel lines will meet, and see if your reason will tolerate it."

"The only liberty of thot which he [God] does not allow is the liberty to think error, to meditate evil, to plan crime. Do you insist on this kind of thinking? If so, be wise and keep it carefully within your thot, for if you reduce this liberty to act it may lead to the penitentiary, where there are many philosophers of liberty of thot."

"By liberty I, of course, mean the right to do right. . . . There are individuals, of course, who claim the liberty to do wrong, but they are comparatively few. Some of them have died suddenly and prematurely by dislocation of the neck, and some others are in the penitentiary. Poor encouragement for disciples of liberty and license and heroes of freethot."

"You content yourself with giving a half page of the softest and silliest kind of gush . . ."

Comment. Anyone who is impolite enough might retort that it is a pity light does not penetrate Mr. Lambert's skull to show him the difference between stoning people to death for religious opinions and

going to war to keep our states united; for the war of '61-'65 was not to punish the slaveholder for putting in practice his liberty of conscience, as he so playfully represents it.

Lambert. "The slaveholder's conscience told him that secession was right. As long as his conscience was purely speculative, the government of the United States allowed him to amuse himself with it. But when he formulated that conscience into overt acts, such as firing on Fort Sumter, the government sent Col. Ingersoll and other embryo Caesars down to interview him and inform him that liberty of conscience was a good thing in its way—a something to keep his mind busy—but if he was such a consummate ass as to imagine that the United States government intended him to *practice* that liberty publicly he would have to readjust his ideas about it on a more solid basis."

Comment. No Freethinker could take offense at the joke about "disciples of liberty of license and heroes of freethot," as "license" does not apply to them and they are not hung or put in penitentiaries, but the contemptuous suggestion will probably serve its purpose, for people who admire the Lambert kind are not critical when their leaders strive to please them.

Thinking as we please cannot describe freethot. On the contrary, it is their critics who argue as

if we could think as we please, which must be what *they* think it is right to believe; this leaves out all individual thot and leaves the government of belief to the authority of others. Freethot—reasoning—is looked on as criminal by those who think belief should be governed by authority. They speak on the supposition that people can believe anything they are told to believe. Says Mr. Lambert: “The intellect . . . is governed by principles of reason, not by the whims of the will. Will that two and two make five,” etc. I do not see what “whims of the will” can mean in the case of thot. We might will that we might govern our minds by not allowing ourselves to examine a question, and think that by shutting out evidence we might lead ourselves to believe as we wish; but it does not seem to me that whatever we might advocate under such circumstances could really be our belief, if we feared evidence would change it. There are those who allow the expression of their thot to be governed by the will of other people; who give up to others the right of investigating other people’s thots on certain subjects. Sometimes they freely give up their right to think on those subjects; sometimes they think they have no right to think, and in such a case they do believe, accepting belief from the authority of others, and not allowing themselves to reason. But when we

have the reasons for and against beliefs, we do not will what to believe, we accept what seems reasonable to us. When the advocates of any particular beliefs prevent, as far as possible, any presentation of an opposing belief it is a confession of the weakness of the cause they advocate. When they allow those under their authority to see opposing arguments only as "reviewed" by themselves we may be sure they have no adequate answers for those arguments, and that they fear to give those under their authority the opposing arguments as they have really been made. Those who give up their right to inform themselves of the thot of the world can be kept in the belief that two and one are one, if a mystery of religion is concerned, and make a merit of believing tho they can not understand it.

Who but Mr. Lambert would speak of common criminals as philosophers of freethot, or philosophers of any kind, and why does he write such a thing? Does he expect his readers to believe that Ingersoll, Darwin, Spencer, the Mills, Professors Draper and Oswald, A. D. White, and people of that kind go to penitentiaries? It seems plain that this review of Ingersoll is written to spread the idea that the beautiful, moral life of his subject was really one of shame and dishonor.

No; Ingersoll does *not* mean by religious liberty

the right to commit treason. Does anybody believe that Mr. Lambert thought he meant that? If he were writing for those who are expected to get anything like a correct idea of Ingersoll he would probably base his criticisms on inferences drawn naturally from the author's simple, plain and clear language, if he criticized him at all. If he favored the reading by religious people of the debate between Ingersoll and Black it would show that there was a probability of his wanting to be fair. When will a religious representative in a debate publish his own arguments and those of his opponents at his own expense, and in the same book? That is what Ingersoll did. What shall we say of the man who tries to keep people from reading the argument of his adversary?

What should be said of the man, even if he were fair enough to not misrepresent his opponent's position, who continually applied to him opprobrious epithets without any reason? This man, who is described by his biographer in the preface of the volume now under consideration as of "quiet, gentlemanly and courteous ways, while his scholarly attainments, good judgment in matters, both public and private, and his genuine Christian character command the respect of all," characterizes Mr. Ingersoll's protests against intolerance as

"your mawkish sentimentalism," and "softest and silliest kind of gush."

He quotes "such a God would know the mists and clouds, the darkness enveloping the human mind"; and remarks: "Some pages back you exalt the human mind, and claim for it the right to rejudge the justice of God, and now you deplore the clouds and mists and darkness which enshroud it."

Exercising the mind drives away clouds, mists and darkness. Accepting everything, no matter how unreasonable, without that dulls the intellect, and allows the clouds to thicken around us.

He recommends Ingersoll to "hear the words of God and obey them, and not misuse the little light it [the mind] has left in denying his existence, or making him the subject of his blasphemous jests."

This is misleading. In all of Ingersoll's earnest and dignified argument there is no jest, blasphemous or any other kind. His accuser makes some efforts which could hardly be called jests, because of their malice. It seems to me malapert sayings would be the most appropriate phrase by which to designate them.

He repeats in substance what Mr. Black said about the manner of carrying on war with an opposing force; that they were justified in doing "as

their enemies did. In your treatment of hostile barbarians, you not only may lawfully, but must necessarily, adopt their mode of warfare. If they come to conquer you they may be conquered by you; if they give no quarter they are entitled to none; if the death of the whole population be their purpose, you may defeat it by exterminating theirs." (By the way, all this is quite irrelevant, for the wars instanced by Ingersoll were aggressive, for the extermination of the people, and the conquest of their country.) He says Ingersoll affects to believe that Black means certain atrocities, which he mentions. Why should he say affects, when those atrocities were the subject of the article which Mr. Black is supposed to be answering? It would be naturally supposed Mr. Black meant the same thing unless he announces the introduction of something else.

Mr. Lambert criticizes Ingersoll for trotting out infants in his writings and lectures.

Lambert. "You trot them out on all occasions, and in all conditions of *deshabille*. Those infants waddle and crawl—and so forth, thru your articles so promiscuously as to remind one of a foundling asylum, with yourself as peripatetic dry nurse in ordinary. By the way, were you not once a colonel of infantry? An old soldier loves to dwell on the reminiscences of the past. But heaven help

you if those infants ever live to take revenge for your worse than Herodian cruelty. When you want to reason with men on great questions, you should send the children to the nursery with orders to have them well supplied with what the old Dutch women used to call bread and milk 'poultice.' This will keep them in good condition until you want to trot them out again in your next lecture on Christianity."

Comment. His humor has an elephantine grace, and his puns the mellowness of a ripe old age. He repeats the quotation, "If they kill the infants in our cradles, must we brain theirs?" and goes on, "Here they are again—yes, by all means, brain them, tear them limb from limb, salt them, ship them to the Cannibal Islands, make them read your article on the Christian religion, or your lecture on 'Skulls'—do anything with them to keep them from muddling your brains when you are reasoning with men on subjects that require all your attention."

After this unmeaning entr'acte look back at the sane and touching protest against barbarity in warfare.

Ingersoll. "If they [the American Indians] take our captives, bind them to trees, and if their squaws fill their quivering flesh with sharpened faggots and set them on fire, that they may die clothed

with flame, must our wives, our mothers, and our daughters follow the fiendish example?"

Lambert. No, we must use quicker and cheaper methods, that the burden of the taxpayer may not be increased; if, we suppose, a hundred of our captives are to be bound to undergo the death torture, and by braining one of their infants we could cause them to desist, then we see what Mr. Black meant by adopting their mode of warfare.

Comment. Not at all; there was no question of preventing further cruelty. Ingersoll pointed out the atrocious inhumanity of the wars of the Old Testament. Black tried to justify them by saying we must adopt the mode of warfare of our enemies, apparently losing sight of the moral view presented by Ingersoll and not noticing they were purely aggressive and by command of Jehovah. Lambert holds up the hands of Mr. Black with the cool hardihood of a brutal murderer, ignoring all humane considerations. His supposed reason for braining the babe is impossible, for the torturing could not take place unless the captives were completely in the power of their enemies, and the friends of the captives would not be where they could brain Indian babes any more than they could free the victims.

Ingersoll. "Is this the conclusion of the most enlightened Christianity?"

Lambert. "Yes, sir, and the conclusion of the most enlightened common sense, too. Life is practical, it is neither poetry nor effeminate philosophy. The passions of human nature, civilized or barbarous, make stern alternatives necessary, and lugubrious cant will not change man's nature or the necessities that arise from it. If those fiendish squaws had lived in Palestine in the days of Jesus and had been put to the sword by the Jews, you would have accused the latter of murder and made God the abettor of the crime. Much depends on the point of view from which we look at a thing."

Comment. Mr. Lambert seems to understand that much depends on whether we look at a thing at all or allow our attention to be diverted to something else which has been substituted for the question in debate.

At any time when there were not supposed to be any exigencies for giving an incorrect representation of an Agnostic author to those who are not intelligent enough or fair enough to read the work for themselves, no one would think of such a thing as writing as if civilized people should become savages to force their enemies to civilized warfare; no one would think of justifying savagery even, much less holding it up as an example of

moral teaching. They know that barbarity cannot under any circumstances be a civilizing force.

Can anyone who believes in a just God who is a loving father to all his creatures read Deuteronomy xx, 10-17, and still believe he is truly represented there?

“When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it.

“And it shall be if it make thee answer of peace and open unto thee, then it shall be, that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee and they shall serve thee.

“And if it will make no peace with thee, but will make war against thee, then shalt thou besiege it.

“And when the Lord thy God hath delivered it into thine hands thou shalt smite every male thereof with the edge of the sword; and the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, thou shalt take unto thyself; and thou shalt eat the spoil of thine enemies, which the Lord thy God hath given thee.

“Thus shalt thou do unto all the cities which are very far off from thee, which are not of the cities of these nations.

“But of the cities of these people, which the Lord

thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth:

“But thou shalt utterly destroy them.”

The author of the “Notes” accuses Mr. Ingersoll of misrepresentation of Mr. Black, “which,” he says, “it is hard to imagine to have been accidental or unintentional,” and gives examples of some things Mr. Black said in other places to prove his accusation. “It is not true that Mr. Black justifies wars of extermination because the American people fought for the integrity of their government.”

Then why did he mention the last in connection with the first? He couldn’t consistently do it, anyhow, for he does not justify the federal union, at least without slavery—the abolitionists, who were “not a very respectable portion of the civilized world” succeeded, “I need not say by what means, or with what effect upon the country.” If that does not mean that the war was wrong and one of the outcomes (the end of slavery) bad in moral effect, what does it mean? “Subordination of inferiors to superiors is the groundwork of human society.” “The improvement of our race . . . must come from obedience to some master, better and wiser than ourselves.” Mr. Black would probably like to choose his master, and that was not possible under slavery. I never knew who was

his master, whether he had his choice of masters, or whether his subjection was willing.

Mr. Black wrote, "I do not say the war was either better or worse for his [Ingersoll's] participation and approval. But if his own conduct (in going out 'a-coloneling'), for which he expresses neither penitence or shame, was right, it was right on grounds which make it an inexcusable outrage to call the children of Israel savage criminals for carrying on wars of aggression to save the life of their government." Does not this make it plain that Ingersoll did not misrepresent Mr. Black? Mr. Black continues: "These inconsistencies are the necessary consequences of having no rule of action, and no guide for the conscience. When a man throws away the golden metewand which God has provided, and takes the elastic cord of feeling for his measure of righteousness, you cannot tell from day to day what he will think or do."

We have just seen, in the extracts from the Bible, the golden metewand which Mr. Black declares to be God's; now let us consider the conscience, which Mr. Black pronounces an elastic cord of feeling, as shown in Mr. Ingersoll's defense of the war in which he had a part.

Ingersoll. "Mr. Black justifies the wars of extermination and conquest because the American people fought for the integrity of their own coun-

try; fought to do away with the infamous institution of slavery; fought to preserve the jewels of liberty for themselves and their children. Is it possible that his mind is so clouded by political and religious prejudice, by the recollections of an unfortunate administration, that he sees no difference between a war of extermination and one of self-preservation? that he sees no choice between the murder of helpless age, of weeping women, and sleeping babes, and the defense of liberty and nationality?

"The soldiers of the Republic did not wage a war of extermination. They did not seek to enslave their fellow men. They did not murder trembling age. They did not sheathe their swords in women's breasts. They gave the old men bread, and let the mothers rock their babes in peace. They fought to save the world's great hope—to free a race and put the humblest hut beneath the canopy of liberty and law.

"Claiming neither praise nor dispraise for the part taken by me in the civil war, for the purposes of this argument, it is sufficient to say that my record, poor and barren as it is, should be compared with his.

"Never for an instant did I suppose that any respectable American citizen could be found willing at this day to defend the institution of slavery; and

never was I more astonished than when I found Mr. Black denying that civilized countries passionately assert that slavery is and always was a hideous crime. I was amazed when he declared that 'the doctrine that slavery is a crime under all circumstances and at all times was first started by the adherents of a political faction in this country less than forty years ago.' He tells us that 'they denounced God and Christ for not agreeing with them' but that 'they did not constitute the civilized world; nor were they, if the truth must be told, a very respectable portion of it. Politically they were successful; I need not say by what means, or with what effect upon the morals of the country.'

"Slavery held both branches of Congress, filled the chair of the Executive, sat upon the supreme bench, had in its hands all rewards, all offices; knelt in the pew, occupied the pulpit, stole human beings in the name of God, robbed the trundle-bed for love of Christ; incited mobs, led ignorance, ruled colleges, sat in the chairs of professors, dominated the public press, closed the lips of free speech, and polluted with its leprous hand every source and spring of power. The abolitionists attacked this monster. They were the bravest, grandest men of their country and their century. Denounced by thieves, hated by hypocrites, mobbed by cowards,

slandered by priests, shunned by politicians, abhorred by the seekers of office—these men of whom the world was not worthy, in spite of all opposition, in spite of poverty and want, conquered innumerable obstacles, never faltering for one moment, never dismayed—accepting defeat with a smile of infinite hope—knowing they were right—insisted and persisted until every chain was broken, until slave-pens became schoolhouses, and three millions of slaves became free men, women and children. They did not measure with ‘the golden metewand of God,’ but with ‘the elastic cord of human feeling.’ They were men the latches of whose shoes no believer in human slavery was ever worthy to unloose, and yet we are told by this modern defender of the slavery of Jehovah that they were not even respectable; and this slander is justified, because the writer is assured ‘that the infallible God proceeded upon good grounds when he authorized slavery in Judea.’”

“Not satisfied with having slavery in this world, Mr. Black assures us that it will last thru all eternity, and that forever and forever inferiors must be subordinated to superiors. Who is the superior man? According to Mr. Black he is superior who lives upon the unpaid labor of the inferior. With me, the superior man is the one who uses his superiority in bettering the condition of the inferi-

or. The superior man is strength for the weak, eyes for the blind, brains for the simple; he is the one who helps carry the burden that nature has put upon the inferior. Any man who helps another to gain and retain his liberty is superior to any infallible God who authorized slavery in Judea. For my part I would rather be a slave than a master. It is better to be robbed than a robber. I would rather be stolen from than be a thief.

"According to Mr. Black, there will be slavery in heaven, and fast by the throne of God will be the auction-block, and the streets of the new Jerusalem will be adorned with the whipping-post, while the music of the harp will be supplemented by the crack of the driver's whip. If some good Republican would catch Mr. Black, 'incorporate him into his family, tame him, teach him to think, and give him a knowledge of the true principles of human liberty and government, he would confer upon him a most beneficent boon.' [This last sentence quoted from Black's excuse for slavery, page 43 of the discussion.]

"Slavery includes all other crimes. It is the joint product of the kidnapper, pirate, thief, murderer, and hypocrite. It degrades labor and corrupts leisure. To lacerate the naked back, to sell wives, to steal babes, to breed blood-hounds, to debauch your own soul—this is slavery. This is what Je-

hovah authorized in Judea. This is what Mr. Black believes in still. He 'measures with the golden metewand of God.' I abhor slavery. With me liberty is not merely a means—it is an end. Without that word all other words are empty sounds.

"Mr. Black is too late with his protest against the freedom of his fellowman. Liberty is making the tour of the world. Russia has emancipated her serfs; the slave trade is prosecuted only by thieves and pirates; Spain feels upon her cheek the burning blush of shame; Brazil with proud and happy eyes is looking for the dawn of freedom's day; the people of the South rejoice that slavery is no more, and every good and honest man (excepting Mr. Black), of every land and clime, hopes that the limbs of men will never feel again the weary weight of chains."

Ingersoll had said a war of conquest was simply murder. Mr. Black answers that Ingersoll himself went a-coloneling in a war of conquest. To this Ingersoll responds that the war for the Union was one in defense of liberty and nationality; that the soldiers of the Republic did not wage a war of extermination, and more to the effect that it was not carried on in a barbarous manner; whereupon Mr. Lambert declares that Ingersoll misrepresented Mr. Black, and that it is hard to think he did not do it on purpose; that as he does not

seem to understand Mr. Black's argument he, Mr. Lambert, will put it in more simple form!

Lambert. "A war of conquest is simply murder." But the war with the South was a war of conquest. Therefore, the war against the South was simply murder. Now Mr. Ingersoll participated in that war, therefore Mr. Ingersoll was a party to the crime of murder. This was your opponent's argument in logical form. You evidently saw its force. You could not extricate yourself except by misrepresentation, and you did not hesitate a moment. Therefore you said: 'Mr. Black justifies wars of extermination and conquest, because the American people fought for the integrity of their own country.'"

Comment. Observe, Ingersoll did not understand, so he would state it simply. Ingersoll did understand, and therefore misrepresented to get out of the trap, etc.

Of course, Mr. Black's statement was perfectly plain and easy for anyone to understand, but Mr. Lambert wished to befuddle his readers with many words, altho they did not make any change in the appearance of the first statement; and to further confuse the ideas of adherents by many more words to the effect that Ingersoll tried to escape from Black's conclusion, when he really answered by his contention that the war in which he engaged

was not a war of conquest, but one for liberty and union.

But hear Mr. Lambert to the end of his rigmarole.

Lambert. "You perpetrated this misrepresentation to make a way to escape from the trap in which you were caught and to afford you a field for a little sentimental gush about 'slavery' and the 'jewels of liberty,' hoping, with the instinct of the cuttle-fish, you might get away in the mud-diness you had created. But, my dear sir, it will not do, for society is not entirely made up of fools. Our war with the South was a war of conquest, for a war of conquest is a war to conquer" [Hear ye!] "and that is what we meant when we sent armies to the South. If conquest is murder then you are guilty of murder in proportion to your importance in that war. But you have said a war of conquest is simply murder. Then, according to the adamantine rules of logic, you are simply a murderer. That is where your opponent landed you.

"You justify the war with the South by saying it was to maintain the integrity of the country. The justification is complete; but what follows from it? Why, it follows that wars of conquest are *sometimes* justifiable, which is the very thing you denied when you said that 'a war of conquest is simply murder.' When you said that your mind

was on the Jew, you wanted to lay down a principle that would surely condemn him and his God, and you did not see that you were making a murderer of yourself. *Ex parte* philosophy is a poor philosophy. You are a student of the infidel philosophers of the last and present centuries, but you have not caught their genius nor comprehended their bulk. You take their points here and there and depend for the rest on your wit and faculty of drollery. Men laugh with you or at you, but, after all, life is a serious affair, and when the play is over the clown is the first to be forgotten."

Comment. The first part of this is based on the assumption that it was admitted that the Civil War was one of conquest; but Ingersoll did not admit it. Who does? Certainly no one, unless he is determined to agree with the priest in everything, no matter how absurd, that he might say in his efforts to make an appearance of discrediting an Agnostic.

What is meant by not comprehending the bulk of the philosophers?

Those who read Mr. Ingersoll's argument know that he made no reference, even indirectly, to the Jews. He kept strictly to his subject.

Ex parte philosophy is not Ingersoll's. *He* wished every one to read all the arguments of his adversaries as well as his own. Liberals have no

Index Expurgatorius, nor have they any priests to present erroneously whatever they fear to have the people see as it is.

Again he represents Ingersoll as a clown. Judge for yourself of the language and ideas to which he refers as given by their author. It is plain that the being calling him a clown was pretty sure that his readers never read Ingersoll's fervent and solemn protest against inhumanity. The tenderness of Ingersoll's nature which glows thru his writings would be a revelation to readers of Lambert who have depended on his exposition of the great Agnostic, who is great because of his sympathetic, benevolent heart. Yet on the very next page, in comments following the ones last quoted, Mr. Lambert quotes Ingersoll, "Not satisfied with having slavery in this world, Mr. Black assures us that it will last thru eternity," and says:

Lambert. "There is but one reply to this. It consists of a vigorous English word of three letters. It is sufficient to say that Mr. Black never assured us of anything from which such an inference could be drawn. On what principle do you justify this gross misrepresentation? Certainly not that divine law which forbids you to bear false witness against your neighbor. If you had said the above under oath would it not have been perjury? Did you say it in view of the fact that

you had made arrangements to prevent your opponent from replying to you?"

Comment. The assertion which led to the use of rough epithets is justified by Mr. Black's words, which Lambert does not give. In speaking of slavery he said: "All improvement of our race, in this world and the next, must come from obedience to some master better and wiser than ourselves."

The false accusation that Ingersoll prevented Mr. Black from replying has been exposed.

Quoting, "Who is the superior man?" he says: "He who does not lie, or misrepresent, or blaspheme his Maker, is morally superior to him who does."

Besides this vile insinuation, which is without excuse, Lambert accuses Ingersoll three times on one page of lying, when anyone can see by reading what Mr. Black did say that Ingersoll was correct.

He quotes some of what Ingersoll says about the superior man and goes on with some of his "analyzing," which appears very learned to those who look up to him as the infallible representative of Almighty God. He would teach us that doing good to others is a *sign* of superiority, but not the *reason* of it.

Is not the one who does good superior *because*

he does good, just as we would naturally understand Ingersoll to mean?

He says, when Ingersoll says "the superior man is one who uses his superiority in bettering the condition of the inferior," he admits "the fact of inferiority and superiority, and therefore subordination." Not so; Col. Ingersoll and many others do better the condition of those who may be inferior in the way of talents or opportunities, but that does not prove there is subordination about it, in any sense. In some cases there is subordination in one sense, as when a farmer hires a man to help him he gives directions as to what he wants done, but that is different from the subordination of the man who is owned by another. The teacher is superior to his pupils in the way of education, and they work under his direction, but we do not draw the inference from this that slavery is right.

Mr. Lambert. The superiority comes before the good act; if superiority were the act of the will all men could be superior by willing it. "Your definition, then, like most of your definitions, means nothing when analyzed."

Comment. If a man does not make good use of his superior talents or advantages he is not a superior man. Actions go with the character and advantages making him superior. Mr. Lambert is great on definitions and analyzing. I look on what

Mr. Ingersoll said as giving his idea of the qualities constituting a superior man, and don't believe anyone but Lambert would think of analyzing them as definitions.

He goes on in the same style of criticism about eyes to the blind, etc., and ends paragraphs in similar style, like this: "I note these small points to show that you are not an adept in the proper use of words and that your definitions are untrustworthy."

Has the reader forgotten what the argument is about after going over all this multiplication of words about words? We must remember that Ingersoll's argument about the superior man was in answer to that of Mr. Black in favor of slavery, while these pages of Mr. Lambert's about words do not touch the question of the debate.

He quotes, "I would rather be a slave than the master," which means, of course, as the sentence itself and the rest of the paragraph show, that he would rather be wronged than to wrong another. But Mr. Lambert makes it the occasion of a sermon in which he works in the implication that such a preference shows "an intellectual imbecile or a consummate hypocrite," and preaches manliness as opposed to "the instincts of a slave." He says he would rather be the master, for he could free the slave. "Perhaps, in view of the proneness

of man to domineer and play the tyrant it were better to be neither the slave nor the master."

Most good people would say that without any perhaps. If the master frees the slave, then, of course, there is no master nor slave. The valuable part of that sermon is that it is short; but it should be preserved to show the temper of the preacher.

Lambert. (In answer to Ingersoll's mention of those who help others to gain or retain liberty.) "Then why do you not advocate the throwing open of our prison doors that the murderers and thieves cruelly shut up there may gain and retain the liberty they sigh for? Ah! that would be dangerous. Well then, it is not always right to help others gain and retain their liberty. It is hard for you to say anything without saying too much or too little. You are fond of making general propositions, but they are dangerous tools and should be handled with care."

Comment. Who would tell the marines or any other people that any writer could find a publisher for any book in which a thing like that last paragraph could appear, without the appearance first of the fact that it is by a Christian who professes to answer an Agnostic? Would any person in any other kind of work intimate that it is dangerous and foolish to advocate liberty as opposed to slavery because murderers and thieves are confined in pris-

on? Would this writer say in so many plain words that slavery is right and profess in so many plain words to believe that our confining thieves and murderers in penitentiaries proves that slavery is necessary to good government?

If art is praised this writer's thots turn to indecent pictures; if liberty is mentioned he immediately remembers criminals and will have nothing of liberty. The subject was slavery and not murder.

Ingersoll goes on, "Slavery includes all other crimes," and Lambert *answers* with more of his contemptuous criticisms on language. He reminds me of the old epigram about language's being the means by which we conceal our thots; but it seems to me the author of the "Notes" uses it to take the place of thots; feeling that something must be said when thots are lacking.

Assuming that Ingersoll should confine his writings on slavery to a dictionary definition of it, and basing insulting remarks on his description of some of its evils, he closes the chapter with a paragraph which could be expected of this man alone—this man who is described as genial, gentlemanly and courteous by the Rev. Patrick Cronin, the writer of the preface to the "Notes." Here is the paragraph in which he comments on "To lacerate the naked back," etc.:

Lambert. "No, it is poetry, poor poetry, of course, but nevertheless poetry, for it is the product of the imagination. You do not seem to understand the meaning of the word. Consult Webster's Dictionary or your law books, or any books that pretend to give definitions of things, and you will find that the definition of slavery given by you is not found in any of them. You may find something like it in the frothy ravings of lunatics, or the rhapsodies of poets, but when pure reason is appealed to we must not quote the mouthing of lunatics and poets. To lacerate the naked back is a cruelty or a punishment incident to, but not confined to the condition of slavery. To breed blood-hounds is no more wrong than to breed canary birds or poodles, and as to debauching your soul, that is done with facility where slavery is unknown except in name. Then slavery is none of these, altho all of them may be incident to that abnormal relation between capital and labor."

Comment. It is right to make a correction of my own comments on the above. It is not right to say that he alone was capable of writing as he did. I was thinking of his book and it is the only one of the kind I have seen. But there are more of that kind of people. Their number may be estimated according to the opportunities for knowing them.

The paragraph last quoted brings the thot that if the writer would confine himself to copying dictionary definitions it would be better for his world; for he does have an influence. Let readers judge whether or not it is for truth, honor and justice.

LIBERTY.

Ingersoll. "With me, liberty is not merely a means—it is an end."

Lambert. "This is too vague. We are all in favor of liberty, as we understand it, but we do not agree as to what it ought to be. It is a foolish loss of time to caw over the word until we have a common idea or understanding of the thing. Do you mean by the word the liberty Guiteau exercised, or that of the Nihilists, or of the Mormons, or that of the thief, the robber, or the murderer? All these appeal to liberty as vociferously as you do. Do you not see that the word liberty must be defined and limited—in other words, that it must become a known quantity before it can become a legitimate object of debate? If there is anything thoroughly detested and abhorred by logicians it is a word, or the use of a word, that has no fixed, clear and clean-cut meaning to it. You use the word 'liberty' with what Shakespeare would call 'damnable iteration' and in all your multifarious

uses of it you have never, so far as I have seen, given a definition of it. 'And without that word all other words are empty sounds.' And that word without a definition—a clear and fixed meaning, intelligible and comprehensible to all in common, is the emptiest and most misleading sound that ever echoed in time and space. It is a pet word of lunatics, fools and philosophers, so-called. It is like a piece of gum elastic, short or long, according to the will of him who fingers it. 'O liberty!' said Madame Roland, as she was carted to the guillotine, 'What crimes are committed in thy name!' The Christian loves liberty as well as you do. He would soar from planet to planet, and from star to star, and drink in the immensity of the universe. He would dive into the center of our world and know its secrets. He would penetrate to the ultimate molecule of matter and know its essence. He would introvert himself and know the mystery of his own being, but the liberty to do these things evades his grasp as the ever-receding rainbow eludes the grasp of the innocent child who hopes to bathe his dimpled hands in its rays by crossing over a field or two. The physical and the moral law stand watch on the limits of liberty and cry 'halt' when we even think to go beyond our sphere."

Comment. About three hundred more words on

liberty follows this. Lack of space makes it necessary to state the idea in a few words:

Lambert. There are three laws equally binding on man, physical, intellectual and moral. "The two former bind him in such a way that he has no liberty whatever, and therefore he is, in no way, responsible for their results." He is responsible to the moral law only, "for it is thru and by this law, only, that he can possibly antagonize God's will as intellect against intellect. Man, then, is no more free in the moral order than he is in the physical or intellectual order. The difference is only this: he has it in his power to confuse the moral order, to make discord," and to do this is to sin.

Comment. Reduced to its lowest terms that would be—Man is never free. If I had given the whole paragraph, the emptiness would have been the same.

To take these comments on liberty and consider them categorically: When two people are arguing on slavery must the advocate of liberty copy Webster's definition of liberty to go with the word whenever he uses it, in order to make himself understood? Would anybody ever think he meant the *liberty* to commit crime? Would anybody who wished to enter honestly into a discussion of slavery ever think of any connection between the advocacy

of liberty and the advocacy of crime? "Pet word of lunatics, fools and philosophers, so-called"! Is liberty the bug-bear of this author or is he only pretending? It is most likely he feels that something should be said to make "some of the people" think Ingersoll has been answered.

I am sure Madame Roland would never have made that remark if she had known it would have been used forever and forever as if it were an argument against liberty by those who hate and fear the word, and condition expressed by it.

We come now to the first and only drop into poetry (this is using his "definition" of poetry, though it would not be mine) to be found in the "Notes," about the Christian's loving liberty, wanting to soar and dive, and drink in the universe, and turn himself inwards—but that would be "going beyond our sphere." Second that here comes in and suggests that it is not worth while to halt for this poetry.

For the page or so on which he works up to the conclusion that man cannot be free in any way, can only confuse the moral order, and that is to sin—Well, if he really arrives at that conclusion, no wonder he hates liberty.

He again sets up liberty as his target when he comes to the subject of polygamy. He quotes Ingersoll in praise of liberty and demands to know

why, then, he objects to polygamy? Besides, he says, there is no principle outside of revelation which forbids it, and it is inconsistent for Ingersoll to find it a disgusting practice. I wonder how many would admit that if it were not for the Bible they might all be polygamists? The most of us feel as if there were something revolting about the practice itself. Mr. Lambert says the sentiment or judgment against polygamy is the result of the Christian religion and Ingersoll has no right to use its weapons in combating it. Ingersoll and Black were arguing on the Old Testament (tho there is nothing in the New forbidding polygamy. It says a bishop shall have one wife. I do not know whether that is generally construed to mean he shall be married, or shall have *only* one wife). They were arguing about the ten commandments and laws of the Pentateuch. Mr. Ingersoll had an idea that it would have been better if polygamy had been forbidden.

I did think it was my duty to copy for you Mr. Lambert's thots on this subject, but they are too—extraordinary, and I cannot bring myself to send such things to the printer. True, they were printed once, but much is allowed to the church.

Ingersoll. "Certainly Jehovah had time to instruct Moses as to the infamy of polygamy."

Lambert. "There is no sense in this, except on

the assumption that you know more about the subject than Jehovah—that your crude notions of virtue and propriety should govern his actions.

"Rousseau, an Infidel like yourself, but an honester and abler man, has given a description of the class of philosophers to which you belong, and it is highly worthy of attention just here."

Comment. It is a long string of denunciations of philosophers, which he ascribes to "Rousseau, as quoted by Gandolphy in his defense of the Ancient Faith." It is not apropos of anything, as it has nothing to do with the Bible, polygamy or Infidels, unless it might be the assertions that philosophers pretend to be skeptics, and "among believers, he" (the philosopher) "is an Atheist, among Atheists he is a believer." Thruout the "Notes" philosophers and Infidels are treated as being the same. Whether Rousseau is a philosopher or not, I do not know, but he is not an Infidel. Popular Biography, 1832, by Peter Parley gives this: "It was not till 1750 that he manifested his splendid literary talents. In that year he gained the prize given by the academy of Dijon for his celebrated Essay, in answer to the question, 'Whether the progress of the sciences and arts has contributed to corrupt or purify manners.' He maintained that the effect had been injurious. From this period his pen became fertile and popular." These last two sen-

tences go far to prove he remained a good Catholic. The Social Contract is named among his works in this sketch, but not noticed in any other way. Johnson's Cyclopedie treats him as a very bad man, and that may be where Mr. Lambert gets his ideas, tho the subject of religion is not mentioned. The New International Cyclopedie has a more complete sketch of him. From it I take this: It tells of his Catholic education; says that he visited Geneva, gave up Catholicism and thus was allowed to assume his rights as a citizen. (It looks plain that he became a Calvinist in *name* only.) Went away with the intention of returning, but Voltaire was there, "and Jean Jacques concluded that they could not live near each other in so small a place." After his letter on Providence, addressed to Voltaire in reply to his poem on the Lisbon earthquake, he had written as his declaration of war against not only Voltaire, but all his associates, *the Lettre a d'Alembert contre les Spectacles*, in which he condemns the stage as a school of immorality.

Probably Mr. Lambert thinks that political and religious unorthodoxy are so closely connected that it is necessary to "slay them all" without adding to the order, in this case, "God will know his own."

Ingersoll. "Where will we find, in the Old Testament, the rights of wife, mother, and daughter defined?"

Lambert. "They are found in the warp and woof of the whole book. But, before particularizing, it is necessary to know what you mean by these rights, and if your notions on the subject are correct. What you may affirm as right I may deny. Until those rights are determined rightly and independently of your or my sentiments or feelings, the question of what the Bible says on the subject cannot be intelligently discussed."

Ingersoll. "Even in the New Testament she (woman) is told to learn in silence and all subjection."

Lambert. "Most excellent advice for man, woman, or child. How can you learn otherwise? Would you have the learner pert and impertinent?"

Comment. So the rights of woman are defined in the warp and woof of the whole book. Why should not we be favored with a few of the references which must be so numerous, if found in the whole warp and woof? But not a single one is cited.

"It is necessary to know what you mean by rights," and "it depends on what you mean by rights," or "liberty," or whatever is the subject considered, has a familiar sound. It is also used by the Catholic laity when they cannot answer; then if the person with whom they are conversing does not think it worth while to pursue the dis-

cussion their first evasion is all that is necessary; if he should explain what he means by the word then they can bring up some other thots which they try to connect with some other conversation, or they can call up some imaginary case, making it fit as well as possible.

As Mr. Lambert did not particularize we may presume that he discovered what was meant by rights, and that Mr. Ingersoll's notions were correct. The Bible does not say man, woman and child should learn in silence, it says woman.

So far Mr. Lambert has answered neither of the quotations; but he now explains the Christian idea: There must be a superior in the marriage relation, but the wife is not subject to the husband as a child is to his father, or a slave to his master, but as the church obeys Christ.

He is in accord with the Bible in that last, but it is understood that Christ is absolute ruler, so, if that meant anything her subjection would be more complete than in the two other cases. He quotes from the Bible, giving chapter and verse, but supplying the places of some of it with dotted lines. I will italicize the portions he omitted; I will also give Eph. v, 22-23, part of which he did not quote. His first quotation seems to me perfectly colorless, but I will put it all in.

"But yet neither is the man without the wom-

an; nor the woman without the man in the Lord. For as the woman is of the man, so also is the man by the woman; but all things of God (1 Cor. xi, 12). Again: *Wives submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church; and he is the savior of the body. Therefore, as the church is subject unto Christ, so let the wives be to their own husbands in everything.* Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it, *that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of the water by the word. That he might present it to himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish.* So also ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself. For no man ever hateth his own flesh; but nourisheth and cherisheth it, as also Christ doth the church. Because we are, members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two of one flesh. *This is a great mystery; but I speak concerning Christ and the church.* Nevertheless, let every one of you in particular love his wife as himself; *and the wife see that she reverence her husband."*

"These are the doctrines that have liberated woman," adds the priest, and this ends the paragraph and the exposition of the Christian idea of the rights of woman.

Before I noticed the omitted texts I thought what a surprisingly meager showing of texts proving doctrines that have liberated woman, compared with the overwhelming array on the other side! The temptation to marshal that array is strong, but time is limited. Besides it does not seem necessary since the parts omitted by the author of the "Notes" have been supplied.

He quotes, "In no country in the world have women less liberty than in the Holy Land," and again says, "It depends upon what you mean by liberty," continuing in a way to show that he takes it in the sense of dissoluteness. If he could drop the word liberty from the language as he tries to keep the thing itself from the world, how it would simplify matters for him! As it is, the only thing he can do is to try to attach some bad meaning to the word.

Ingersoll. "Under the domination of the Christian church woman was the merest slave for at least a thousand years. It was claimed that thru woman the race had fallen, and that her loving kiss had poisoned all the springs of life."

Lambert. Of the first sentence he says: "This

is too general and indefinite." General statements can be met only by general denials, and calls for proofs; Christianity raised woman and put her at the side of man; the fall was thru Adam; and the last part he answered with the single word, "Fudge!"

Comment. That last answer is short, and better than his usual device—a deluge of obscuring words. It does take such a long time to read them, and they must be troublesome to write, tho they do fill up when he cannot afford to answer in good faith.

By way of answer to Mr. Ingersoll's summary of the qualities of Mr. Black's God, and request that he would have the kindness to state a few of his objections to the devil, Mr. Lambert, affecting not to see the point, writes this: "He is the prince of liars, full of sophistry and deceit, misleading and unreliable—a purveyor of Dead Sea apples."

Just below we have more undignified and irrelevant comments about the Jews kicking out the Canaanites on the toe of their sandals. Ingersoll's question was about persecuting for opinion's sake heathen philosophers who taught that all men were brothers, equally entitled to liberty and life.

After a page in which he says man "became a victim not of evolution but devilution"; that God knew his revelation would be abused (not answer-

ing the charge that it had been a “breastwork behind which tyranny and hypocrisy would crouch”), but wouldn’t deny it to man because he knew “the hypocrite would deny it and blaspheme,” and that it would be “misrepresented by hypocrites called Infidels” (why was it not worth while to point out the “misrepresentations” instead of continually making unproved charges?). After this page appears another example of foolish trifling, on page 121, on the text “He knew that he taught the Jewish people little of importance.” (This follows, “If Jehovah was in fact God, he knew,” etc.)

Lambert. “You only imagine that you know this. You must not confound your knowledge with that of Jehovah. How do you know that he knew? You evidently do not need to pray the old Scotch dominie’s prayer, ‘O Lord, gie us a gude conceit o’ oursel’.”

Comment. His own opinion as to whether or not Jehovah knew is not here divulged, and the paragraph seems to be thrown in for an exhibition of smartness.

POLYGAMY, SLAVERY AND WAR, WITH PERSONALITIES FOR DESSERT.

Ingersoll. “I here take occasion to thank Mr. Black for having admitted that Jehovah gave no

commandment against the practice of polygamy, that he established slavery, waged wars of extermination, and persecuted for opinion's sake even unto death."

Lambert. "First. You must have been in a very gushing humor when you so formally thanked your opponent for admitting what no Christian ever dreamt of denying. Your opponent said that 'if you were a statesman instead of a mere politician you would see good and sufficient reasons for the forbearance to legislate directly' [there was no legislation direct or indirect] 'on this subject (polygamy), and that it would be improper for him to set them forth' in an article intended for the general reader. Not being a statesman, a moralist, or a physician, you, of course, do not see those things to which your opponent delicately directs your attention."

Comment. This is very puzzling. What can be the justification of polygamy which it would be indelicate for Mr. Black and Mr. Lambert to give—which a statesman, a moralist, and physician could see, but which Mr. Ingersoll and the rest of us cannot see?—admitting, for the sake of information *only*, that we are not moralists. If the writer of pages 105-108 of the "Notes" might be suspected of sincerity I should never think of making the inquiry.

Lambert. "Second. When you say Mr. Black admitted that Jehovah established slavery you say what is not true. It is the height of unwisdom to make a statement that is so easily refuted. Your thanks were premature, as Mr. Black never, at least in the article you reply to, admitted anything of the kind. He said: 'Jehovah *permitted* his chosen people to hold the captives they took in war or purchased from the heathen as servants for life.' That is he permitted the Jews to follow the customs of the times in this matter. Is this an admission that Jehovah established slavery? Like a lawyer more 'cute' than cunning and able, you change the word *permitted* to *established*. You do not need to be told that there is a difference between *permit* and *establish*. It is unbecoming in the great apostle of 'candor' and 'honor bright' to thus misrepresent his antagonist, and it must bring a blush of shame even to *your* cheek to be caught in such petty chicanery."

Comment. Both disputants meant the Bible laws, and it may be found by reading that book that *established* is the correct word. Mr. Black did say authorized, but that word does not make any change in the meaning. If the law distinctly authorizes slavery by deciding authoritatively who may be held as slaves, and by regulating the institution—like this: "Notwithstanding if he continue"

(to live) "a day or two" (after the smiting with a rod) "he" (the master) "shall not be punished; for he is his money"—undoubtedly that is establishing slavery. In another place Mr. Black did say, "Jehovah permitted his chosen people to hold the captives they took in war or purchased from the heathen as servants for life." Permitting the enslavement of captives and the buying of slaves from the "heathen" was certainly establishing slavery. As an act of Jehovah authorizing, permitting, and establishing, are the same. The last sentence of Mr. Lambert's criticism supplies an excellent word to describe his method of word juggling in place of fair discussion—chicanery.

In his "*Third*," about wars of extermination, he takes up his definition plan again instead of answering. He says exterminate is from *ex* and *tirminus* and means to drive from the border, to expel, to drive out. While it is true about the derivation of the word, it is not true that by common usage it is defined in that sense. It is used according to Webster's definition "to utterly destroy"; and if we did not know it before, would not Jehovah's command to leave alive nothing that breathes show that it did not mean to drive out?

Continuing the denial in detail of the specifications he had admitted all together he charges misrepresentation of Mr. Black when Ingersoll said

that he admitted that Jehovah persecuted for opinion's sake, even unto death; and "God as God holds his intelligent creatures responsible for every thot, but God as the temporal monarch of Judea inflicted punishment only for overt acts." What were those overt acts to be punished with death by the command of Jehovah? Praising another religion? Engaging in some unfashionable form of worship? If no one was punished for opinion's sake it must have been for the expression of opinion. But this is what Mr. Black wrote which Mr. Lambert said was misrepresented, "But things were wholly different under the Jewish theocracy" [different from a country like ours] "where God was the personal head of the state. There blasphemy was a breach of political allegiance; idolatry was an overt act of treason; to worship the gods of the hostile heathen was deserting to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. These are crimes which every independent community has always punished with the utmost rigor. In our own very recent history they were repressed at the cost of more lives than Judea ever contained at any one time."

Comment. This shows that Ingersoll did not misrepresent as charged.

Though Jehovah is not the temporal ruler of this state, we have blasphemy and idolatry here. The expression of one man's religious opinions

may be very shocking to some other man of different views; that is blasphemy. The earnest prayer of one is an astonishing exhibition of idolatry to another. What a state of affairs if certain of these opinions and modes of worship were called treason for which the penalty is death!

Altho Mr. Lambert says on page 121 that Mr. Ingersoll thanked Mr. Black for admitting what no Christian ever dreamt of denying, he again charges on page 123 misrepresentation in saying that Mr. Black admits what most theologians deny, for, says Mr. Lambert, the admissions were never made by him; he says that Mr. Black admits the truth, but not what Ingersoll states; that Mr. Black is not a theologian; "he has made some admissions, not of fact but of principle, which he should not have made; and taken certain positions which he cannot hold successfully; and, singular as it may seem to him and you, those positions are the very ones which are not Christian." (The very next sentence in the same paragraph is remarkable. The subject was polygamy, slavery, wars of extermination, and persecution for opinion's sake.) "One instance will suffice. Mr. Black says that the creation was a miracle. Theologians do not agree with him in this."

Let us put those things close together for a plainer view. Black admitted these things which

no Christian denies ; he does not admit them ; those admissions "for which you credit him at the expense of theologians" were never made by him ; he made admissions which he should not have made, and has taken positions which he cannot hold successfully, and these positions are not Christian ; one instance will suffice : He says the creation was a miracle. This was written and published, and is to be found on pages 121-124 of the "Notes."

The chapter is concluded with these gems :

Lambert. "Now as to the theologians, at whom you take your fling over Mr. Black's shoulders, I will say this of them : If they were guilty of as much puttying and patching, misrepresentation, low trickery, cunning, deceit, flattering of popular passions and errors, as you have perpetrated in this one article of yours, I would be disposed to look upon them as sharpers of the meanest order who were inspired, not by the genius of Christianity, but of infidelity.

"You deem it no offense against decency to accuse theologians of intention to perpetrate and perpetuate fraud, to call them hypocrites, etc., and yet if they turn on you and call you a speculator who turns falsehood into dollars, a fraud, and a liar, you begin to whimper about the Master who tells them to turn the other cheek. You are a brave man. You challenge to mortal combat, and on the

field you seriously tell your antagonist that he cannot, and must not, according to his principles, blow your brains out; while you claim to shoot him thru the heart if you can. There is no epithet in your vocabulary low or venomous enough to fling at priests and theologians, but when a 'policeman,' like Mr. Black, ventures to catalog you, you are up in indignation, and whine and whimper about decency and the etiquette of debate."

Comment. When Ingersoll says theologians generally try to fix up the record, but Mr. Black is honest enough to admit it as it is—that could never be called whipping them over his shoulders; but if Ingersoll had meant to criticize them and feared to do it, so charged him with fault, when people knew the criticism applied to them, that would be whipping them over his shoulders. Of course, tho, everybody knows that and knows Ingersoll's language was straightforward.

Anyone who reads Ingersoll will find the malevolent adjectives in this paragraph entirely inappropriate to him. In my opinion the outcome, in any court, of a trial for calling him a fraud and a liar would be disastrous for this priest, unless some one should be able to rake up some old statute for the benefit of clergy.

This is what Lambert calls whimpering: "For a man who is a 'Christian policeman' and has taken

upon himself to defend the Christian religion; for one who follows the Master who said that when smitten on one cheek you must turn the other, and who again and again enforced the idea that you must overcome evil with good, it is hardly consistent to declare that a civilized nation must of necessity adopt the warfare of savages." I know of no one but Mr. Lambert who calls Ingersoll "a speculator who turns falsehood into dollars." Ingersoll was not answering any personality. He refused to answer personal insult, except references which I shall quote, but kept directly on with the argument.

Mr. Black said his duty was analogous to that of a policeman, so the reference to a policeman was not an expression of contempt for anybody—policeman or judge.

Ingersoll. "Mr. Black should have answered my arguments instead of calling me 'blasphemous' and 'scurrilous.' In the discussion of these questions I have nothing to do with the reputation of my opponent."

Comment. I will give another extract showing what Ingersoll said concerning disparaging epithets and his protest against personalities. These will show the ostensible grounds for the imputation in the last paragraph of chapter xiv. To answer what Lambert said about challenging to mortal combat I

will begin back a little ways. Bear in mind this answer of Ingersoll to Black is the very thing Lambert is professing to answer.

Ingersoll. "Not until the article, 'Is All of the Bible Inspired?' was written did I know who was expected to answer. I make this explanation for the purpose of dissipating the impression that Mr. Black had been challenged by me. To have struck his shield with my lance might have given birth to the impression that I was somewhat doubtful as to the correctness of my position. I naturally expected an answer from some professional theologian, and was surprised to find that a reply had been written by a 'policeman' who imagined that he had answered my arguments by simply telling me that my statements were false. It is somewhat unfortunate that in a discussion like this anyone should resort to the slightest personal detraction. The theme is great enough to engage the highest faculties of the human mind, and in the investigation of such a subject, vituperation is singularly and vulgarly out of place. Arguments cannot be answered with insults. It is unfortunate that the intellectual arena should be entered by a 'policeman' who has more confidence in concussion than discussion. Kindness is strength, good nature is often mistaken for virtue, and good health sometimes passes for genius. Anger blows out the lamp

of the mind. In the examination of a great and important question, every one should be serene, slow-pulsed and calm. Intelligence is not the foundation of arrogance. Insolence is not logic. Epithets are the arguments of malice. Candor is the courage of the soul. Leaving the objectionable portions of Mr. Black's reply, feeling that so grand a subject should not be blown and tainted with malicious words, I proceed to answer as best I may the arguments he has urged."

THE BIBLE—SLAVERY.

Chapter xv begins with the accusation that Ingersoll "assumes to determine what is monstrous, miraculous, impossible and immoral," speaks of "an Infidel offering his crude notions as ultimate principles or axioms," and says that is deciding in his own favor—playing counsel and judge at the same time.

Comment. The assumption that every right-minded being would determine that assassination and many other crimes were monstrous, etc., would be fully warranted. Does Mr. Lambert "assume to determine" otherwise? In these two rather long paragraphs of his not a single argument appears; and the same is true of the two very long paragraphs at the end of the last chapter.

Mr. Black wrote: "I do not enumerate in detail the positive proofs which support the authenticity of the Hebrew Bible, tho they are at hand in great abundance, because the evidence in support of the new dispensation will establish the verity of the old—the two being so connected together that if one is true the other cannot be false." In his answer Ingersoll begins his argument on that point by saying: "Mr. Black comes to the conclusion that the Hebrew Bible is in exact harmony with the New Testament, and that the two are 'connected together'; and, 'that if one is true the other cannot be false.'" The volunteer champion quotes the first part of the paragraph, and says, "Mr. Black comes to no such conclusion"; tho it is true they are so closely connected together, etc. He says this is very different from what Ingersoll represents.

There is a great sameness about these rude and unreasonable contradictions, but they should all be answered. But, imagine some one in your parlor, who, whenever someone makes a remark, bristles up and shouts vehemently, "It is no such thing." "It is nothing of the kind." "It is a lie." "That is only your conceit." "You rave like a lunatic."

To return to this volunteer in the war against Ingersoll. You will notice that in the sentence now

under discussion, in the part where Ingersoll does not give the direct quotation, he gives Mr. Black's idea exactly. The volunteer does not expect his readers to know the arguments of Mr. Black and Mr. Ingersoll, except as they are presented by him.

Ingersoll. "It hardly seems possible to me that there is a right-minded, sane man, except Mr. Black, who believes that a God of infinite kindness and justice ever commanded one nation to exterminate another."

Lambert. "It no doubt appears strange and hardly possible to you, after your prodigal use of deceit and sophistry, that anyone should believe anything at all. When God commands one nation to exterminate another the Christian believes that there is a very serious reason for it. He believes that God knows more than he, and does not think that to be a philosopher it is necessary to exhaust the resources of his lachrymal glands on every guilty wretch and law-breaker whom the God of Justice sees proper to lash or exterminate. God makes instruments of nations to punish nations."

Comment. It is characteristic of Mr. Lambert to pick out guilty wretches and law-breakers, as if they were the only ones who suffered, when the subject was *the extermination of all the people of a nation*. The subject of the Ingersoll-Black debate was, Is All of the Bible Inspired? Among

the reasons given for believing the bad passages were not was the one that in it God was represented as commanding wars of conquest and extermination. "When the Lord thy God shall drive them before thee, thou shalt smite them, and utterly destroy them; thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor show mercy unto them." The question is asked whether it is possible that a being of infinite goodness and wisdom said this: "I will heap mischief upon them; I will send mine arrows among them; they shall be burned with hunger, and devoured with burning heat, and with bitter destruction. I will send the tooth of beasts upon them, with the poison of serpents of the dust. The sword without, the terror within, shall destroy both the young man and the virgin, the suckling also, with the man of gray hairs."

Ingersoll's comment on this is what the priest calls "exhausting the resources of his lachrymal glands on every guilty wretch and law-breaker." Does he choose his insolent and sneering expressions, or does he shake them up and draw?

Lambert devotes the next two pages to denying that Mr. Black made any effort to prove that God established slavery in Judea; to saying that Ingersoll blundered in his haste and failed to understand Black when he said that the doctrine that slavery was a crime under all circumstances was

started, etc., less than forty years ago; that Black took it for granted that Ingersoll "knew the difference between what is wrong in itself and what is wrong by circumstance." "Your opponent was too good a historian to say that the anti-slavery movement began only forty years ago. Since the advent of Christianity slavery has been considered a social and circumstantial evil, an improper relation between labor and capital, but it was never considered by men of healthy brains an evil *per se*, an evil in its nature and essence. This is what Mr. Black meant by 'all circumstances,' but you were in such a hurry you could not see it. This distinction takes all the pith from your eloquence on this point." Christianity, he says, began the anti-slavery movement; its Councils tried to abolish it or to mitigate its severities. As Black did not say the movement began forty years ago, but the doctrine that it was wrong under all circumstances began then, "your argument loses its wind." Christianity antagonized slavery by legislation; he gives the names and dates of "some of the Councils which legislated to protect the slave." "Pope Gregory XVI. in 1839 published apostolic letters against the slave trade." Anti-slavery is a Christian thot.

Comment. In all these pages of Mr. Lambert's I do not find any information as to the circumstances which make slavery right in his opinion.

He seemed to consent to whatever Mr. Black said on the subject, and Mr. Black thot it right to make slaves of captives (if it is right, according to the Bible, I suppose he would think it right forever), and to buy them of the heathen. I suppose that means the Gentiles, tho it may take in all not of the Jewish religion. Those are the only circumstances given in which slavery is right, as far as learned from the two apologists. When Jehovah's people warred among themselves they could not make slaves of their captives, for they were commanded to "save alive nothing that breathed." Here we have a case in which slavery was wrong. I wish Mr. Black, Mr. Lambert, or any of those Protestants and Catholics who were united by the "Notes," and took Mr. Lambert "cordially by the hand as a vigorous and successful defender of Christianity," would enumerate the times and circumstances in which slavery is right. The Bible tells us, by implication, of the case where it is wrong, for captives—men, women and children and all animals—must be killed. Now if some of the cordially united sectarians would only risk sustaining Ingersoll to that extent and try to think of some other cases in which it may be wrong, tho it is never wrong *in itself!*

RISE OF CHRISTIANITY PROOF OF ITS DIVINE ORIGIN.

Mr. Black said: "I do not enumerate in detail the positive proofs which support the authority of the Hebrew Bible, tho they are at hand in great abundance, because the evidence in support of the new dispensation will establish the verity of the old—the two being so closely connected together that if one is true the other cannot be false."

I can find nothing in Mr. Black's essay which seems to be intended to prove the authenticity of the Old Testament. He does try to show that the God delineated in the Old Testament is moral and excusable for his acts, tho they would at this day be pronounced infamous by all people. That argument is expected to show that the Bible might be written by the inspiration of God, but it does not seem to be anything that would be understood as an argument for its authenticity. If inspiration were shown by ascribed goodness, Tobit would stand a better chance of being inspired than Joshua.

Mr. Black carries on his argument for the "truth" of the New Testament and Christianity together. Beginning with the early difficulties and rapid rise of Christianity he ends this phase of the argument thus: "Is it Mr. Ingersoll's idea that this happened by chance, like the creation of the world?"

(Mr. Black is not my theme, except so far as it is necessary to speak of him for an understanding of Mr. Lambert, so I pass that sentence by.) "If not, there are but two other ways to account for it; either the evidence by which the apostles were able to prove the supernatural origin was overwhelming and irresistible, or else its propagation was provided for and carried on by the direct aid of the Divine Being himself. Between these two infidelity may make its own choice."

Mr. Ingersoll brings forward the rapid rise of the anti-slavery sentiment, giving a short summary of what it had accomplished in less than forty years, and asks if that happened by chance, or proved that it was of supernatural origin, or provided for and carried on by the direct aid of the Divine Being himself? He says the same argument applies to all religions, and says that according to Mr. Black's position Mohammed was most certainly the prophet of God. "Years before Gautama died his religion was established and his disciples numbered by millions," and, "more than one-third of the human race are today the followers of Gautama." A Brahmin could use the same arguments as Mr. Black. "Egypt, the mysterious mother of mankind, with her pyramids built thirty-four hundred years before Christ, was once the first in all the earth, and gave to us our trinity,

and our symbol of the cross. Could not a priest of Isis and Osiris have used your arguments to prove that his religion was divine, and could he not have closed by saying, "From the facts established by this evidence it follows irresistibly that our religion comes from God?"

It is said that a snapping turtle never puts his head out of his shell without snapping at something.

Mr. Lambert snaps again; denies that Mr. Black took the position that the rapid rise of Christianity demonstrated its divine character, "altho you labor to make your readers believe that he did. Theologians do not teach that rapidity of rise and spread, taken alone, is evidence of the divine character of Christianity. Hence, your several pages devoted to show the unsoundness of that position are so much waste paper. It is a loss of time as well to overthrow a position that no one holds—that has no existence, except in your vivid imagination." He quotes from Mr. Black, showing it was just as Ingersoll said; then he goes on to say this was the statement of *facts*, but Mr. Black goes on to speak of "the circumstances under which this rapid rise took place."

Comment. Yes, and so did Mr. Ingersoll speak of those circumstances. When I came to "circumstances" as the excuse for all that blustering

denial I remembered little Davy who in his dream was walking thru the woods when he came upon a number of little people, one of them with a gun. The one with the gun would load it, and the others would gather around him and watch the loading. Whenever it was ready to be fired the others would all run away and hide themselves behind trees and bushes until the gun was fired. Every time it was fired the ball would roll gently out and fall at the feet of the gunner. After this had been done several times Davy went up to the marksman and asked how it was that the ball always rolled down to his feet? The gunner answered, "That is because it is loaded with tooth powder."

Mr. Lambert often loads with tooth powder, but I never saw anyone run and hide.

He grants, for argument's sake, he says, that other religions rose as rapidly, but did they arise under like circumstances, and did they meet and overcome like obstacles?

Whether the obstacles were exactly alike or not does not affect the argument. *The rapid rise* of Christianity was Mr. Black's argument, which Mr. Ingersoll answered. Mr. Lambert's coming in afterwards with the perfectly inconsiderable objection that the obstacles to the rise of Christianity and other religions were not alike merits no attention.

Mr. Ingersoll gave some of those met and overcome by Mohammed, and also gave account of the "circumstances" and remarkable success of all the religions he mentioned. He said Black's argument in its simplest form is, all that succeeds is inspired. Besides the numbers of adherents he mentioned the "circumstance" that Mohammed was not crucified; he was a conquerer.

So far Mr. Lambert has quoted one sentence only of Mr. Ingersoll's on this point. "It will not do to take the ground that the rapid rise and spread of a religion demonstrates its divine character." He gives Mr. Black's in full, altho it shows that he gives the rapid rise and success in overcoming obstacles *alone* as proof of the verity of Christianity. Not that he stops with this argument, but he is being answered on every point as he advances it, and this *alone* is here offered as proof. Without once stopping to ask what Mr. Black means by verity; without substituting other words as more suitable than obstacle or chance; without any language carping, he comments thus: "This, Mr. Ingersoll, is your adversary's argument in full, and the reader will see why you twist it out of shape before you attempt to answer it, and why you notice one part and ignore the other." If the Rev. Patrick Cronin had called this "untruthful in statement, illogical in reasoning, dishonest

in inference, vile in innuendo, and malevolent in purpose," what unprejudiced person who had read the whole debate would contradict him?

The next thing he takes up is an argument of Ingersoll's on which he has already passed judgment (that the Mohammedan could just as effectually use Mr. Black's argument against an Infidel; that it would be equally applicable to all the religions of the world), and says the Mohammedan, the Brahmin, or the priest of Isis or Osiris could not; because, said Mr. Lambert, "the rise and spread of these false religions have nothing in common with the rise and spread of Christianity, except, perhaps, rapidity, and that is not given by Mr. Black as a proof of the divine origin of Christianity. You evidently set about answering his argument before you got hold of its full force and meaning."

He does not get up any explanation of what he wishes us to consider the meaning of Mr. Black's plain words to be. He evidently depends on the willingness of his adherents to give up their reasoning faculties entirely. This is shown by his putting Mr. Black's argument before them and affect that it is not as they see it. Perhaps he depends on his statement that Ingersoll did not understand to leave the impression that they could

not understand and must not doubt the word of a holy man.

Lambert. "Your efforts to make the argument fit Buddhism, Brahminism and Mohammedanism can succeed only by the way of misrepresenting it, which, by the way, you have not hesitated to do."

Comment. This "misrepresentation" can not be proved, and Mr. Lambert contents himself with the unsupported assertion.

FOUNDERS OF CHRISTIANITY.

Perhaps the consideration of the last point of the argument should have been begun by a longer quotation from Ingersoll to better show on what Mr. Lambert's criticism was based, but I must not go back to it. I will give his argument on the good, bad and mistaken men at length.

Ingersoll. "The old argument that if Christianity is a human fabrication its authors must have been either good men or bad men, takes it for granted there are but two classes of persons—the good and the bad. There is at least one other class—*the mistaken*, and both of the other classes may belong to this. Thousands of most excellent people have been deceived, and the history of the world is filled with instances where men have

honestly supposed that they had received communications from angels and gods.

"In thousands of instances these pretended communications contained the purest and highest thots, together with the most important truths; yet it will not do to say that these accounts are true; neither can they be proved by saying that the men who claimed to be inspired were good. What we must say is, that, being good men, they were mistaken; and it is the charitable mantle of a mistake that I throw over Mr. Black, when I find him defending the institution of slavery. He seems to think it utterly incredible that any 'combination of knaves, however base, would fraudulently concoct a religious system to denounce themselves, and to invoke the curse of God upon their own conduct.' How did religions other than Christianity and Judaism arise? Were they all 'concocted by a combination of knaves'? The religion of Gautama is filled with most tender and beautiful thots, with most excellent laws, and hundreds of sentences urging mankind to deeds of love and self-denial. Was Gautama inspired?

"Does not Mr. Black know that thousands of people charged with witchcraft actually confessed in open court their guilt? Does he not know that they admitted that they had spoken face to face with Satan, and had sold their souls for gold and

power? Does he not know that these admissions were made in the presence and expectation of death? Does he not know that hundreds of judges, some of them as great as the late lamented Gibson, believed in the existence of an impossible crime?"

Lambert. "Then you must belong to this newly invented class. The *mistaken* must be either good or bad. If they are honestly mistaken they are good, as far as the subject of the mistake goes; if they are dishonestly mistaken they are bad. Don't you see we must come back to the two classes which 'the old argument takes for granted'?"

Comment. We can very well see that men may believe what is not true; in that case they might be said to be honestly mistaken; but as for being dishonestly mistaken I do not see how that could be, for he is not mistaken unless he believes a mistake, and how could there be anything dishonest about that? Mr. Lambert does not bring his powers as a definer to bear on this word dishonestly, as qualifying mistaken, tho it seems really perplexing.

But if there were really only the two classes after all, as he says, he does not show how that would prove that Christianity is not a human fabrication.

Lambert. "How do you know that they honest-

ly supposed" [that they had received communications from angels and gods]? "From the nature of the case you take their word for it, so it is their *claim* that must be examined. History is full of these instances and is full of instances where they were rejected for want of sufficient evidence." (About good men tho mistaken.) "Then you know more about events that transpired nearly two thousand years ago than those who were eye-witnesses of them! Whatever else a modern Infidel may lack, he is never found wanting in assurance. It is his strong point."

Comment. As assurance is here ascribed to the modern Infidel it is supposed to be used in the sense of impudence. In the same sense it may be more correctly applied to the following explanation, for it assumes as proved the things which are questioned or denied.

He says apostles in these comments. It is common to say apostles and their successors, meaning priests, but it does not so appear in this place; this book is written to please *all* of the opponents of Rationalism. He proceeds on the assumption that the divine mission of the apostles was proved by miracles, which reliable witnesses saw with their own eyes and heard with their own ears. If argument consisted in repeating an assertion instead of

trying to give reasons for sustaining it, what a fine debater Mr. Lambert might be!

Lambert. Because there are fanatics and insane men it does not prove that sane men have not had commissions from God; a false prophet does not prevent the possibility of a true one, and a counterfeit note does not destroy the value of a genuine one; there are many presidents and queens in the insane asylums, which does not vitiate the real title. "Does the delusion of a Guiteau destroy the claims of a St. Paul or Moses to a divine commission? Yet this is the assumption and drift of your argument against the mission of the apostles! Your reasoning, stated in form, is this:

"Some men have been mistaken.

"Therefore the founders of Christianity were mistaken.

"A boy who could reason no better than this ought to have his ears boxed—if boxes large enough could be found."

Comment. But the boy who reasons thus is not Mr. Ingersoll; it is Mr. Lambert. It is quite different from Mr. Ingersoll's reasoning. Let us consider this last specimen of Mr. Lambert's reasoning. The believers in other religions are not in insane asylums, any more than Christians; their prophets are not Guiteaus; one note is not genuine because another is counterfeit; if inspected, it

must stand the test or be rejected; if one holds a note he believes to be good he should be willing to submit it to examination. If he refuses to allow it to be compared with other notes we naturally suppose he is not sure it is good, but wishes it to pass anyhow.

AUTHENTICITY OF THE GOSPELS— MIRACLES.

In view of the great advance in knowledge of the Bible it hardly seems worth while to take time in noting the pages on the authenticity of the Gospels. This is not written to support or refute any opinions respecting the Gospels, but to show Mr. Lambert's plan of campaign, especially his treatment of the man he opposes.

I see he discusses the subject as if such a thing as higher and lower criticism had never been heard of; and as if nothing had been written for a century or two by those who have made a study of the Bible beyond simply quoting texts. He writes as if his authoritative statements had never been disputed; indeed he says, "There can be no reasonable doubt whatever that Matthew, Mark, Luke and John wrote the gospels attributed to them. Your statement to the contrary has not a particle of evidence to rest on." "It is a remarkable fact

that the authenticity or genuineness of the Gospels was never brot in question until modern times, and then only by a few Infidels; and even these confine themselves to bold, naked, groundless statements."

In reference to Mr. Ingersoll's question to Mr. Black, "How is this known?" (Mr. Black had said nothing had ever been said against the personal honesty of the evangelists) he supposes the case of some one of Ingersoll's friends praising his personal honesty, when some one asks, "How is this known?" He goes on in this surprising strain:

Lambert. "What would you think of the man who would reply by saying: 'How is this known?' You would say he was a coward and a contemptible sneak, with the heart of an assassin without his courage. Is not your honesty and virtue to be taken for granted until there is evidence to the contrary? Is not that man a criminal who attempts to rob you of your character by hints or winks or insinuating questions?"

Comment. Do you think anything could be more astounding than this description of his own manner of defaming a character that he must know cannot be truthfully assailed?—and written in his own style, too! But the wonder of it is surpassed by the next sentence: "Christianity teaches that he is, whatever you may think, with your code of morals." (!)

After quoting from some Pagan philosophers as to miracles, he says:

Lambert. "Now, Mr. Ingersoll, do not all these attempts of ancient philosophers to belittle and explain away the works of Jesus Christ prove that these works were real—that they were known and admitted? These men knew the facts better than you do, and instead of denying them as you do, they tried to make little of them or explain them away."

Comment. The citations simply show that the Pagans claimed for their great men, Aristeus, Pythagoras, Appollonius, greater miracle-working powers than the Christians claimed for Jesus. Claims for workers of miracles were common in those days.

He takes up miracles again in chapter xxvii. For the sake of convenience we will take two of his texts together, and his comments in the same way.

Ingersoll. "How it is known that it was claimed during the life of Christ that he had wrot a miracle? and if the claim was made, how is it known that it was not denied?"

Lambert. "It is known from four histories, written by four well-known historians: Matthew, Mark, Luke and John. These histories relate that the Jews accused Jesus of working miracles by the power of Beelzebub, and Jesus argued with them

to prove that he did not." "There is contemporary evidence that the claim was made and admitted, and there is no evidence whatever that it was ever denied. On the contrary, all history takes these miracles as facts that have been passed upon as no longer legitimate subjects of dispute.

"As you have adduced no ancient historian who denies the miracles of Christ, it must be taken for granted that there is none. If there was a single line of Jew or Pagan denying these miracles, you Infidels would hammer on it as persistently as the gentlemanly waiter hammers on the Chinese gong at the railroad depot—twenty minutes for refreshments. Failing to find any evidence of this kind, what do you do? It is almost incredible, but nevertheless true; you actually call on Christians to prove that no such evidence ever existed! You say how is it known that it was not denied? The devil himself, in the highest flights of his genius, never surpassed this piece of supreme impertinence." Further, Mr. Ingersoll is a lawyer and should know something of legal logic at least; suppose the prosecution in the star route case, not finding any evidence of guilt, should say, "How do you know that such evidence does not exist?"

Comment. But Ingersoll did give many things to prove that it had been disbelieved by some in the time of the life of Jesus, and pointed out the

absence of any proof from contemporary history. He showed how such claims might be made at the time the accounts were written without exciting any comment, when but few people could write, and a manuscript did not, in any modern sense, become public. Besides all the reasons given, it seems to me enough to recall the fact that Eusebius admitted that he kept only what favored the church, and suppressed whatever he considered against it; and, that manuscripts and books that were suspected of being against the faith, or of doubtful use as to the benefit of the church, were burned.

Lambert himself says, in answer to "Did the Jews believe that Christ was clothed with miraculous power?" "They did. And they *believed that their prophets were also clothed with miraculous power, even that of raising the dead* (italics mine), and this was the reason why the miracles of Christ did not convince them that he was God, or the Messiah."

Mr. Lacy, in his answer to the "Notes," says a good deal about miracles which is all very good, but too long to quote in full here. Mentioning some miracles, he says (page 136): "Should we accept such statements on the same kind and amount of evidence as we do the reign of a monarch, the history of a battle, or the constitution of a state? No, for there is an antecedent improbability that such

things ever happened. They contradict human experience. They imply the intervention of a force unknown either to science or philosophy. Not only so, but we find them wedded to superstitions which the educated world has long ago discarded." And on page 138: "Before we can credit miracles we must insist on the most indubitable proof—not such as may suffice in a question of a common historical or everyday fact, but such as disinterested, educated and unbiased minds would deem sufficient." "But were the accounts of miracles given us by the evangelists strictly contemporary with the events they record? Or, was the present canon of Scripture accepted and the books therein contained unquestioned as to genuineness and inspiration in the infancy of the church? I love to quote Catholic authority; it is often so charming in its explicitness. Bishop (afterwards Archbishop) Purcell, in his debate with Campbell (p. 130), says: 'You did not see the miracles; the books that record them were written long after they occurred, and many of the most important portions of this very book were doubted for upwards of three hundred years after Christ, even by Luther himself, in the enlightened sixteenth century! His [Campbell's] author, Du Pin, says there were abundance of false gospels, false epistles, false Acts, in the early ages. How then, according to his [Campbell's]

principles, can we be sure of the authenticity of a single book of the Old or the New Testament, being we have no vouchers for the truth but the testimony of men? Here are chasms to be bridged, and links in the chain of scriptural testimony to be welded, for full three hundred years, aye, sixteen hundred years before the various books of the Scriptures were collected together.

"But have we a divine sanction, or other proof, to show that Jesus ever authorized anyone to write a history of his acts and sayings? Let Catholic authority answer. See 'The Bible Question,' by the great and good Fenelon, Fletcher's notes, p. 48: 'Our Divine Redeemer wrote nothing; he only preached. But did he not command his apostles to write? Of this or of such command there is no testimony in the Bible. So that thus there is no proof, in the sacred book itself, that any written word has ever been appointed by Jesus Christ himself to be the rule of our belief.' Again, p. 57: 'The Bible neither proclaims its own inspiration, nor can the sacred article be proved by any testimony of the Bible.' In the same work (p. 57) are quoted approvingly the words of 'the excellent and learned Hooker,' as he is there called: '*But it is not the word of God, which doeth and can assure us that we do well to think it is his word*'" (pages 139-140).

Comment. Mr. Purcell's argument was in refutation of Protestants, instead of trying to please them and get their aid in working against free inquiry; Mr. Lambert keeps everything offensive to them for some other time. Everything is sweet and smooth for them thruout the "Notes."

Ingersoll. "Is it not strange that the ones he had cured were not his disciples?"

Lambert. "It would be strange if true; but how do you happen to know they were not? Is it not strange that you should know more about those who were cured than history knows? Where did you get your information? How do you know that the son of the widow of Nain was not a disciple of Christ? or Lazarus, or the deaf, the blind and the lame? You simply know nothing whatever about it. And yet with your Infidel brass you say they were not."

Comment. It is usual to speak of the twelve as the disciples; it is used in the Bible in that way; the concordance says disciples where the body of the book says twelve disciples. The disciples of John are mentioned, and if the word simply meant followers in general, the word disciples would not be used, for they would all be the followers of Jesus. In the subject index references are given where the meaning was followers in general, but the word disciples was not used in the text. The

word is often used now to mean learners or followers, but if we are speaking of the Gospels the twelve would be understood.

Ingersoll. "Can we believe, upon the testimony of those about whose character we know nothing, that Lazarus was raised from the dead? What became of Lazarus? We never hear of him again. It seems to me he would have been an object of great interest. People would have said, 'He is the man who was once dead.' Thousands would have inquired of him about the other world; would have asked him where he was when he received the information that he was wanted on the earth. His experience would have been vastly more interesting than everything else in the New Testament. A returned traveler from the shores of Eternity—one who had walked twice thru the valley of the shadow—would have been the most interesting of human beings. When he came to die again people would have said: 'He is not afraid; he has had experience; he knows what death is.' But, strangely enough, this Lazarus fades into obscurity, with 'the Wise Men of the East' and with the dead who came out of their graves the night of the crucifixion."

Lambert. (In answer to "Can we believe . . . that Lazarus was raised from the dead?") "Yes, we can and must as we believe all facts of history," enumerating a number of events; he ends

the paragraph, "The principle that destroys the credibility of the Gospel histories destroys at the same time the credibility of all history and the credibility of the human race."

[The rest of the chapter is given entire for readers should be acquainted with the Lambertian quibbles.]

Ingersoll. What became of Lazarus?

Lambert. It is probable that he lived an honest life and did not spend his time asking foolish questions.

Ingersoll. We never hear of him again.

Lambert. The world has not ceased to hear of him to good purpose for the last nineteen hundred years.

Ingersoll. It seems to me he would have been an object of great interest.

Lambert. So it has proved, altho he was not the first man who was raised from the dead, as we learn from the Old Testament.

Comment. No one can fail to understand that the disappearance of Lazarus from the *Bible story* is meant; the most stupid could never imagine that people of the present day do not hear of him; but the dodging expedient of the priest had to be again brot into requisition.

JOSEPHUS—INSPIRED WITNESSES.

Ingersoll. "The paragraph in Josephus is admitted to be an interpolation."

Lambert. "Admitted by whom? By you and Paine and Voltaire, and other Infidels, Tooley Street tailors."

Comment. Wondering who were the Tooley Street tailors, looking in the dictionary of noted names of fiction, etc., and not finding them, the next thing in trying to get on their track is to look up printed authorities to find what those authorities say about others who admit the interpolation. Those accessible to me and references to others show many names that do not seem to point to any people who could be compared to Tooley Street tailors, whatever they may be. Christian writers see the improbability if not the impossibility of the truth of the passage. But I see nothing suggestive of any kind of tailors.

Mr. Lambert. "Eusebius was the first to quote this passage, and it is morally impossible that he could have forged it without being detected."

Comment. Besides his being the first to use it, his admission of unpardonable faults as a historian would direct suspicion to him as the originator.

Ingersoll. "Are the statements of the inspired witnesses alike on this point?" [The ascension of Jesus.]

Lambert. "Yes. But your opponent does not say inspired witnesses. Christians do not teach that the apostles were *inspired witnesses* of the events they narrate. It does not require inspiration to witness a fact. This is an illustration of your art in changing words to introduce into the question false ideas. The apostles witnessed the events in the life of Christ, as others witnessed them. But unlike others, they were inspired to give a narration of the events they witnessed. You are fond of words of double meaning. They give room for sophistry. A witness may mean one who has seen an event take place, or it may mean one who gives testimony of what he has seen. The evangelists were the inspired narrators of what they witnessed. I mention this merely to show how carefully you have to be watched. The statements, then, of the inspired witnesses, are alike on the ascension."

Comment. Witnesses testify to what they know; these witnesses testified in the books called the gospels; as the gospels are spoken of as inspired the writers would be called inspired witnesses—inspired testifiers. As Mr. Black spoke of these witnesses as inspired and Mr. Ingersoll in his answer used the words in the same way, I do not see how Mr. Lambert could properly charge him with changing words to introduce false ideas. If he sees any false ideas let him point them out. Let

him point out the double meaning and the sophistry. This wordy critic seems to find some bad meaning suggested, but not expressed. If there is really something bad in his mind let him speak out and show, if he can, that it is not indigenous. What is the use of his boasting that he is watching, if he brings nothing to light? He abounds in hints that he has seen something. Why does he not say what? He stands high as a caviller, and pre-eminent in unmeaning innuendo.

Ingersoll. "Matthew says nothing on the subject" [the ascension of Jesus]. ". . . To this wonder of wonders Mark devotes one verse: 'So then, after the Lord had spoken unto them, he was received up into heaven and sat at the right hand of God.' Can we believe that this verse was written by one who witnessed the ascension of Jesus Christ; by one who watched his Master slowly rising thru the air till distance reft him from his tearful sight? Luke, another of the witnesses, says: 'And it came to pass, while he blessed them, he was parted from them, and was carried up to heaven.' John corroborates Matthew by saying nothing on the subject. Now we find that the last chapter of Mark, after the eighth verse, is an interpolation, so that Mark really says nothing about the occurrence. Either the ascension of Christ must be given up, or it must be admitted that the witnesses

do not agree, and that three of them never heard of that most stupendous event."

Lambert. "Your opponent said the statements *made* by the evangelists were alike, etc. He said nothing of statements *not made* by this or that evangelist. Matthew's history ends with the resurrection and commission of the apostles, and does not extend to the ascension."

Comment. Each of the Gospels is looked upon as a biography—a story, or history of Jesus. Their stories may be called statements. Among Webster's definitions of the word appears: "a narrative"; "a recital"; and of narrative: "the recital of a story, or a continued account of the particulars of an event or transaction; story." Of recital definitions we have, "a telling of the particulars of anything, as of a law, or an adventure, or of a series of events; narration." If an important circumstance is left out of a gospel, the natural inference is that the author never heard of it, or disbelieved it. When Luke tells of the ascension and Matthew says nothing about it, their statements do not agree.

Of the one verse in Mark concerning it, Mr. Lambert writes: "Is not one verse sufficient to state an important fact? You, no doubt, would have devoted many words to this fact, but that was not Mark's style—he was not a romancer. The difference between him and you is this: He was inspired

to write the truth, while you are not—at least your writings give no evidence of it."

Comment. Here is another accusation of untruth without any excuse for dragging it in.

He quotes Luke's statement and says: "Well, is not this statement and that of Mark alike?" taking no notice in this place of the reason why Mark did not count. He seems to want the statement, that they are alike to stand prominent. Further along he says we do not find it an interpolation, "and when you say you have found it, you simply take a dishonest advantage of your ignorant admirers. That they deserve no better treatment at your hands is no excuse for you." He says the words are found in almost all the ancient manuscripts; the most ancient of the fathers admit them; all the oldest Latin, Syriac and Arabic copies have them. They must, therefore, be considered genuine until we have some better reason for rejecting them than your "we find."

I notice that he says they "are found in almost all of the ancient manuscripts." He does not say anything about *the most ancient*, which sustains the charge of interpolation. The Revised Version has this on the margin: "The two oldest Greek manuscripts, and some other authorities, omit from verse 9 to the end. Some other authorities have a different ending to the Gospel."

Lambert. "The ascension of Christ will not be given up. It should never have been believed if it could be overthrown by the silly trash which you advance as arguments. The evidence of the three evangelists whom I have quoted do agree, and no man of sense and unbiased judgment will pretend to the contrary . . . There are only four evangelists. Three of them speak of the ascension . . . now where do you find your other three who never heard of it? But you contradict yourself. According to your reasoning only one of the evangelists mentions the ascension, the rest are silent or never heard of the stupendous event. Now if only one of four witnesses speaks, how can they contradict each other? There is such a thing as being too smart."

Comment. If he had shown that silly trash had been advanced as argument there would have been no necessity for this invective, and giving evidence of a thing is much more effective with thinking people than the use of opprobrious epithets so habitual with this writer. Anyone reading what Ingersoll wrote about it finds that he says Matthew and John say nothing on the subject; that the last chapter of Mark, where it was mentioned, has been found to be interpolated, and Luke is the only one mentioning it. The agreement of the Gospels on this subject stands disproved.

The author of the "Notes" quotes John iii, 13. This is not given in the subject index of the Oxford Sunday School Edition in "Ascension of Christ." It is in the concordance "No man hath ascended." I do not find it in Young's Concordance as "The Ascension." It is, "And no man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven." As Jesus says that to Nicodemus in the first part of his public life, or his ministry, I do not see how that could prove what is called the ascension. Had no one else ascended? "And Elijah went up by a whirlwind into heaven" (2 Kings ii, 11).

Ingersoll. "Again, if anything could have left its form and pressure on the brain, it must have been the last words of Jesus Christ. The last words, according to Matthew, are: 'Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world.' The last words, according to the inspired witness known as Mark, are: 'And these signs shall follow them that believe; in my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing,

it shall not hurt them ; they shall lay hands on the sick and they shall recover.' Luke tells us that the last words uttered by Christ, with the exception of the blessing, were : ' And behold, I send forth the promise of my father upon you ; but tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem, until ye be endued with power from on high.' The last words, according to John, were : ' Peter, seeing Him, saith to Jesus, Lord, and what shall this man do ? Jesus saith unto him, If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee ? Follow thou me.'

"An account of the ascension is also given in the Acts of the Apostles ; and the last words of Christ, according to that inspired witness, are : ' But ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you ; and ye shall be witnesses unto me, both in Jerusalem and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth.' In this account of the ascension we find that two men stood by the disciples, in white apparel, and asked them, ' Ye men of Galilee, why stand you gazing up into heaven ? This same Jesus, which is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven.' Matthew says nothing of the two men. Mark never saw them. Luke may have forgotten them when writing his Gospel, and John may have regarded them as optical illusions."

Lambert. "Now these are not the last words of Christ according to Matthew, and Matthew does not say they were the last words. Why do you interpolate into the gospel of Matthew a statement he never made? Is it thru stupidity, or ignorance, or a desire to deceive? You must excuse me, but I must talk according to the facts; your statement is absolutely false. Matthew does not pretend to give the last words of Christ. The words, 'Go ye,' etc., are simply the last words reported by Matthew."

"What I have said above in reference to the last words of Matthew are equally applicable here. St. Mark does not report these words as the last utterance of Christ. They are simply the last words he (Mark) reports. You can be excused from bad faith here only at the expense of your intelligence."

"Luke tells us nothing of the kind; and it is hard to believe that you did not know you were misrepresenting Luke when you said so. You must have an unlimited faith in the credulity of this age, or the bottomless ignorance of the class to which you appeal, when you make such a statement. It is not at all surprising that great and learned Christian theologians do not care to meet you. The reason of their silence is evident to men of sense. It is not their duty or business to turn aside

to meet every blatant blasphemer who wags his tongue against Christianity for dollars, under the pretense of being a philosopher. They decline to talk with you about theology on the same principle that a Taney, a Marshall, or an Evarts would decline to discuss Common Law or the Code Justinian with a mountebank."

"It is needless to tell the reader, after what I have said in reference to your falsification of the other evangelists, that your assertion as to what St. John says is utterly false and without a shadow of foundation. You are squandering your reputation too cheaply."

"This" (in the Acts) "is equally as false as what you have said about the gospels."

Comment. Was there ever such a collection of foolish denials, framed in such abusive language? Insults are never defensible, and the denials are based on a pretense. I have copied all there is in the "Notes" about the last words of Jesus. If he had been desirous of stating his argument without any personalities he could have given the whole of it in one sentence, thus: The last words of Jesus given in the Bible are not his last words, but the last words that were reported.

But, in a circumstantial account of the life and death of the subject of any written work the last words reported are, of course, the last words.

Ingersoll. "Luke testifies that Christ ascended on the very day of his resurrection."

Lambert. "Luke nowhere testifies that Christ ascended on the very day of his resurrection. On the contrary, he tells us in his *Acts of the Apostles* that 'He (Christ) showed himself alive after his passion, by many proofs, for *forty* days appearing to them and speaking of the kingdom of God' (1-3). Here Luke testifies explicitly as to the time of the ascension, whereas in his Gospel he signifies no time." Quoting Ingersoll, "These depositions do not agree," he says: "It is your travesty of them that does not agree."

Comment. I will give Ingersoll's whole paragraph, and then show that he was right about Luke.

Ingersoll. "Luke testifies that Christ ascended on the very day of his resurrection. John deposes that eight days after the resurrection Christ appeared to the disciples and convinced Thomas. In the Acts we are told that Christ remained on earth for forty days after his resurrection. These 'depositions' do not agree. Neither do Matthew and Luke agree in their histories of the infancy of Christ. It is impossible for both to be true. One of these 'witnesses' must have been mistaken."

Comment. Mr. Lambert says that in his gospel Luke specifies no time of the ascension. As far as I have ever found out, Christians agree that

Jesus rose on the first day of the week. That day the women found his body was missing and reported. Peter went to the sepulchre; two of them *went that same day*, etc., met Jesus, talked with him, saw him vanish out of sight, and *that same hour* returned to Jerusalem, told what they had seen when Jesus stood in the midst of them . . . blessed them, was parted from them and carried up to heaven.

THE GENEALOGIES OF JESUS.

Ingersoll. "Two of the witnesses, Matthew and Luke, give the genealogy of Christ. Matthew says that there were forty-two generations from Abraham to Christ. Luke insists that there were forty-two from Christ to David, while Matthew gives the number as twenty-eight. It may be said that this is an old objection. An objection remains young until it has been answered. Is it not wonderful that Luke and Matthew do not agree on a single name of Christ's ancestors for thirty-seven generations?"

Comment. Mr. Lambert's argument is here given in full without interrupting it with his two quotations of the above argument of Ingersoll. Please do not fail to read the whole of it.

Lambert. "It is indeed an old objection, and in

this it is like all the objections you have made. They are all, thus far, merely the old, oft-repeated and oft-answered ones varnished and revamped into modern parlance. They lose some of their force in the translation, but what they lose that way is made up by flippancy and verbal flummery.

"Your objection is that Matthew and Luke contradict each other in the number of generations. Generation has two meanings. It means first, the actual number of persons in direct line, as father, son, grandson, great-grandson, etc. Generation in this sense gives us no measure of time, since every individual in the above series may have lived from twenty to twenty-five hundred years or more. This kind of generation is therefore of no use whatever in calculating time or historical epochs. It is too indefinite. It is, however, of use to prove legitimacy, and the right of inheritance. It is generation in this sense that St. Luke traces, because it is his purpose to show that Christ was of the direct line of the royal family, and that he was the person who, if royalty had continued in the family of David, would have legally inherited the throne. Luke was dealing with the question in reference to legitimacy and inheritance, and with no reference to historical times or epochs.

"The second meaning of generation has reference to *time* and denotes *the average life* of man, which

at present is supposed to be thirty-three years. As men lived longer in the early history of the race than now, the average life or generation was much longer. Now, Matthew uses the word generation in reference to *time*—to the average duration of life when the prophecies concerning the coming of Christ were written—to prove that those prophecies were verified. His purpose was to show two things; first, that the time announced by the prophets had been completed at the advent of Christ, and second, to show that Christ was of the royal line of David. Generations of *time*, then, in the sense used by Matthew, might contain two, three, or four generations of *individuals* in the sense of Luke. It follows then, that as these two evangelists were writing about two different things they did not contradict each other. Luke spoke of *individual* life, Matthew of *average* life.

"It is wonderful" (that Luke and Matthew do not agree on a single name of Christ's ancestors for thirty-seven generations) "only to those who are ignorant of the fact that Matthew gives the ancestors of Joseph, while Luke gives the ancestors of Mary, the Mother of God. Are your ancestors on your mother's side all Ingersolls? Must your maternal and paternal ancestors necessarily have the same name? A careful study of Christian

writers would save you a good deal of ignorant blundering."

Comment. He says these are *old objections* and oft answered, but does not say where the answers are to be found, so I looked it up in Paige's Commentaries. This author, unlike the author of the "Notes," thinks the objection *new*, and therefore not entitled to weight. He says he recognizes the difficulty presented by the difference of the two genealogies, and thinks the most probable solution is that Matthew gave the genealogy of Joseph, the reputed father of Jesus, while Luke gives that of Mary. "The descent of Jesus from David and Abraham was the great fact to be proved, and this could not be satisfactorily done without distinctly showing that such was the descent of Mary; because both Matthew and Luke distinctly assert that Joseph was not the actual father of Jesus. . . . Whether or not this be the true solution of the difficulty, we need not doubt the substantial accuracy of either genealogy." Going on, he quotes some Barnes, who "very sensibly observes" that early objectors to Christianity did not see anything wrong about the two accounts being so different. He quotes Whitby, who tells what each of the fourteen generations (see Matt. i, 17) did, and adds, "to make the full number of fourteen in each class David and Josiah must be counted twice—

each ending one class and commencing the next." I see by Mr. Paige's introductions to the commentaries on Matthew and Luke that both are authentic and inspired. The date of publication is 1844.

Here end the quotations from the Commentary.

As both of them are Joseph's genealogies, any argument on their reconciliation with truth must be on the ground that the story of the virgin birth of Jesus, as given by both authors, is not true. One is traced back from Joseph and one down to Joseph, and both thru the direct male line, step by step, so Mary could not possibly be brot in. And there could be no difference in the number of ancestors in the direct male line, nor in their names. According to Matthew Joseph's father was Jacob, his grandfather was Matthan, his great-grandfather Eleazar. According to Luke Joseph's father was Heli, his grandfather Matthath, his great-grandfather Melchi.

Average and individual life can have nothing to do with it; both accounts are too plain. Besides Mr. Lambert knocks out that explanation with his other one—that Luke gives Mary's genealogy—tho the Bible says it is Joseph's.

As the descent in both is thru the male line the "ignorant blundering" charged and the remark about Ingersoll's ancestors on his mother's side being all Ingersolls seem very extraordinary—I do not mean in the way of literary merit or courtesy.

DOCTRINES OF THE GOSPELS—LAST WORDS ON THE CROSS.

Without quoting any of the argument, or statement of the doctrines of the four writers of the gospels, Mr. Lambert takes the introductory and the closing sentences of Ingersoll's presentation for his texts, and goes on in his usual virulent style, charging untruthfulness three times in a little more than half a page. On the next half page asks Ingersoll if he expects a Christian scholar to stoop to meet him; contradicts with his usual arrogance; says Ingersoll's efforts are a miserable failure, and his case in a very bad way indeed. There is no argument advanced till near the bottom of the page when he denies that the last words *reported* in Matthew of the last words of Jesus when he was crucified were his *last words*, and repeats the same assertion in separate paragraphs, in reference to all the other Gospels.

He charges ignorant and unprincipled misrepresentation of the Gospels; wishes to know by what code of morals, if any, Ingersoll is governed; "Gautama, Confucius, or Koang-Foo-Tzee, Zoroaster, Lao-Tzsee, Hermes, Trismegistus, Moses and Mohammed all forbid lying in their codes. What code do you follow, anyhow?"

He seems to depend on this impressive array of

names to call attention from the lack of proof of what he stigmatizes as lying. He does not say the words given are not as they are in the Bible, of course. He gives no reason for thinking the last words reported were not the last words. In two cases they could not fail to be the last. John has the account this way: "He said, It is finished, and he bowed his head and gave up the ghost." In Luke the words are: ". . . he said, Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit: and having said this, he gave up the ghost." If either of these accounts had been given without the other accounts, would there ever have been any question about the last words?

Matthew and Mark both say there was darkness from the sixth to the ninth hour, and at the ninth hour (Mark), about the ninth hour (Matthew), Jesus cried with a loud voice, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? Then one account has two, and the other three verses of what others said and did, and "Jesus, when he had cried again with a loud voice yielded up the ghost" (Matthew), "and Jesus cried with a loud voice and gave up the ghost" (Mark).

Ingersoll. "Luke says that Christ said of his murderers: 'Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do.' Matthew, Mark, and John do not record these touching words. John says that

Christ, on the day of his resurrection, said to his disciples: 'Whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained.'

"The other disciples do not record this monstrous passage. They did not hear the abdication of God. They were not present when Christ placed in their hands the keys of heaven and hell, and put a world beneath the feet of priests."

Lambert. "The other disciples do not record this passage, eh? Matthew was an apostle and a disciple, was he not? Well, Matthew says: Verily, I say unto you, whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall loose upon earth shall be loosed in heaven (xxvii, 18). And again: I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, etc. (xvi, 19).

"This is enough to prove you ignorant or dishonest, and you may take your choice of position. You should not forget that you are not only sacrificing your own dignity and veracity, but are sacrificing and humbling in the dust, so far as one man can do it, the dignity of our common manhood, by your false, foolish, and reckless statements."

Comment. The *xxvii*, 18, must be a misprint, for

xviii, 18; that and xvi, 19 are as given by Mr. Lambert. He seems to be satisfied that they are the same as the text in John; he is remarkably easy to satisfy this time, and does not find these texts at all indefinite. But it seems to me that no one would think that whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, etc., meant the same as Whose soever sins ye shall remit, etc., unless his mind had been fixed on the idea that Matthew meant the same as John before he read it. I feel sure if I had read Matthew and not John I should not have thought forgiveness of sins was meant. But the text in John says in plain words that the priests may forgive sins. Matthew xviii, 18, does not seem plain as xviii, 19, does. It is, "Again I say unto you, that if two of you shall agree on earth, as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my father which is in heaven." That is easy. Perhaps too many prayed that Garfield might live; it should have been arranged for two. Excuse digression.

Lambert. "When you say, 'They were not present when he placed in their hands the keys,' etc., you intended to perpetrate one of those side-splitting jokes which are wont to set your audience in a roar. The idea of their not being *present* when he placed in their *hands* the keys, is droll, when we come to think of it. But the subject is very serious, and the joke is out of place. When we want

to enjoy such things we go to the circus or to the minstrels. But let us return. You say that that commission which Christ gave to the apostles to pardon sinners 'puts a world beneath the feet of priests.' Does the power of pardoning criminals, which is reposed in the hands of the governor, place the people of this State at his feet? Reflect on this for a moment, and you will learn that there is more sound than sense in the observation."

Comment. This shows that the necessity for saying something must have been felt to be very urgent indeed. Could anyone be led to believe that Ingersoll used the word *hands* ignorantly?—had not sufficient command of language to give correctly the idea he intended? For, of course, no one with his intelligence awake could believe that he would try to make even a good joke (and this is a very poor one indeed), and spoil the effect of a strong argument eloquently expressed. But Mr. Ingersoll's strikingly effective sentence stands. A weak, evasive pretense of an answer can have no effect on it. If it were worth while to describe the author of this specimen of inanity put forth as an answer to Ingersoll, we might turn back a few pages and copy some of the epithets he tries to make readers believe are descriptive of the subject of his diatribe.

The word *hands* was quite correct as used by

Ingersoll. Common usage justifies it; some of Webster's definitions are: possession, ownership, control.

Priests, as a means of helping to keep the world beneath their feet, try to prove that everyone should be subject to the Pope because we have a Supreme Court, and also, that the doctrine that they have the power to forgive sins is all right because some governors of states have the pardoning power. The Supreme Court and executives of states are means of protecting people against criminals. The court is for the trial of crimes—of what are recognized by all as crimes. The "sins" of sending children to public schools, and of failing to attend mass are not recognized by the laws of states as crimes; if they were they would be judged and punished by authorities instituted by the people. Theological opinions of "sins" differ, and if the State is wise it does not meddle with them, but attends to its own legitimate business. The belief in the power of a priest over the temporal or spiritual affairs of other men; the belief that one man can assume absolute control over another, is very often denied, while all admit that the machinery of the State is for the protection of the rights of the people.

GOSPELS—SALVATION—INFIDEELS.

Ingersoll. “It is easy to account for the differences and contradictions in these ‘depositions’ [Mr. Black had called them depositions] (and there are hundreds of them) by saying that each one told the story as he remembered it, or as he had heard it, or that the accounts have been changed, but it will not do to say that the witnesses were inspired of God. We can account for these contradictions by the infirmities of human nature; but, as I said before, the infirmities of human nature cannot be predicated of a divine being.”

Lambert takes the first sentence, leaving out the parenthetic part, says it is easy to account for things by “saying”; “that is the way you account for almost everything,” but it does not account for everything. “It has been the misfortune of your theological career that you have placed too much reliance on ‘saying’ and too little on ‘proving.’”

Comment. Notice, that is entirely aside from the argument, besides being untrue.

He says no contradictions have been shown (!) so there is no necessity for accounting for them. “Hence your cunning method of accounting for them by ‘saying’ is gratuitous, uncalled for and entirely inconsistent with Christian principles. Christianity must be defended by straight, true, and cor-

rect methods or none. It cannot afford to be defended in the spirit in which you attack it. It must not use sophistry, or cunning, or wit, or jokes, or lies. Its platform is truth, and if that ground sinks it must go under with it."

Comment. This assumption that he uses the straight methods instead of the others which he censures is wonderful, even for him.

He makes so many references to jokes, which he ascribes to Ingersoll, that I will copy the only anecdote that appears in the whole article, and let all compare it with the frequent sallies of the "Holy Father."

Ingersoll. "A little while ago, in the city of Chicago, a gentleman addressed a number of Sunday school children. In his address he stated that some people were wicked enough to deny the story of the deluge; that he was a traveler; that he had been to the top of Mount Ararat, and had brot with him a stone from that sacred locality. The children were then invjited to form in procession and walk by the pulpit, for the purpose of seeing this wonderful stone. After they had looked at it, the lecturer said: 'Now, children, if you ever hear anybody deny the story of the deluge, or say that the ark did not rest on Mount Ararat, you can tell them that you know better, because you have seen

with your own eyes a stone from that very mountain."

Comment. This was to illustrate his argument that "All the natural things in the world were not sufficient to establish the supernatural." I wish there were space to give his whole argument concerning that point in the debate. The story comes in to show you that it is pertinent to the argument, and that he brings in no personal flouts at Mr. Black.

Ingersoll. "Why should there be more than one inspired Gospel?"

Lambert. "The fact that there were four inspired Gospels written is sufficient evidence that there was *reason* for four. God does not act without reason. But your question shows that you do not understand what is meant by inspiration. An *inspired* history is not necessarily a *complete* history. The inspiration has reference to what is *said* by an inspired writer, and not to what is *not* said by him." This is the substance of the argument tho he keeps on for two more pages, getting in, by the way, the repetition "while you talk so glibly about inspiration you do not know what it means"—the repetition with an added insult. He explains that while one Gospel was written for one set of people, another was written for another set. While they were all inspired while being written

they do not all tell everything. He amplifies on what was written for the Jews, what for the Gentiles, what for Theophilus, and what (John) to refute heresies.

Comment. [The thought here arises that none of them were written for Americans of 1908.]

Ingersoll. "There can be only one true account of anything."

Lambert. "You confound true with complete and adequate." "They are all true, different, yet not contradictory. The truth of history depends on what it says, not what it does not say . . . You simply confound true with complete and adequate. A school boy writing his first composition might be excused for an improper use of adjectives, but a philosopher should be more careful—or more honest."

Comment. No one who reads Ingersoll will believe that he does not perfectly understand the difference between true, complete and adequate, or that he doesn't use words in their proper significance—or that he uses words when he lacks ideas. "More honest," like the rest of this person's haphazard ammunition, is as ineffectual as tooth powder.

Ingersoll. "That which is a test of truth as to ordinary witnesses is a demonstration against their inspiration."

Lambert. "The test of truth in the case of ordinary witnesses is the fact of their agreement. The fact that the evangelists agree in the statements made by them is evidence of their truth, just as in the case of ordinary witnesses. Now, how the evidence of their veracity can be a demonstration against their inspiration is difficult to understand. You have said if they *disagree* they cannot be inspired, and you are right. But you are not satisfied; you now try to prove that if they *agree* they cannot be inspired. Any remarks of mine on this reasoning of yours would only draw the reader from a contemplation of its sublimity. So we will pass in silence to other points."

Comment. This confused me for a time, and I began to consider evidences of credibility in ordinary and in inspired witnesses to see what Ingersoll meant. But reading the whole paragraph in the Ingersoll-Black discussion cleared away the smoke. His sentence means, in other words, if the same test of truth that is applied to ordinary witnesses is applied to them it will demonstrate that they are not inspired.

Ingersoll. "My doctrine is that there is only one way to be saved, and that is to act in harmony with your surroundings—to live in accordance with the facts of your being."

Lambert. "Then you have changed your 'doc-

trine' considerably since you began your article. Your 'doctrine' in the first part of it was that there is no God, or at least that we cannot know whether there is or not; that a future life was 'invented' by Christians to give God a chance to rectify the mistakes of this. Your 'doctrine' now is that there is one way at least, to be saved—it is 'to act in harmony with your surroundings.' Well, your surroundings are certainly Christian. If you lived among the Mormons you should be a Mormon; if in Turkey you should have a harem, and sit cross-legged like a tailor; if among Thugs you should be a Thug; if among assassins, an assassin; if among thieves, a thief! This theory has the advantage of being in harmony with the 'elastic cord of human feeling.' "

Comment. Does an idea on the eternity of the universe preclude the possibility of having one also on the conduct of life? In what possible way can one conflict with the other, even if the first should be called a doctrine, as it is by Mr. Lambert? Cannot Mr. Lambert hold the doctrine of atonement without first changing his mind as to the doctrine that unbaptized infants are condemned to eternal darkness?

I don't think to act in harmony with surroundings is meant as Mr. Lambert construes it. A widow has children and she must look to their

future well-being. She is in a crowded part of a large city, is poor, but not dependent. Some people in her neighborhood drink, talk loud, laugh or quarrel thru the first part of the night, often. But that does not govern *her* life. She must live according to the circumstances of *her own life*. She must work, watch her children, read to them, and keep her own mind from rusting. It would not be in harmony with her circumstances to spend her time in gossip, or in mourning her hard lot, or in pretending to be what she is not. She must live in accordance with the facts of her being, not making useless efforts to accomplish what is not possible, but marking out the best that can be done, and working to that end. The different surroundings of others and the different facts of their being call for different manner of life to be in harmony with *their* surroundings, and the facts of *their* being.

Mr. Lambert. "But you explain. To live in harmony with your surroundings is to live 'in accordance with the facts of your being.' Good. This is precisely what Christianity demands of us. But what are the facts of our being? There's the rub. This question brings the whole controversy back to the starting point. It is time you should understand that the whole question between you and the Christian, as well as the heathen, the pagan, the

barbarian, and the Christian is: *What are the facts of our being?* This question is the root or foundation of all the difference of opinion that ever existed in the world as to man, his duties and his obligations. It is the question that philosophers in all ages have tried in vain to solve, and which the Christian believes unaided reason cannot solve.

"What am I? Whence came I? Whither am I drifting? Your answer to these questions is: I do not know. Your reply is true, tho no answer.

"It is a common understanding among men of sense that when a man confesses ignorance of a subject, he should not force himself to the front and confuse investigation by his ignorant, garrulous talk. If he confessedly knows nothing of the subject under investigation, it is incumbent on him, as a man of sense, to hold his tongue. Ignorance is no disgrace where it is not one's own fault, but there is nothing so admirable in an ignorant man as a quiet tongue and an attentive ear; and there is nothing more pitiable and detestable in God's universe than an ignorant man trying to play the role of a teacher of mankind.

"What are the facts of our being?

"It is the mission of the true religion to answer this question. And by God's help it has been answering it and dinging it into the ears of humanity, as it surges by, generation after genera-

tion, from the time of Adam down to the year of our Lord 1884, and it will continue to do so until the angel of eternity calls the muster roll of time. Voltaires, Frerets, Gibbons, Diderots, Paines and Ingersolls will appear from time to time to curse the moral world, as plagues, small-pox, leprosy and insanity have cursed the physical world. But Christianity is destined to survive the one, as the human race survived the other."

Comment. He says unaided reason cannot solve the question, What are the facts of our being?—philosophers have tried vainly thro all the ages to solve it, tho the true religion has been answering it since Adam's time. Why does not he tells us the answer? Why have not the philosophers and all the rest of us heard the answer which he says religion has been dinning into our ears?

In my opinion the above dissertation has been spread out before us with all this pomp and circumstance of words to make us think there is something deep and mysterious under it, while in reality the facts of our being are pretty well understood by all who take the trouble to make their lives worth living. I said those who take the trouble, but they are really the ones who get the greatest joy and satisfaction out of life. Mr. Lambert is great on definitions. Suppose we take this

for a definition of the facts of your being: *What you are.*

What am I? Whence came I? Whither am I drifting? are not Ingersoll's questions. They are the questions people ask when they are leading up to talk of God and immortality. I don't think anyone in thoughtful seriousness ever asks, whither am I drifting? No worthy person ever drifts.

INFIDELES—ATHEISTS—REASON.

Chapter xx begins with contemptuous jests to the effect that an *honest* Infidel could not be found; but if the evangelical pulpit "could be convinced of the 'honesty' of an Infidel, and his decency in other respects, it would check him thru as a victim of defective phrenal development."

This is the *answer* to, "For the honest Infidel, according to the American evangelical pulpit, there is no heaven."

And the following, on, "For the upright Atheist there is nothing in another world but punishment."

Lambert. "The upright or downright Atheist will no doubt be treated as the upright rebel or traitor is treated by the government whose laws he defies, and whose authority he rejects. Christianity teaches that God loves the honest man, that he will never punish him for his honest convictions;

it teaches also that God, who is infinitely wise, knows the difference between an honest man and a loquacious demagogue. Christianity teaches that honesty is an affair of the heart and conscience, and not a matter of word-spinning and gush."

Comment. When he says Christianity teaches that God loves an honest man he is using the word in the sense in which it is used more and more as belief in its creeds changes or dies. Many drop the beliefs of Christianity, and speak of it as if the word were synonymous with the word goodness. The *beliefs* are sustained by many who keep them in the background, or even deny them; these people call goodness Christianity, tho it is really the beliefs they are sustaining under the name of goodness, which they call Christianity. But this priest sustains Catholicism which is the only thing he recognizes as Christianity. When any good qualities are brot up in an argument he sweeps them into his basket, tho they do not belong to him, and he does not carry them home with him, for his Christianity is the real, old-fashioned, deep-dyed Catholic belief.

One would think he would hesitate to use the expression word-spinning, it so obviously applies to his style, and is so directly opposite to that of Ingersoll.

Ingersoll. "Mr. Black admits that lunatics and idiots are in no danger of hell."

Lambert. "That should be a consolation to many, for we are told that the number of fools is infinite."

Ingersoll. "This being so, his God should have created only lunatics and idiots."

Lambert. "He has in his inscrutable ways created more than we poor finite creatures can understand the reason for, and he permits them to play their antics before high heaven to an extent that can be explained only by reference to his infinite patience."

Comment. Can anyone be found who thinks these sentences are answers? Did this man think when he began to write the "Notes" that he would not attempt argument, but would depend on his readers' being satisfied with cheap wit, chiefly in the form of insults and evasions? To those of us who do not think him an infallible teacher such efforts will not attain their purpose, but as far as we are able to judge of his subjects they must appear to accept whatever he offers, as valuable truth, or keen and convincing retort, whether they really do or not. I presume they generally really do so accept it.

Notice his thot in the elaborate sentence above: God created lunatics and idiots, and allows them

to live the kind of life he gave them because he is patient. No one is expected to ask why he should create unfortunates instead of happy and useful people.

Notice, also, he disregards the argument entirely in his answers.

Ingersoll. "Why should the fatal gift of brain be given to any human being, if such gift renders him liable to eternal hell?"

[His comments on this are long, but can be summarized because they are given as arguments, and are not personal abuse. Let us mark this to his credit—he substitutes argument.]

Lambert. Reason was given to be used and not abused. [He answers what he calls Ingersoll's theory by these illustrations:] A man should not be deprived of a pistol, razor, or knife because he might harm himself with them; a man may learn to write tho his knowledge renders him liable to forge; he may have hands tho he should steal or murder with them; you can eat tho you might eat too much; you have a tongue tho you might talk nonsense or commit perjury. "What would you think or say of God if, to free us from all possible danger, he should deprive us of every faculty that may be abused, of everything that constitutes us men—everything that makes life worth living?"

Comment. Men soon learn the right use for

knives, etc., and the evil consequences of a bad use of them prevent most people from putting them to a bad use. The argument was concerning the danger of hell. Would it not be better to be deprived of everything which makes life worth living, if this short life were followed by an eternity of bliss? What would it profit a man to be fitted to enjoy all the blessings of this life if an eternity of hell might follow? Besides all these things are supposed to be in the power of God, and that he has foreknowledge of everything. Some theologians say that he does not foreordain, but he has foreknowledge. It seems to me that foreknowledge would make foreordination necessary to a good character.

From Mr. Lambert's argument we infer that God did not deprive idiots and lunatics of brains to save them from hell. He gives no hint of what he thinks God's purpose is.

What is *abuse* of the reason? The more reason a man has the more good he can do. A man's learning to write is never going to make him a forger. There is something the matter with the forger's brain. He is a criminal, and he would be one if he did not know how to write. The more reason he has, the less danger of criminality.

Ingersoll. "Better be an idiot in this world if you can be a seraph in the next."

Lambert. "Better be an idiot saved than a philosopher damned. But fortunately for men of common average sense, there is a middle course. Idiots and philosophers are extremes—phenomenal and exceptional. The majority of mankind are neither, while they are sometimes the victims of both."

Comment. Here we have a new idea: it is better to be half-way idiot; a very good mind is dangerous. Blessed idiots in heaven; and damned philosophers in hell! What a prospect for a future life!

The only reason one can have for preferring to be an idiot is the theological one.

I do not see how a person can be a victim of a philosopher. I believe that outside of the church they are thot to be benefactors of the race. We read in Catholic books and hear Catholics say when they have no reason for an argument, "The pride of intellect has lost many a soul and will lose many more." Why should a modest question about the reason for a belief indicate *pride of intellect* any more than the dogmatic statement of a belief? What is pride of intellect? I never heard the phrase applied to anything but the use of reason on a religious subject. The use of intellect is considered commendable on any other subject.

THE ATONEMENT.

Ingersoll. "For nearly two thousand years Judas Iscariot has been execrated by mankind; and yet if the doctrine of atonement is true, upon his treachery hung the plan of salvation. Suppose Judas had known of this plan—known that he was selected by Christ for that very purpose, that Christ was depending on him. And suppose that he also knew that only by betraying Christ could he save either himself or others; what ought Judas to have done? Are you willing to rely upon an argument that justifies the treachery of that wretch?"

Lambert. "Judas is justly execrated because he was a traitor and gave away his friend. His treason has nothing to do with the doctrine of Atonement. Judas was a free agent. The plan of salvation involved the death of Christ, but not by the treason of Judas.

"Suppose that he was *not* selected for this very purpose; that Christ was *not* depending on him. Where did you learn that Judas was selected for this very purpose, or that Christ depended on him?"

Comment. According to the plan, then, how was the sacrifice to be carried thru? Did God provide the victim and leave the rest to chance?—but that could not be, for, according to the Bible, everything took place according to the plan. It was

understood by Judas and Jesus. Jesus said he was going to be given up to the authorities by one of the disciples, and when the time came he told Judas to do it quickly and Judas obeyed.

The Bible does not say whether Judas was instructed in the whole scheme or not. He might have performed the part set for him, and might have thought Jesus could vanish when arrest seemed imminent, as he had done before. At any rate, it always seemed queer to me to worship the victim of a sacrifice, which was accomplished in a few hours, and forever execrate the memory of the unfortunate agent—or we might include Pilate, and say agents.

When Judas saw that Jesus did not escape he was much distressed and—. How *did* he die? I think the account which says he hanged himself is the one preferred by most of those who speak of him.

“Him” (Jesus) “being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have sacrificed and slain” (Acts ii, 23).

Altho this text has not before been introduced into this discussion as far as I know, I do not think it irrelevant to the subject of the guilt or innocence of Judas. Paige, in his commentaries, says as to “*By the determinate counsel and foreknowl-*

edge of God—When God sent his son into the world, nothing pertaining to his mission or its results was a matter of chance or contingency. Every circumstance was clearly and distinctly foreseen, and absolutely determined by the Supreme Ruler. So much is here distinctly affirmed; and any contrary supposition would be manifestly inconsistent with a just conception of an omniscient and omnipotent God." There is much more, too long to quote, but the closing sentence is this: "Let no man flatter himself that he is guiltless, because God rules the world; for guilt results from an evil design." (I wish I had more commentaries; they are interesting reading.)

The above explanation agrees with the Bible account, but I should like to have some one bring about an agreement between the idea that the sacrifice was all arranged and carried out by God, and yet his agent was a guilty man—a contemptible traitor. Ingersoll refers to the "treachery of that wretch," but *Ingersoll* does not believe the dogma of the atonement.

Lambert quotes: "And suppose." That stands on one line. On the next line he begins this wondrous comment: "No, sir; we must suppose nothing. I want facts and not suppositions and guesses." That is all he says about it. He does not quote the rest of the sentence, which is this:

"And suppose that he also knew that only by betraying Christ could he save either himself or others; what ought Judas to have done?"

The first "suppose," which Lambert answers by saying, Suppose he was *not*—a clear evasion—was a question of fact. The next "suppose" he answers as a *word*, as if he had just noticed the word for the first time, and calls for *facts*. While the first one can be answered by statement of the *fact* of the Bible story (this does not involve the truth of the story), the last one, the one where he calls for *facts*, involves a religious dogma only.

Taking up this same dogma as stated by Ingersoll, "Are you willing to rely upon an argument that justifies that wretch?" he replies, without touching the only real question of the controversy, with low abuse of Ingersoll, the man.

The whole tirade here follows:

Lambert. "No, I am not, any more than I am ready to rely upon your assertions. Judas was a bad man, but there are worse men living than he. He did not go lecturing about Judea, boasting of his crime, and ridiculing the Christ whom he had betrayed—he went and hanged himself. I do not commend his desperate act, because suicide is murder, but the fellow showed some respect for the opinions of his fellow men by ridding them of his detestable presence. He loved money, but in this

he was not alone. There were no lecture bureaus in those days, and he felt that his career was at an end. Had he known that others would come to continue his work he might have been terrified, and perhaps repented, but not foreseeing this he only hanged himself."

Comment. It makes no difference to this malicious calumniator that Ingersoll did not say one word against Jesus, and that he spoke of him in terms of admiring respect on pages 94 and 102. When a man argues against the inspiration of the Bible, he is accused of ridiculing Jesus. What would that kind of argument be called if it could be engaged in by an Infidel?

So, Mr. Lambert thinks that the character of Judas is justly execrated, but better than that of Ingersoll, because Judas did not go about *boasting* of his *crime*. If Lambert had ever found any boasting in any of the Ingersoll writings it seems certain that he would make no delay in publishing his discovery. As for crime, who but a very inferior Catholic priest would make himself ridiculous enough to stigmatize the expression of opinion on religion as a crime?

According to the priest another way in which Judas showed his superiority to Ingersoll was by hanging himself. Altho he pronounces suicide the crime of murder yet he thinks it would have been

more decent for Ingersoll to commit that crime and thus show "some respect for the opinions of his fellow men by ridding them of his detestable presence."

Here we come upon a whole bushel basketful of delicate, ripe, religious, moral instruction, direct from an infallible teacher.

Judas's love of money is excused because in having this fault he is not alone, and in taking the money for the betrayal of Jesus, he had the further excuse of not knowing that Ingersoll was going to carry on the work with the aid of lecture bureaus; if he had known, says Mr. Lambert, "he might have repented, but as it was, he only hanged himself."

Before getting hold of this Lambert idea we had been led to believe that it was supposed by the Bible writers to be repentance which caused his suicide; indeed, the account says so. However, another Bible writer gave another version. He said Judas killed himself by falling headlong in the field he had purchased with the price of the betrayal.

There is some mistake about that money, for the writer of Matthew said when Judas saw that Jesus was condemned he repented, and took back the money to the chief priests and elders, saying he had betrayed an innocent man. They said, "What

is that to us? See thou to that," whereupon Judas threw down "the pieces of silver in the temple and departed, and went and hanged himself." This account comes before the other one in the order in which the books of the Bible are bound together, which is, perhaps, the reason it is accepted, tho the other one still stands in the book of Acts.

What do the Catholics and Protestants who have taken this priest by the hand and thanked him for "holding up to the scorn and contempt of mankind"—"this blatant reviler of all revealed truth," this "fraudulent peddler of old Infidel junk"—Ingersoll—what do they think of his idea that the plan of salvation was not carried out by Judas, but has been carried on by Col. Robert G. Ingersoll some years after the death of Judas? Will they deem it necessary to change hymns like this? "Jesus died upon a tree, That from sin we might be free, And forever happy be, Happy in the Lord. He has paid the debt we owe, If with trusting hearts we go, He will wash us white as snow, In his blood. Then with joy and gladness sing, Worthy is our Savior King. Loudly let his praises ring. Praises ever more."

I ask pardon for putting this stuff before you, but Protestants thought it good enough to teach my children in the public schools, and it was set to rowdy, dowdy, dowdy, dow music, too.

Mr. Lambert says he does not rely on an argument that justifies Judas (the atonement). I should think some of the Protestant preachers who were in the long line of those who congratulated him on the "Notes" would take some notice of this abandonment of the foundation dogma of the Christian religion. Catholics, too, are supposed to believe it, the cross, the crucifix, and images of the Virgin Mother of God are their chief emblems. It is known, tho, that they insist that people must accept the offices of the church if they are to gain salvation.

Mr. Lambert did not say particularly what is to be the effect of Ingersoll's work, but the logical conclusion is that it is to somehow work for salvation under the direction of the priests.

Ingersoll. "I insisted upon knowing how the sufferings of an innocent man can satisfy justice for the sins of the guilty."

Lambert's comments are a fair exposition of the Jesuitical mind, trained to dodge an argument behind an array of words which they expect, depending on the aid of religious mists, to pass muster as containing sense, tho the beholder sees it only with the eyes of faith.

It is so long I will give one paragraph, without criticizing his grammar, and summarize the most of the rest.

Lambert. "It would have been wiser to have insisted upon knowing the *fact* than upon knowing the *how* of it. There are many facts that you know and admit, and yet if you were asked the how of them you could not answer. How do you *think*? How do you apprehend a thot? How do you know that you are, or that you are Ingersoll? Would it be just to infer that you know nothing because you cannot explain "how" you know? This is precisely what you expect of your opponent. You ask *how* can the sufferings of the innocent satisfy for the sins of the guilty? Your opponent replies by saying that the answer involves a question of metaphysics. He is, in my opinion, wrong in this, because he confounds the supernatural with the metaphysical. These terms are not synonyms. To answer your question he had no need to appeal to metaphysics; in doing so he appealed to the wrong court. His appeal should have been to *reason*; he should have confined himself to the *fact*, or the possibility of it, and not to the *how* of it. We don't know the 'how' of anything; and the philosopher who asks it and expects an adequate answer is nothing better than the end man in a minstrel show. Conundrums are associated with tambourines and burnt cork. Lecturers who make pretensions to philosophy should not infringe on the amusing trade of honest minstrelsy."

Comment. When the foundation dogma of the Christian religion—the atonement—is stated, the priest waves it contemptuously away and calls for facts. The *how* that he pretends is so inexplicable simply means, give reasons for this belief. In place of the five pages of word-spinning (that is a good word when it is used right), it seems to me it would have been much better for him to say, It is above reason, God only knows.

How he makes out that reasoning is a mere statement of an assumed fact, instead of the “*how*” of it, an uninspired mortal can never understand. As for his relegating a philosopher who asks the “*how*” to the position of the end man in a minstrel show, such an idea appears to be original with him, but if we should read disquisitions of other priests on the same subject I presume we should find them all alike, and perhaps expressed in identical words.

Repeating his last quotation from Ingersoll he again recurs to the method of lecturing on words. The next three pages are filled with solemn complaints about the use and misuse of the word justice. He says: “Unless the word is made to express a definite idea common to your mind and mine your question is unintelligible and not susceptible of an intelligent answer.” With many words he demands to know what one of the many

meanings of the word is used. Again he demands to know what is meant by the word justice? If justice in the abstract, why then it "is a mere abstraction having no entity of its own. A pure abstraction can induce no obligation, no duties, no suffering of innocent or guilty."

He continues : "Do you mean what theologians call *original justice*? Original justice is the subjection of the body to the mind, the subjection of the will to reason, and the subjection of the will to God. This is the justice that was lost by Adam's fall and restored by the suffering of Christ.

"Do you mean *divine justice*? That, so far as creatures are concerned, is the *will* of God, and he is free to determine the nature of atonement.

"Do you mean justice in its theological sense? In that sense it is a moral virtue or influence constantly inclining the will of man to render to every one his own. This meaning can have no application to your question.

Do you mean *legal justice*? Legal justice is that which co-orders the parts or individuals of a community in reference to the whole, and inclines the individual to render to the community what is necessary for the common good."

He proceeds in this manner thru distributive justice, commutative justice, vindictive justice and labors along this way: "You see the word justice

has many meanings. As you are a theologian, philosopher and lawyer, you should be able to say in what sense you use the word, and you must not imagine your opponent to be fool enough to commit himself to any answer till he knows what you ask."

Thinking, I suppose, that he now has the reader sufficiently hypnotized by his unmeaning monotone to believe there is truth in the last sentence, which he makes conspicuous in a paragraph by itself, he ascribes a fallacy to the question for which there is not the slightest foundation. Of course, he cannot have any such idea himself, but knows perfectly well that Mr. Ingersoll's question means nothing of the kind. Here is his pretended find of a fallacy: "The fallacy of your question consists in this: It supposes justice to be a thing existing independent of God and man, whereas it is an attribute, in different degrees, of both God and man, and has no existence outside of them."

"But," he says, "I am not done with your question yet." (!) Then he goes on with a long paragraph, containing his usual, "What do you mean by" satisfy? and ending with this astonishing conclusion: "Mere suffering then, of innocent or guilty, does not satisfy for sin; and this fact takes the bottom out of your question."

Here is an answer at last, tho it does not take

the bottom out of the question. It *only* takes the bottom out of the doctrine of the atonement.

But the pomp does not come to an end here; there is a long-drawn paragraph following:

Lambert. "Again you ask: How can the sufferings of the innocent satisfy for the *sins* of the guilty? The mere suffering alone of the innocent *do not* satisfy for the *sins* of the guilty. They can, however, satisfy for the *suffering* due the sins of the guilty, which is quite another thing. You can pay a fine of five dollars for a loafer who has committed an assault, and save him the sufferings of six months in the workhouse; but while your vicarious sufferings to the extent of five dollars remit the punishment, they do not satisfy for the offense. I think by this time the reader sees that the question upon which you 'insisted' means nothing when cleared and cleaned of its sophistry and words of double meaning. Mr. Black was wrong when he said it raised a 'metaphysical question.' He should have said it raised a psychological or phrenological question involving the condition of your mind or brain when you asked it."

Comment. Does anyone have a better understanding of the atonement *now?* We always knew that the death of Jesus was supposed to save believers from suffering for their sins. He says suffering of the innocent or guilty does not *alone*

satisfy justice for the sins, tho he does not mention what else is necessary. He says it can satisfy for the suffering due to the sins, which, *he says*, is a very different thing. He illustrates by pointing out that one can pay another's fine, but that does not satisfy for the offense. It seems the law permits it, but it does not permit one to pay the penalty of another for murder. Mr. Lambert may believe the doctrine of atonement, but he does not explain it, nor does he show anything wrong about Ingersoll's question. He could get along better explaining absolution.

Ingersoll. "To answer an argument, is it only necessary to say that it raises a metaphysical question?"

Lambert. "No; but a question, to deserve an answer, should have some sense to it."

Comment. The question, remember, was: How can the suffering of an innocent man satisfy for the sins of the guilty?

NON-RESISTANCE.

Ingersoll. "The idea of non-resistance never occurred to the man with the power to protect himself. This doctrine was the child of weakness, born when resistance was impossible. To allow a crime to be committed when you can prevent it,

is next to committing the crime yourself."

Mr. Lambert quotes the two first sentences. The weakest mind could not fail to understand what was meant by non-resistance by reading the first sentence, and would find the idea perfectly clear and definite, but the priest begins :

Lambert. "This is one of your soft, indefinite generalities. Let us see what it means and what it is worth practically.

"Non-resistance to what?"

Comment. Would you believe it? and he says the very same thing again on the very next page. He keeps on for more than a page as if supposing Mr. Ingersoll meant to favor resistance to things which no one thinks of opposing.

Lambert. He says there can be resistance and non-resistance only where there is aggression [which is true]; that aggression may be just or unjust [which is news to me]. He says your natural rights are limited or infringed on by society, and that is *just* aggression. To this aggression you agree, and therefore the idea of non-resistance must have occurred to you. Then the tax collector aggresses on you; you yield and pay. Here again is the idea of non-resistance. The idea occurs to every honest man. Woe to the government whose citizens yield only because they must. "Such citizens cannot be trusted in time of danger. They are

latent rebels every one of them. Resistance to the just requirements of law is sinful, and non-resistance a duty. Hence the idea of it should and does occur to every honest, loyal citizen."

Comment. After this long pursuit of the phantoms of his dream he appears to get partially awake, and subsides thus:

Lambert. "You will say that you meant non-resistance to unjust power and tyranny. Probably you did. But you did not say it, and a man of your power of talk is expected to say what he means."

Comment. He *did* say it, and Mr. Lambert could not help seeing what he said about the "power to protect himself," before writing all those comments for the purpose of clouding over the text or at least putting it in a false light. He most likely also saw the sentence, "To allow a crime to be committed when you can prevent it is next to committing the crime yourself." Yet he goes on with a ridiculous sermon about *just* and *unjust* aggressions! and patriotic citizens—disregarding the plain text of his discourse.

Lambert, repeating the quotation, again says: "Non-resistance to what?" [This is certainly a unique book] "as you reject the doctrine of non-resistance without limitation, it follows that you hold the opposite doctrine without limitation, which

is that you believe in resistance to everything. But you are not original in this. The world is familiar with men of this kind, and has provided for them as comfortably as circumstances will permit."

Comment. This is worth preserving as an example of sophistry in its worst sense.

STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

Ingersoll. "Mr. Black insists that without belief in God there can be no perception of right and wrong, and that it is impossible for an Atheist to have a conscience."

Lambert. "Mr. Black made no such statement —insists on neither of the things which you attribute to him. Why this misrepresentation?"

Comment. As Ingersoll was not making a direct quotation he had a perfect right to put the idea in his own words, as he did not change the sense. Mr. Lambert criticizes Ingersoll for the use of "perception" and "conscience"; says these words are not used by Mr. Black; "it does not require much brains to distinguish between perception of right and standard of right."

Mr. Black's words were: "Then for him there is no standard at all; one thing is as right as another, and all things are equally wrong. Without a ruler there can be no law, and where there is

no law there can be no transgression," etc. "No perception of right and wrong" express the same thing more tersely. As for conscience, Mr. Ingersoll's use of that word does not change the sense of Mr. Black's writing and is justified by common usage and Webster's dictionary.

Lambert next quotes Mr. Ingersoll about wars of extermination, says he and Mr. Black differ as to their being wrong, and who shall decide between them? They must fix upon some common standard, or measure, or form of right and wrong. To illustrate, he says, suppose the disputants to disagree about the length of a piece of cloth, a yardstick is the common measure. "It was the want of a common standard or measure like this that Mr. Black called attention to as an insurmountable obstacle in debating ethical questions with you. He had a standard, the *will* of God; you have none. Between him and you, then, there is no *common* standard, and hence the difficulty of arguing with you."

Comment. A yardstick cannot decide ethical questions, even if you call it the will of God. While Mr. Black thinks slavery right (wars of extermination were mentioned above, but slavery was included in the argument), because it is the will of God, others may not think it the will of God, and therefore feel under no obligation to defend it. Inger-

soll shows very clearly why he thinks it wrong, and many intelligent, reputable people now stand with him. By the way, does Mr. Lambert think it right under any circumstances? He and Mr. Black both decide according to the will of God—but slavery has been overthrown.

Ingersoll. “Yet I am told that I have no knowledge of right and wrong; that I measure with ‘the elastic cord of human feeling,’ while the believer in wars of extermination and human slavery measures with the ‘golden metewand of God.’”

Lambert. “Until you have a criterion, or standard of right and wrong you cannot determine what is right and what is wrong; and as long as you cannot do this, you cannot claim knowledge on the subject. You may have ‘notions’ or ‘opinions,’ but knowledge you cannot claim.”

Comment. Ingersoll has the standard of high courage, justice, and kindness, and had the will and capacity to live according to that standard. His “notions” and “opinions” of right and wrong are appreciated by those who know him personally or thru his writings. If those notions and opinions differ from knowledge, let the difference be shown.

Mr. Lambert continues to harp on the common measure—the will of God. Let us see about this common measure. Of people who may or may not be believers in God, some have higher stand-

ards of honor than others. One very religious person who would not think of stealing any piece of property that might be out of the sight of the owner, might take advantage of another in trade, while another, also very religious, would scorn to do any such thing. Neither of them has any doubt but he does the will of God. How about the common measure in such a case? Two men receive an injury at the hands of a fellow man. One of them, out of revenge, will do something to the injury of the one who has wronged him. The other would never feel like doing anything of the kind, and if a friend suggests retaliation, he sees at once that it would not be right and feels no temptation to do anything to the detriment of the man who has shown himself unfriendly. Do these two opposite examples have a common standard? They both believe in God, but neither of them asks whether it is the will of God that they do or do not this thing. One of them has a better sense of right and wrong which in no way depends on his religious belief, for their beliefs are the same. One man might say I will manage to buy this thing for less than it is worth of this man who would not fail to cheat me if he had the chance. Another man sees that the seller does not know that the market price has advanced, but it would never come into his mind to take advantage of the other's

ignorance of prices. Have both of these buyers the metewand of God, or has one a better sense of right than the other?

Lambert quotes, "Everything is right that tends to the happiness of mankind," and judges it a vague rule. He quotes, "And everything is wrong that increases the sum of human misery," and judges it vague and unsatisfactory. I leave out the superfluous words that go with those opinions. Far from being a vague rule it is quite definite. A vague or uncertain rule would be "the will of God." There is a wide difference in judgment as to what is the will of God; some men are kind, some cruel; some generous, some otherwise; some are foolish, some of strong intellect; some sober and industrious, some lazy and intemperate; consider each of these in any common affair of life, or in time of calamity. There are multitudes in all of these classes who every one believe in God, and think they are doing his will. Is it not a vague rule that works out such a wide difference in characters?

Mr. Lambert asks Mr. Ingersoll if he would pause and reflect whether in the long run it would tend to human happiness before performing an action? We might just as well ask him if he stops to ask whether it is the will of God? Would not each one act according to his character?

Mr. Lambert asks, "Who is to determine what is for the happiness of mankind?" That seems to me to be much easier than to determine the will of God. If he saw a barefoot child, blue with cold, he would know in an instant what would conduce to happiness. Each person determines actions according to his own mind and character—even when he determines the will of God, and the action is determined when the occasion comes.

He kindly says as it is plain that Mr. Ingersoll does not know what conscience is he will give him a *definition* of it. "Conscience," he explains, "is a practical judgment which passes on each and every act of our life, and determines, before we perform the act, whither it is right or wrong." I do not see how that corrects Mr. Ingersoll in the least. But Mr. Ingersoll was not writing definitions, but a short magazine article. The practical judgment—the conscience shown in that article is above criticism. Mr. Lambert adds to his definition, "It does not determine what is right and wrong in the abstract—that is the office of the moral intellect." How can you determine *in the abstract* what is right or wrong? According to common use abstract means something considered apart from other associated things. It seems to me the quality of right and wrong must be associated with some idea or act; we cannot think

of it in any other way. And what is "moral intellect" but conscience? Is not the moral judgment of the intellect the conscience? It seems to me there can be no right and wrong in the abstract, and that moral intellect is not a clear expression; and it seems to me the intellect is with you all the time, and it judges of every moral question as it arises in the intellect.

Mr. Lambert. "It" (the conscience) "is not the power of realizing vividly the sufferings of others, as you dogmatically state. The word for that is sympathy, or philanthropy, not conscience."

Comment. I take Mr. Ingersoll's argument to mean, not that a sympathetic feeling for another *is* conscience, but that the capacity for understanding and caring for the feelings of another *is what gives him conscience*.

Answering "Consequences determine the quality of an action," Mr. Lambert again brings forward Guiteau, and speaks of his considering assassination a good act. Does Mr. Lambert think that consequences in that case did not show the act to be bad, just because the crazed politician tried to justify himself by calling it good? Mr. Lambert forgets that Guiteau was religious, and therefore had the metewand of God; the same one used by the Spanish Inquisitors.

If he did think his act a good one does that

show that people are never to do what they consider good acts?

Mr. Lambert suggests that if consequences determine it would be necessary to find the sum of the consequences, or, if one consequence was to be considered, which one, before determining the nature of the act.

The moral sense always tells. One knows if he lies about a person that the consequences are bad for at least two persons; the one lied about is wronged; the character of the one who lies is lowered. So it is with all faults and crimes—the consequences are always known to be bad.

Again Mr. Lambert asks who is to determine the quality of the consequences? The actor judges, but luckily there is a pretty general agreement as to what is good or bad, tho some have a better capacity than others for judging and for performing.

Ingersoll. "If consequences are good, so is the action."

Lambert. "According to this dictum, you cannot say a cold-blooded murder or an assassination is good or bad until you have learned the consequences of it! The consequence of Garfield's taking off can never be known to man. Then, according to your philosophy, it can never be known whether his murder was a crime or a virtue! Are you not afraid

that your philosophy may put a bee into the head of some religious fanatic, who, misled by your teachings, might consider his killing of you a virtuous and holy act, foolishly imagining that the result of it might, in its consequences, prove beneficial to society and religion? I, as a Christian, condemn that act beforehand, as a crime deserving the eternal torments of hell; but you cannot consistently condemn it, because, according to your Infidel theory, the act cannot be said to be evil or wicked till its consequences are known. As the consequences of your death cannot be known, it follows that your murder might be a good or a bad act! This is the result or consequence of your philosophy. From a Christian point of view it is a very bad consequence, and therefore, if there is any virtue in logic, your philosophy is bad. The Christian holds not only that murder is a crime, but that even the intention, determination, or un-actuated resolve is a crime, deserving of hell. It is thus that the Christian religion strikes at the root of this murderous propensity in man, and kills the dragon before he issues from his innermost den in the human heart. The doctrine that acts take their nature and quality from their results is a logical and necessary consequence of the denial of God. It destroys individual responsibility and is subversive of all government and social

order. It denies all appeal to right, and destroys not only justice, but the very idea of it. It contemplates nothing but results—physical, cognizable results."

Comment. Are the consequences of Guiteau's crime not known? How many, so far as known, prove his act a virtue? It is known that Garfield was taken off in his prime; his family and friends bereft. The National Executive, elected by the people of the United States, shot down by an assassin crazed by factional prejudice thus staining the reputation of the Republic. Were not these consequences (I do not mean that these are all) enough to stigmatize the crime as hideous in the view of the whole world? The consequences to Guiteau were a shameful death, and memory disgraced; to his family and friends a lifelong shame and sorrow. All of the consequences unalloyed bitterness.

No. Mr. Ingersoll's arguments for the right against the wrong have never led anyone to crime and never will. Your argument that the belief in hell prevents crime does not hold good. According to my observation no one has ever been deterred from crime by this belief, while we all know of great numbers of cases of believing criminals. The belief as far as I know has never led people to

crime without first driving them insane, but there have been many instances of that kind.

The belief that good consequences determine the quality of an action will never destroy individual responsibility nor prove subversive of government and social order, but quite the contrary. The doctrine of the atonement might if the belief in it had anything to do with the conduct of the life of the believer. If it had any effect it would destroy individual responsibility, and that is at the bottom of government and social order.

Life soon teaches consequences. Anything so plain as murder is understood without any really conscious thot. Other things, more intricate and less striking, require a finer conscience for their comprehension, and systems of worship and belief are not effectual educators of the conscience.

Don't worry about any religious fanatic's being led by Ingersoll's teaching to kill him; that idea is farfetched over a very difficult road. Religious fanatics hear of him only thru their own religious teachers, who hold up a false picture of him for their scorn and contempt. As the picture is of a weak clown without any influence it is not likely their learners would think him worth killing. Those liable to be led by him would find themselves journeying along to a more generous humanity.

I have not been thinking of him as dead; but he

lives now in memory and in the consequences of his deeds. Why do not priests try to destroy those consequences instead of traducing an honorable character?

Physical, cognizable results? But the discussion is altogether from a moral point of view and cannot be diverted to a physical aspect.

That "it denies all appeal to right and destroys not only justice, but the very idea of it" is one of the most audacious perversions I ever saw. Why, it *is* appeal to right, and its foundation is justice..

When religious dogma is not under discussion I think the rational idea that right conduct always produces good results, and wrong conduct always produces bad results is accepted by all.

"If actions had no consequences they would be neither good nor bad." Mr. Lambert begins his last chapter with quoting this and setting up a straw man, first issuing this piece of jargon: "Which is the same as saying if actions were not actions they would not be actions." He says that actions are inseparable from their consequences; there can not be an act without consequences. That is not opposed to anything Ingersoll said. If Mr. Lambert means anything it must be that he is trying to make it appear that Ingersoll meant that sometimes actions were neither good nor bad, be-

cause they had no consequences ; but he meant only what he plainly stated.

Mr. Lambert declares again that consequences cannot be known, and to show how far-reaching they may be illustrates by the often used pebble thrown in a stream. After a lecture on gravitation, etc., he says: "A false principle taught to a child will grow with it and spread from it to others, and from these others to yet others, and thus on thru the ages, and when time ceases it will continue into eternity and affect heaven and hell. Thus this one act of a false teacher changes the current and harmony of the world."

I should like to know if these consequences are not enough to keep well-disposed people to the highest mark? Luckily one false teacher cannot have it all his own way. There are other pebbles. Let the good teachers use their best influences. The good spreads as well as the bad.

I should like to quote the next two and a half pages—they contain some Lambertian gems—but this division of the subject has been gone over before, except that he says man cannot learn what is right and wrong by experience.

Ingersoll. God or no God, larceny is the enemy of industry—industry is the mother of prosperity —prosperity is a good, and therefore larceny is an evil. God or no God, murder is a crime. There

has always been a law against larceny, because the laborer wishes to enjoy the fruit of his toil. As long as men object to being killed, murder will be illegal.

Lambert. "To say an act is a larceny is to determine its nature—its quality. You have said that the quality of an action is determined by its consequences. How then can you assert that any given act *is* a larceny till its consequences are known? To assert larceny, you must assert it of particular acts, for larceny in the abstract is simply nothing, and can have none but abstract consequences, which are no consequences at all, and therefore cannot be an enemy of industry, unless it be industry in the abstract, which again is no industry at all. Larceny to injure industry, must be larceny in act and practice—the act of A, B or C. But how can you assert that the act of A, B, or C is evil or larcenous till its consequences are known? for, according to your philosophy, the *nature* of the act of A, B, or C can be known and judged only by its consequences."

Comment. How fortunate it is that Mr. Ingersoll was not educated to argue this way by the day! He did not take up space in trivialities—hair-splitting to confuse his readers, trying to make them think black is not black, because it might be faded into white. He wrote and spoke always to

the point—to be understood, and he was understood.

Larceny is the name of the crime of wrongfully depriving a person of his own property. The known consequences of the act are what makes the act a crime. That is why a penalty is imposed by the civil power. The legal penalty incurred and loss of reputation are some of the consequences affecting the criminal. As for "larceny in the abstract" and "industry in the abstract" time might be taken up indefinitely with such an array of words and with such questions as, "What do you mean by justice?" As so much is said about abstract larceny's being simply nothing and can have no consequences, because the consequences are abstract, why, say then, larceny (in the abstract) is a crime (in the abstract) and its consequence (in the abstract) is a *penalty* (in the abstract).

Lambert. "According to your *standard*, prosperity is good only when its consequences are good. But the philosophy of history teaches that prosperity leads to the downfall of nations as well as of individuals. What did prosperity do for Egypt, Greece and Rome? It made the people luxurious, voluptuous and imbecile, and buried the monuments of hardier ages in ruins. It was the siren that led Hannibal, Alexander and Caesar to untimely graves, and Napoleon to Moscow and Waterloo.

Prosperity leads to decay, national, individual, intellectual, moral and physical. When prosperity is at its zenith, decay is at the door; when the tree is in full bloom there is but one step to the sere and yellow leaf. Prosperity has evil consequences, and if, as you say, consequences determine the quality of actions, how can prosperity be good?"

Comment. Down with prosperity! Death to the siren! Let us have impeding poverty and groveling ignorance.

I deny that any evil is the consequence of prosperity. I think other causes lead to the undoing of nations and people. The full bloom of the tree is the promise of its fruit; the sere and yellow leaf announces the rest of the forces which work again next year. When the tree dies it is not because of its prosperity; a stunted tree in poor soil dies also, and the poverty of the soil and other unfavorable conditions do not prolong its life.

Oh! but here is another paragraph introduced by an impressive "Again. Prosperity, aside from those who prosper, is an abstraction, nothing, and therefore the good you assert of it is equally an abstraction, a delusion and a snare."

Do not put prosperity with those who prosper and no harm will be done, for it will remain an intellectual abstraction.

About murder, he begins with reminding Inger-

soll to not forget his principles, for it is wrong to say murder is a crime when he doesn't know the consequences, and proceeds as before about murder in the abstract.

He says laws against larceny are unjust if it is a virtue, etc., as before.

Lambert. "If there is no God, the real thieves are those who have and hold the goods of this world from those who have not. This is in fact the doctrine of your Infidel confreres, the communists of France. Proudhon, a prophet of Infidelity, lays it down as a maxim that 'property is robbery.' The difference between you and Proudhon is this: He denies God and carries that denial to its logical consequences, while you, without an atom of logic in your head, deny God and yet assert the sacredness of property. If there be no God, Proudhon is right; but God or no God you are wrong."

Comment. We should remember that the debate was on the inspiration of the Bible; that Ingersoll's argument was against the Old Testament representations of God; that he did not deny nor affirm the existence of God. Therefore, it is in order to consider the statement, "If there is no God the law against larceny has no moral or binding obligation ("Notes," p. 194) unconnected with any prejudice against Ingersoll and see what you think of it. Do you feel any "moral unlift" about

which we have lately heard so much, from this "high ideal" presented by the writer of the "Notes"?

To show that Mr. Lambert made a bad use of Proudhon, calling him a prophet of infidelity in trying to make a point against Ingersoll, I will give a short quotation from, *What is Property?* by Proudhon, page 256: "His (man's) conception of God and a future life is spontaneous and instinctive, and his expressions of this conception have been by turns monstrous, eccentric, beautiful, comforting and terrible. All these different creeds at which the frivolous irreligion of the eighteenth century mocked, are modes of expression of the religious sentiment. Some day man will explain to himself the character of God whom he believes in, and the other world to which his soul aspires."

Lambert. "Convicted murderers object to being killed; is it therefore murder or illegal to execute them? But here again you show a bad memory. Only five lines above you say: 'Consequences are the standard by which actions are judged,' and now you tell us that the *objection* of men to being killed constituted the illegality of murder! Now which of these two statements do you intend us to believe? Of course we cannot believe them both, because they are contradictory. This is the consequence of trying to reason without a standard of truth and morality."

Comment. One might suppose that this author looked upon the world as chiefly inhabited by murderers; that there were no other people worth mentioning; as if laws were by them and for their protection—if his purpose were not understood to be to use language for the purpose of darkening instead of enlightening.

Ingersoll's language was perfectly clear and perfectly correct; and it does not present the least contradiction to what he said before—that consequences determine the quality of an action.

Ingersoll. “According to Mr. Black the man who does not believe in a Supreme Being acknowledges no standard of right and wrong.”

Lambert. “You ought to be ashamed to misrepresent an honorable antagonist. Mr. Black never said that, nor anything like it, nor anything from which such an inference could be drawn. He complained of the difficulty of arguing with a man like you, who had no acknowledged standard of right and wrong. That his complaint was just is evident from the fact in your reply to him you give *half a dozen different standards, and all contradictory*, as we have just seen.”

Comment. It has already been shown by quotation from Mr. Black that he did say it, and Mr. Lambert repeats it, showing that he understood the

argument, tho he charged misrepresentation before.

I have not seen the half a dozen different standards of right and wrong, all contradictory, which Mr. Lambert says we have just seen. Have you, Reader? Please look for them, and "when found make a note o't."

Ingersoll. "Is it possible that only those who believe in the God who persecuted for opinion's sake have any standard of right and wrong?"

Lambert. "Only those who believe in the true God, whom you falsely accuse of persecuting, can have the *true* standard of right and wrong. That those who do not believe in him may have *some* standard is evident from the fact that you have laid down *half a dozen* standards, such as they are; and no doubt you could give more if the exigencies of your argument required it. But when Mr. Black spoke of a standard he did not mean India rubber strings. Every man has, or ought to have, some *one* standard by which to regulate his conscience and his acts, but you have half a dozen worthless ones; hence the difficulty of knowing where to find you. Mr. Black's complaint is that you have no standard that holds you, or that prevents you from acting like the little joker in the game of thimble —now you see it, and now you don't."

Ingersoll. "Were the greatest men of antiquity without this standard?"

Lambert. "Which standard? Do you refer to the *true* standard, or to *some* standard? These great men had a standard—the will of the gods. They thus recognized a very important truth; namely, that the standard of morals should be a *will* superior to the human will. They erred in *locating* this superior or supreme will, but they recognized its necessity *somewhere*. In doing this these great men paid a magnificent tribute to the true God and to human reason. These great men whose genius the world honors were too great to be Atheists. They believed in the existence of God, and failed only to *identify* him and understand his nature. They honored the true God, when by mistake they accepted the false one, as you would honor a genuine United States bond by accepting a counterfeit thro ignorance. They had, then, a standard of right and wrong, and altho it was not the true one, yet they were consistent and held themselves amenable to it in their lives and in their logic. Their philosophy and theology began where yours end. It is your misfortune that you never studied them profoundly, as they deserve to be studied, for they were giants, these men of old."

Comment. What has become of Mr. Lambert's

yardstick? He had it when he began, but dropped it out of sight while he was comparing Ingersoll to the little joker—"now you see it, and now you don't." (He knew what game he was playing, and knew Ingersoll was not present.) Here he contents himself with any standard—even that of the will of the gods. Does he admit more than one standard for those who accept many gods, or can he imagine a composite of Bacchus, Juno, Jove, Mars, Ceres, etc.? [The lady gods go with the others.] No; that would be impossible, for then there would no longer be gods, but one god. Remembering what he said about the treason of worshiping other gods than Jehovah it looks to me as if he were giving aid and comfort in large quantities to traitors, and the penalty is death. He picks up his yardstick again and informs us those great man had his God, but didn't know him; but again loses it when he comes to the very strange idea (for him) that they honor the true God by worshiping a false one by mistake, and still keeps it out of sight while he goes on to the effect that tho the great men's yardstick was not the true one, they stuck to it anyhow, and were giants whose acquaintance Ingersoll, unfortunately for him, did not make.

Ingersoll. "In the eyes of the intelligent men

of Greece and Rome, were all deeds, whether good or evil morally alike?"

Lambert. "No, sir. As we have seen they had a standard—the will of the gods—and therefore all deeds were not, in their eyes, morally alike. Their standard, not being a true one, did not enable them to correctly distinguish right and wrong. In this their standard was superior to any you have advanced; for your denial of God destroys all difference between right and wrong, and leaves the words crime and virtue without a meaning."

Comment. In short, Greeks, Romans, and Ingersolls do not any of them know any difference between right and wrong; the Greeks and Romans being incapacitated by having too many gods, and Ingersoll by not having enough. A large number of false gods are preferable to no god. Mr. Lambert does not appear to use his yardstick any more; just above he thought the false gods could be made to cover the deficiency if people kept a tight hold on them; but now he thinks they are inadequate tho they do show those who worship them that there *is* a right and wrong. It does not seem as if it would be of any use to know there are such things if you can't tell them apart, and this Mr. Lambert tells us they cannot do. If they cannot distinguish right from wrong, they would be just as likely to choose one as the other; it would all

depend on chance. I don't see why he thinks Ingersoll has not the same chance. What follows does not shed any light on the subject. It is introduced only for the sake of euphony, but I want you to see it.

Lambert. "These men of Greece and Rome were not so stupid as to believe your theory that consequences determine the nature of actions. They never stole the truths, beauties and magnificent results of the Christian religion and tried to make believe they were the fruits of Paganism, as modern Infidels try to make it appear that those magnificent results are the fruits of reason and experience. These intelligent men of Greece and Rome had their faults, but they were not given to that kind of lying."

Comment. Let us have an extract from Epictetus to take away the bad taste: "Mind, knowledge, right reason—here seek the essence of goodness."

Civilization is claimed as the result of Christianity, but that claim is not sustained by history. Christians now often speak of morality as religion and many accept it as such on account of the label. The power of wealth and social and political influence in the churches enables them to keep up a certain sentiment of refinement which does not belong to bare religion itself. Many people forget that it is a system of belief and worship; and that

its organization is kept up at great expense for the perpetuation of that belief and worship. Many lose sight of the fact that it does not stand on its own merits. It is the habit of the masses to consent to an established custom, and defer to a powerful organization. The church has the advantage of the support of the State in many ways. This means, of course, the people are compelled to help support it by means of taxation. The State will do this as long as the church demands it, and the people make no organized or general objection felt by politicians. It is astonishing to hear the supporters of the church argue that Christianity could not stand if left to the voluntary support of its adherents. This is admitting much more than Infidels could expect from any taxation reform.

Ingersoll. "Is it necessary to believe in the existence of an infinite intelligence, before you have any standard of right and wrong?"

Lambert. "Yes. Deny the infinite intelligence or God, and all deeds are morally alike; there is no right, no wrong, and of course no distinction between them." (He keeps the yardstick where he can use it or not, as he pleases.) "Where there is no right nor wrong, there can be no standard of right and wrong. Where there is no standard there cannot be any standard." (This gem is worth keeping. How much longer does it take to get up

sentences like these than when there are ideas in them?) "It will not do to say that Christians admit a difference between right and wrong, for they do not admit it, if there is no God; on the contrary, they deny it." (There is an idea, tho it is a queer one.)

Ingersoll. "Is it possible that a being cannot be just and virtuous unless he believes in some being infinitely superior to himself? If this doctrine be true, how can God be just and virtuous? Does he believe in some being infinitely superior to himself?"

Mr. Lambert cuts these three sentences apart, denies the first one; calls it a trick; says every *finite* being must believe, etc.; answers the others as if they were made ridiculous by his answer to the first one; says to the second that it supposes Ingersoll had caught a gudgeon; reproaches him for an unworthy play upon words, and says: "God is just *because* he is *justice*; and justice and virtue are justice and virtue because He is, and without Him, there is neither justice and virtue, nor anything else. I merely indicate here Christian principles; to enter into a discussion of their metaphysical basis with you would be to degrade a magnificent science, of which you manifest an ignorance which is only commensurate with your brazen egotism." He answers the third question,

"It is not at all necessary. After the trickery of your former question there is not timber enough in this last one to nail an answer to."

Comment. Separating the sentences does somewhat interfere with the clearness of the logical effect, and commenting on the first one in the way he did gave him the chance of making it appear to careless readers in his comments on the other sentences as if he had answered the first, tho he did not. He merely excepts God from the rule without showing any reason for the exception. Saying God is infinite is not a reason. Then he builds his argument in the answers to the other sentences on the false assumption that he had answered the first one.

When trying to hide the fact that he cannot answer he often insists on definitions. There would be some reason in asking him what he means by "play upon words," he uses the phrase so much at random. Ingersoll's second question follows the preceding one naturally leading to the conclusion of the argument, and nothing like a play upon words appears.

Ingersoll. "If there is a God, infinite in power and wisdom, above him, poised in eternal calm, is the figure of Justice."

Lambert. In answer to this he tells Mr. Ingersoll that it is not pleasant to talk to him; that he

has no idea of God; he is "too intellectually blind to see that to place an *abstraction* called *justice* above God is to destroy God." [Abstraction has been drawn so often that the Rev. Mr. Lambert is nearly driven to distraction. Let the pile of words be turned over and shaken up.] "Justice has no existence of its own, aside from that which is just, justice is a pure abstraction." He says justice to exist must exist as a quality, or mode or form of something; it can't live by itself.

Comment. The writer of the "Notes" seems to be in a position similar to that in which he imagines the Pagan philosophers regarding right and wrong. He knows there is such a thing as Justice, but does not know it when he sees it. Not going into enumerations of the different ways in which the word can come in different subjects, nor analysis of subjects in which the word occurs, nor giving all the definitions, I should say Justice *is* a quality; it does not exist as a quality in the sense of appearing as something else. If I were a Pagan I might say, Justice, oh beautiful Goddess! keep my life pure! Do not allow me to contract the disease of the false witness, or a tergiversator while reviewing the book of a finite mortal! O sweet Goddess! I fear I am not immune to the sin of trifling. Help thou me!

Ingersoll wrote for the purpose of expressing

ideas, and knew everyone would know what he meant by Justice.

Ingersoll. "There is no world, no star, no heaven, no hell, in which gratitude is not a virtue, and where slavery is not a crime."

Mr. Lambert admonishes Ingersoll to confine himself to this world; says he is going to hold him to his standard of right and wrong; as long as he is "bound by that standard, your talk about virtue and crime is unmitigated hypocrisy; for until the consequences of acts are known, there is no difference between virtue and crime."

Comment. So much iteration will put readers to sleep. This must be hurried on to the end as fast as possible.

Ingersoll. "I have insisted, and I still insist, that it is impossible for a finite man to commit a crime deserving infinite punishment."

Lambert. "A little more reason and a little less assertion would be more becoming in a philosopher."

Comment. I do not know why he begins in this blustering way, for he goes on with a copious flow of words to point out that Christians all agree with Ingersoll. But down the page he remarks, "But you had a purpose and a meaning in your statement." [How strange that one should write with purpose and meaning!]

With a great show of asperity he charges Ingersoll with juggling words to bring in another very different idea. It turns out that Ingersoll has done a very shocking thing. He said *infinite* when he should have said *everlasting* punishment. [Let Mr. Lambert have everlasting punishment, by all means, if he prefers it.]

He says because Ingersoll said infinite his "whole argument on this point collapses like a punctured balloon." He repeats, man is capable of receiving everlasting, but not infinite punishment.

Ingersoll. "Of the supernatural we have no conception."

Lambert. Then how can you say anything about it? To admit this after writing your article "is to advertise yourself a thotless gabbler." In his usual prolix style he argues that no one can think or talk of that of which he has no conception, and so it is not surprising that he said wonderful and curious things in his argument with Mr. Black:

Comment. We may think and talk on the supernatural even if we do not believe in it. Mr. Lambert may have no conception of Ingersoll's creed of science, but may express his ideas about it.

Ingersoll. "Mr. Black takes the ground that if

a man believes in the creation of the universe . . . he has no right to deny anything."

Lambert. "This is mere trifling, and shows what an Infidel philosopher is capable of when put to the stretch. There is not a word of truth in what you say, and *you knew it when you said it*. Mr. Black takes no such ground as you, in utter disregard of the obligations of veracity, attributed to him."

Comment. Mr. Ingersoll did not give a direct quotation. He gave the substance of the same thing. You may find it on pages 56-57 of the Ingersoll-Black debate.

Ingersoll. "We should remember that ignorance is the mother of credulity; that the early Christians believed everything but the truth, and that they accepted Paganism, admitted the reality of all the Pagan miracles—taking the ground that they were all forerunners of their own. Pagan miracles were never denied by the Christian world till late in the seventeenth century. Voltaire was the third man of note in Europe who denied the truth of Greek and Roman mythology. 'The early Christians cited Pagan oracles predicting in detail the sufferings of Christ. They forged prophecies, and attributed them to heathen sibyls, and they were accepted as genuine by the entire church.'"

[Taking part of the first sentence of this para-

graph, "We should remember . . . that the early Christians believed everything but the truth, and that they accepted Paganism, admitted the reality of the Pagan miracles," for his text, Mr. Lambert concludes the "Notes" thus]

Lambert. "In making and printing this statement you lose all claim to respectful consideration. We must brand it in the whole and in all its parts as a falsehood, and he who made it is ignorant or malicious or both. And yet this falsifier talks glibly of 'honesty' and 'honor bright'! *We charge* Mr. Ingersoll with *falsehood* in making the above statement. We call on him to verify it, or stand as a convicted falsifier. A falsifier cannot be trusted; his glib talk of honesty and virtue must be looked upon as a snare, like that of the profligate who talks of virtue to his intended victim. We can respect an enemy, but when we find deceit and falsehood in his methods, we relegate him to that disreputable class which affords remunerative employment to detectives and policemen. A falsifier is a manufacturer of base coin, a counterfeiter, a fraud.

"We here conclude these notes, believing we have accomplished what we undertook to do. We have said enough to convince our readers that Mr. Ingersoll is profligate of statement; that he is not to be trusted; that he is unscrupulous; that as a

logician and metaphysician he is beneath contempt; that he is a mere galvanizer of old objections long ago refuted; that he is ignorant and superficial—full of gas and gush; in a word, that he is a charlatan of the first water, who mistakes curious listeners for disciples and applause for approval.

"Of course we do not expect him to reply to us, and for several reasons. First, he will not want to; second, he cannot; third, he can pretend not to notice an obscure country pastor. Very well. Then let some of his disciples or admirers try to rehabilitate his smirched character. We hold ourselves responsible to him, and to all the glib little whiffets of his shallow school."

Comment. Anyone who has read the other pages of this attempt to correct Lambert's presentation of Ingersoll, will see that it is not necessary to use any more time on these pages. He presents the usual charges of "deceit," "falsehood" and "glib talk" which have been exposed before.

This view has been very imperfectly presented. It is impossible for me to place the author of the "Notes" and the subject of his criticism before you as plain as I hoped to make them, because I have not been able to avoid the appearance of a dialog between Ingersoll and Lambert, which is occasionally interrupted by my comments. But a dialog of this kind could never have taken place. Please

remember that Mr. Lambert selected sentences and parts of sentences as he pleased, put them where he pleased, and put on them any construction he pleased. Ingersoll neither heard him nor answered him, and he did not answer Ingersoll; he only tried to make people think he scorned him.

Altho Ingersoll did not notice Mr. Lambert, we have in book form his debates with Mr. Gladstone, Judge Black, Rev. Henry M. Field, and the great controversy which followed the famous Christmas sermon.

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